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Note om layout for del 2 og del 3:

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- Noen enkle figurer og illustrasjoner er sletta
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2. Consciousness, Self and Social Encounters

In this chapter I shall seek to fulfil several objectives. First of all, I shall discuss some basic conceptual problems posed by connecting the main concepts of structuration theory to an interpretation of the nature of the unconscious. This turns upon questions of how the self, especially the 'I' of the reflexive agent, should best be conceptualized. I shall then move on to a portrayal of how the psychological foundations of the interweaving of conscious and unconscious can be represented, utilizing in particular the writings of Erikson. But it will be a major part of my argument that such a portrayal immediately raises questions of a social nature to do with the routinized character of day-to-day life. Via an analysis of 'critical situations', in which routines are radically disrupted, I shall try to indicate how the reflexive monitoring of encounters in circumstances of co-presence ordinarily co-ordinates with unconscious components of personality. This will lead directly through to an examination of some of the insights which can be drawn from Goffman about interaction between co-present agents. Concern with the body, as the locus of the acting self and as positioned in time-space, is the key linking theme of the material discussed and analysed.

Reflexivity, Discursive and Practical Consciousness

Freud divides the psychic organization of the individual into three divisions represented in English by the unfortunate terms 'id', 'ego' and 'super-ego'. I do not believe these terms are particularly useful and shall instead substitute the threefold division suggested in the stratification model: basic security system, practical and discursive consciousness. I do not mean

these to parallel the Freudian notions directly. The intersecting planes of the interpretative schemes and norms which actors utilize in the constitution of their conduct are embedded in all three dimensions of personality. But certainly the 'I' *(das Ich)* is at the core of what is involved in discursive consciousness and demands considerable attention conceptually. We can approach the issues involved by tracing some of the difficulties posed by Freud's division of the personality, especially in so far as these bear upon problems of agency.'*

Freud, of course, regarded the individual as an agent but also often spoke of the id, ego and super-ego as agencies within the individual. In his writings prior to the 1920s Freud frequently used the term *das Ich* to refer to the whole person, as well as to designate a part of the mind. These shifts of usage also apply to 'super-ego', sometimes differentiated from another notion, that of 'ego-ideal'. Terminological inconsistencies and transitions seem to indicate here some rather more significant conceptual troubles. Suppose *das Ich* is a subdivision of mind. How can Freud then say such things as that the ego 'decides on the repudiation of the incompatible idea' ?[2] Is the ego's deciding some sort of process in miniature of the agent's deciding? This, surely, does not make much sense. Freud also writes, for example, of the ego's 'wish to sleep', although while sleep occurs it 'stays on duty' to protect against the worst emanations of the unconscious, 'guarding' the sleep of the dreamer. The same sort of questions arise. Whose sleep is it that the ego desires? The agent's? Its own? Whose waking does the 'guard' protect? And so on. Consider, finally, Freud's most general characterization of the tasks of the ego. The ego has the task of 'self-preservation', which it executes 'by learning to bring about changes in the external world to its own advantage'.' But which 'self' does the ego defend? Is its advantage also my advantage?

Now one traditional tactic among interpreters of Freud is to accept that there are misleading anthropomorphic usages in Freud's writings, but to claim that these can be dispelled if we understand id, ego and super-ego as referring to 'processes' or 'forces'. But this

is not really very much help, for such concepts do not allow us properly to grasp the nature of human agency.

((footnote))

*References may be found on pp. 105-9.

Freud, of course, does himself speak of hydraulic flows, blockages of energy and so on. But these then conjure up the sort of mechanical conception of the origins of human conduct associated with the most naive forms of objectivism. Part of the problem is the use of the terms ego, super-ego and id (whether in their original German formulation or in their English version), each of which has some connotation of agency; each is a miniagent within the agent as such. Discarding the terms 'id' and 'super-ego' helps, but this has to be complemented by recognition of the distinctive character of *das Ich,* the 'I'.

We might suppose that the 'I' is the agent. However, this is surely mistaken, even though it figures as the central assumption or proposition of whole schools of philosophy, including Cartesianism and the latter-day philosophy of G. H. Mead. Mead's writings certainly help to elucidate the processes leading to the emergence of a 'self' as a 'me'. But the 'I' appears in Mead's writings as the given core of agency, and its origins hence always remain obscure. To relate the 'I' to agency, it is necessary to follow the detour suggested by structuralists in respect of the decentring of the subject, without reaching conclusions which treat the subject simply as a sign within a signification structure. The constitution of the 'I' comes about only via the 'discourse of the Other' - that is, through the acquisition of language - but the 'I' has to be related to the body as the sphere of action. The term Tis in linguistic terms a 'shifter': the contextuality of social 'positioning' determines who is an 'I' in any situation of talk. Although we might tend to think of 'I' as bearing upon the richest and most intimate aspects of our experience, it is in a way one of the emptiest terms in language.4 For the 'I' refers only to who is speaking, the 'subject' of a sentence or utterance. An agent

who has mastered the use of 'I', as Mead says, has also mastered the use of 'me' - but only via concomitant mastery of a syntactically differentiated language. For I have to know that I am an 'I' when I speak to 'you', but that you are an 'I' when you speak to 'me', and that I am a 'you' when you speak to me .... and so on. The point is not just that these usages presume linguistic skills of a very complicated kind but also that they entail a ramified control of the body and a developed knowledge of how to 'go on' in the plurality of contexts of social life.

Recognition of the essential importance of the reflexive

monitoring of conduct in the day-to-day continuity of social life does not mean disavowing the significance of unconscious sources of cognition and motivation. But it does involve giving some attention to the differentiation which separates 'conscious' from 'unconscious'.

Ordinary English usage gives us at least a general guide to this. Sometimes we speak of consciousness as equivalent to what might be called 'sensibility'.' Thus someone who falls asleep or is knocked over the head 'lapses into unconsciousness' or is 'rendered unconscious'. 'Unconscious' here means something different from its orthodox Freudian usage, and the 'consciousness' with which it is contrasted has a very broad sense. To be 'conscious' in this meaning is to register a range of surrounding stimuli. There is nothing specifically reflexive about consciousness understood in this way. The sense in which human beings 'lose' and 'regain' consciousness is directly applicable to the higher animals also. This notion of consciousness evidently refers to the sensory mechanisms of the body and to their 'normal' modes of operation and is presupposed by the concepts of both practical and discursive consciousness.

'Conscious' is sometimes used to refer to circumstances in which people pay attention to events going on around them in such a way as to relate their activity to those events. In other words, it refers to the reflexive monitoring of conduct by human agents, largely in the sense of what I have called practical consciousness. Thus, for example, a school teacher may be 'conscious' of what the children in the front rows of the classroom are doing but 'unconscious' of others near the back who have started gossiping with one another. The teacher may be being inattentive, but is not unconscious in the same sense as an individual who has 'lost consciousness'. If this sense of 'conscious' has its counterpart among animals, it is not as unambiguously defined as in the more elemental sense of consciousness noted above. A third sense of 'conscious', labelled by Toulmin 'articulateness', corresponds roughly to discursive consciousness.' To use Toulmin's example, a businessman who obtains money on false pretences from a client can be said to have engaged in 'conscious and deliberate fraud'. On the other hand, if

the same consequence follows quite inadvertently from the activities of the businessman, without his being aware of it, he 'unconsciously'

becomes the instrument of the other's financial discomfiture. Here the agent has to 'think' about what he or she is doing for that activity to be carried out 'consciously'. 'Consciousness' in this sense presumes being able -to give a coherent account of one's activities and the reasons for them.

The Unconscious, Time, Memory

It is clear that the psychoanalytic sense of 'unconscious' has something to do with a contrast drawn between it and this third meaning of 'conscious', a contrast with what I have termed discursive consciousness. Discursive consciousness means being able to put things into words. The 'unconscious' in psychoanalytic theory has reference to the opposite of this - not being able to give verbal expression to the promptings of action.

To further explicate the notion of 'unconscious' as 'the unconscious', however, it is necessary to make some comments on memory, since memory and language are patently very close. I propose to argue that 'the unconscious' can be understood only in terms of memory and that this in turn means examining rather carefully what memory is. Here all the issues of theorizing temporality whose significance I have insisted upon before reappear.

(1) Prima facie, one might suppose that memory refers simply to the past - to past experiences, traces of which somehow remain in the organism. Action then occurs in the spatiality of the present, drawing upon memories of the past whenever such are needed or desired. A moment's reflection will demonstrate the inadequacy of such a view. 'Present' cannot be

said or written without its fading into the past. If time is not a succession of 'presents' but 'presencing' in the sense attributed to this by Heidegger, then memory is an aspect of presencing.

(2) One might imagine that memory is above all a recall device - a mode of retrieving information or 'remembering'. Such a view is quite consistent with the idea that the past is clearly severed from the present because memory can then be seen as the recall of the past into the present. But once we discard such a standpoint, it is no longer plausible to define memory

as the remembrance of things past. Proust's title should surely be read as an ironic comment on just this type of naive conception. Recall is obviously not irrelevant to memory, but it does not designate what memory is.

These observations indicate that memory and perception are very closely linked. It is of some interest to point out that theories of perception tend to divide around an axis of subjectivism versus objectivism. One type of standpoint tends to emphasize, in quasiKantian fashion, the role of the perceiver as the processor of what would otherwise be a formless void.' An opposing view holds that perception is organized by the pre-given form of the object-world.' Attempts to overcome this division have stressed the importance of time, and of spatial differentiation, in perception. Like intentions, reasons, etc., perception is not an aggregate of discrete 'perceptions' but a flow of activity integrated with the movement of the body in time-space. Perception is organized via anticipatory schemata whereby the individual anticipates new incoming information while simultaneously mentally digesting old. Perception normally involves the continued active movement of the eyes, and usually of the head, even when the body is at rest. Because schemata are anticipations, they are, as one author puts it, 'the medium whereby the past affects the future', which is 'identical with the underlying mechanisms of memory'.' It may very well be that touch, ordinarily regarded as the most humble of the senses, and certainly the least studied, provides most clues for understanding perception in general. Touch

has no clear-cut perceptual locus, like the eye; incoming haptic information is not ordered through any single mechanism within the nervous system; the use of touch is self-evidently part of the manipulatory movement of the body in the contexts of its action. A striking feature of most of the literature on perception, moreover, is that it treats the senses as though they operated in separation from one another. It has been observed that virtually all experimental studies of perception have involved only a single sense." That this is artificial is shown by the most cursory examination of the nature of day-to-day life, in which the continuity of activities persistently integrates the various senses.

Perception, then, depends upon spatial and temporal continuity,

actively organized as such by the perceiver. The main point of reference has to be neither the single sense nor the contemplative perceiver but the body in its active engagements with the material and social worlds. Perceptual schemata are neurologically based formats whereby the temporality of experience is continually processed. Such processing may in turn be understood as inherently involved with the reflexive monitoring of action in general. It seems impossible to deny that the new-born infant possesses an innate perceptual equipment. In other words, it has not only the sense organs but also neurologically established schemata that allow it to respond selectively to the surrounding world, even if that selectivity is relatively gross compared with what is developed later. A good deal of evidence exists to the effect that infants respond with

movements of the head towards the direction of sounds, follow moving objects visually and reach out towards them. 'Looking towards sounds', of course, already involves integration of the senses." Neonates already assess this in terms of a time difference between acoustic responses in the two ears, leading to the movement of the head in one direction or the other. Such responses do, of course, become more precise with further psychological and motor development; it takes a long while for children to learn the arts of coping conceptually with objects that have gone out of sight. Naming or identifying objects is evidently not just a matter of attaching a label to phenomena whose qualities are already known. To name something correctly is to be able to talk about it correctly, which means typifying its properties: relating it to a class of comparable objects differentiating it from other classes." In this respect we can see both the attractions and the limitations of Gibson's concept of 'affordance'. According to Gibson, all the uses or activities which objects make possible - which they afford to the human actor - are directly perceivable. Such a view has the advantage of stressing the practical character of perceptual activities, but it does not indicate their connection with conceptual designations of objects, which are likely to be culturally variable.

If perception be understood as a set of temporal ordering devices, shaped by, yet shaping, the movements and orientations of the body in the contexts of its behaviour, we can understand thereby the significance of selective attention in day-to-day

conduct. In every context of activity there is far more going on than the actor actually attends to, events or qualities that remain unnoticed. How does this happen? The usual answer is that redundant material is filtered out. But this is quite misleading, for it suggests an active attempt to reject redundant material. Selection is, however, a positive rather than a negative process; it expresses the active engagements of agents with their environments. Consider the following much debated experiment." Tape recordings of two separate and different spoken messages were played simultaneously to experimental subjects, one in each ear and at equal volume. Subjects were instructed to listen to only one message and to repeat it as they heard it. They experienced no difficulty in doing this and by and large did not 'hear' the alternative message at all. The experimental situation is an interesting one because it mirrors what agents do most of the time when co-present with others in situations where more than one conversation is going on. The experimental results have been widely interpreted in terms of negative information filters." Redundant information, in other words, is supposedly blocked off from reaching the higher cortical centres - definite neural mechanisms have been suggested as controlling such a process. But this type of theory not only treats the individual as essentially a passive receiver of input; it also depends upon an untenable dissociation between perception and memory. For it is supposed that while we perceive everything in our environment at any given moment, much of what is perceived is 'blocked off' - very rapidly 'forgotten'." As Neisser has pointed out, the assumption is that any use of information a few milliseconds after it has been registered is dependent upon memory rather than perception. Such a view is neither conceptually compelling nor empirically plausible. If perception is regarded as what agents do, as part of their temporally and spatially situated activities, there is no need to posit any blocking mechanisms at all.

Organisms are active: they do some things and leave others undone. To pick one apple from a tree you need not filter out all the others; you just don't pick them. A theory of apple picking would have much to explain (How do you decide

which one you want? Guide your hand to it? Grasp it?) but it would not have to specify a mechanism to keep unwanted apples out of your hand. 16

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If the 'present' is not cut off from the flow of action, 'memory' can be nothing other than a way of describing the knowledgeability of human agents. If memory does not designate 'past experience', neither does consciousness (in any of the three senses mentioned above) express the 'present'. What a person is 'aware of' cannot be fixed at a particular point in time. We need to distinguish, therefore, between consciousness as sensory awareness (the first and most general sense of the term mentioned above); memory, as the temporal constitution of consciousness; and recall, as the means of recapitulating past experiences in such a way as to focus them upon the continuity of action. If memory refers to this temporal mastery so inherent in human experience, then discursive and practical consciousness refer to *psychological mechanisms of recall,* as utilized in contexts of action. Discursive consciousness connotes those forms of recall which the actor is able to express verbally. Practical consciousness involves recall to which the agent has access in the *durée* of action without being able to express what he or she thereby 'knows'. The unconscious refers to modes of recall to which the agent does not have direct access because there is a negative 'bar' of some kind inhibiting its unmediated incorporation within the reflexive monitoring of conduct and, more particularly, within discursive consciousness. The origins of the 'bar' are of two related sorts. First, since the earliest experiences of the infant, shaping the basic security system whereby anxiety is canalized or, controlled, predate differentiated linguistic competence, they are likely to remain thereafter 'outside the bounds' of discursive consciousness. Second, the unconscious contains repressions which inhibit discursive formulation.

As a matter of conceptual definition, these remarks are moderately consonant with Freud's characteristic usage of the 'conscious' and 'the unconscious'. But the thesis that most day-today activities are not directly motivated means placing in question the model of

motivation with which Freud characteristically operated. For Freud all human activities are motivated, including (for example) apparent triviata or 'errors' such as slips of the tongue. Freud was often concerned precisely to demonstrate that phenomena which might be supposed to be 'accidental' do, in fact, have their origin in (unconscious) motives. There is no particular reason to question the illuminating quality of Freud's

insights in such matters. But it makes no more sense to claim that every act or gesture is motivated - meaning that a definite 'motive' can be attached to it - than it does to treat action as involving a string of intentions or reasons. There is a logical flaw here in the simplified view of the nature of human action. Action, as I have said often, cannot satisfactorily be conceptualized as an aggregate of acts. Concentrating mainly upon specific demarcated 'segments' of behaviour (neurotic symptoms), Freud's writings inevitably tend to express such a deficient conception of action. But rather than supposing that every 'act' has a corresponding 'motive', we have to understand the term 'motivation' to be a processual one. What this means concretely is that the unconscious only rarely impinges directly upon the reflexive monitoring of conduct. Nor are the connections involved solely dependent upon psychological mechanisms within the personality of the individual actor; they are mediated by the social relations which individuals sustain in the routine practices of their daily lives.

Elaborating a little on this point provides something of a transition between the discussion so far in this chapter and that which follows later. The main theorems I wish to propose run as follows. Ordinary day-to-day life - in greater or less degree according to context and the vagaries of individual personality -involves an *ontological security* expressing an *autonomy of bodily control* within *predictable routines.* The psychological origins of ontological security are to be found in basic anxiety-controlling mechanisms (as indicated by Erikson, whose ideas I discuss in what follows), hierarchically ordered as components of personality. The generation of feelings of trust in others, as the deepestlying element of the basic security system, depends substantially upon predictable and caring routines established by parental figures. The infant is very early on both a giver as well as a receiver of trust. As he or she becomes more autonomous, however, the **child** learns the importance of what are in Goffman's term 'protective devices', which sustain the mutuality implied in trust via tact and other formulae that preserve the face of others. Ontological security is protected by such devices but maintained in a more fundamental way by the very predictability of routine, something which is

radically disrupted in critical situations. The swamping of habitual modes of activity by anxiety which cannot

be adequately contained by the basic security system is specifically a feature of critical situations.

Criticizing Freud's terminology of agency and self carries with it several implications. The 'I' is an essential feature of the reflexive monitoring of action but should be identified neither with the agent nor with the self. By the 'agent' or 'actor' I mean the overall human subject located within the corporeal timespace of the living organism. The 'I' has no image, as the self does. The self, however, is not some kind of mini-agency within the agent. It is the sum of those forms of recall whereby the agent reflexively characterizes 'what' is at the origin of his or her action. The self is the agent as characterized by the agent. Self, body and memory are therefore intimately related.

Erikson: Anxiety and Trust

Theories which give prominence to unconscious elements of human behaviour often tend to go along with objectivist perspectives. It is not too difficult to see why. For objectivism, like many accounts of the unconscious, treats the reflexive monitoring of action as mere froth on the surface of human activity, whose true origins lie elsewhere. In setting out an account of (a few features of) the unconscious and social relations, I shall not follow those versions of structuralist psychoanalysis, associated particularly with Lacan, that are currently fashionable in some quarters. Although Lacan's writings undeniably contain some ideas of great interest, in my opinion they express an impoverished conception of the agent similar to that generated by 'structuralist Marxism'." Lacan has been one of the figures in the forefront of the attacks upon the work of the so-called 'ego psychologists' within psychoanalysis. These polemics have been in substantial degree successful, since the work of Sullivan, Homey, Erikson, Kardiner and others now lies under

something of a shadow. I consider that some of the contributions of these authors, however, retain a very considerable importance and shall draw upon them in some part here.

Critiques, 'revisionisms' and self-professed 'orthodoxies' have been as prolific in psychoanalytic theory since the early years of this century as they have been within Marxism. The ego psychologists, however, have been associated with two principal

lines of development as regards the 'classical' formulations of psychoanalysis in Freud's writings. On the one hand, they have taken up the perspective fostered by Anna Freud. That is to say, they have argued that Freud's preoccupation with repression and the unconscious led him to underplay the more cognitive, rational components of the agent. On the other hand, they have been influenced by the writings of social analysts, especially anthropologists, which demonstrate the sheer diversity of human modes of social life. Freud's cultural writings - however much they may retain their importance in some ways - were essentially bound up with the evolutionism of nineteenth-century anthropology. Being aware of this diversity means also acknowledging the variety of different forms of family organization, and hence of early socialization, that exist. Recognition of these two sets of factors, taken together, means making substantial departures from more traditional views of psychoanalytic theory, although it does not entail adopting a full-blown cultural relativism; there are processes of child development and adult personality common to all human societies. Erikson expresses this in *Childhood and Society* in the following way:

> Psychoanalysis today is implementing the study of the ego .... It is shifting its emphasis from the concentrated study of the conditions which blunt and distort the individual ego to the study of the ego's roots in social organization . ... Long childhood makes a technical and mental virtuoso out of man, but it also leaves a lifelong residue of emotional immaturity in him."

Erikson, together with Sullivan, are perhaps the two outstanding figures among those writers who have preserved certain universal elements of Freud's original account of the stages of psychosexual development, while at the same time adopting contributions from the social sciences. I shall draw - although sparingly and critically - upon their ideas in what follows. On the basis of both his clinical work and the study of a range of cultures, Erikson has distinguished a series of stages of personality development over the period from infancy to adulthood. His discussion of the nature of the motivational inclinations and mental capacities of the infant is

extremely persuasive. But I do not think he brings out sufficiently the essential threshold in child development that derives from the phase of the syntactical mastery of language, a

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transition in the life of the individual, as Chomsky has demonstrated, whose consequences can be fairly readily identified but the origins of which remain tantalizingly obscure.

In all societies the early nurture of the infant is dominated by a single mothering agent, nearly always the biological mother of the child. The initial phases of personality development may be characteristically associated with resolutions of needs or tensions deriving from the physical traits of the organism. But it seems almost certain that Freud squeezed these into too deterministic a scheme, and a more flexible one is required to make sense of variations between and within societies. We may say that the earliest interaction between infant and mother is layered into the development of the 'unconscious': neither 'bodily movement' nor 'bodily control' is very similar to the senses in which they are involved in 'action' in the case of the adult member of society. If we follow Erikson, we can distinguish three successive polarities associated with the transformation of the body into an instrument of acting-in-the-world. The first, and earliest, is that of 'basic trust' versus 'basic mistrust'. The new-born infant is a bundle of impulses, which have certain genetically given homeostatic mechanisms of adjustment, existing in an alien environment; the activities of the mother provide care and protection. 'Trust' (here conceived of as a trait of personality) is understood as psychologically 'binding' time-space by the initial awakening of a sense that absence does not signify desertion. The psychological dyamics underlying the intersection of presence and absence have their point of origin in the body, bodily needs, their modes of satiation and control.

As Erikson comments, 'The infant's first social achievement, then, is his willingness to let the mother out of sight without undue anxiety or rage, because she has become an inner certainty as well as an outer predictability.' Predictability, continuity, sameness, provide 'a rudimentary sense of ego identity which depends... on the

recognition that there is an inner population of remembered and anticipated sensations and images which are firmly correlated with the outer population of familiar and predictable things and people'."
'Trust' here equals confidence, and very early on, Erikson suggests, it has a definite mutuality to it; there is at least an incipient feeling of 'being trustworthy' associated with the generalized extension of trust to the other.

Not, of course, that the initial formation of trust occurs without conflict or strain. On the contrary, it operates against the background of diffuse anxiety, control of which suggests itself as the most generalized motivational origin of human conduct. The interaction between infant and mother embeds the growing human individual in a nexus from which, for better or for worse, there is thereafter no escape. The mother is an agent (already a representative of the 'generalized other') who, in caring for the infant, lays a social claim upon it that presages the normative sanctions associated with the later formation of social relationships. The anxiety of absence is defused through the rewards of co-presence, setting the ground for the dialectic of engagement and disengagement on which the diversity of encounters is based. The expansion of the autonomy of the infant, anchored in control of the body as a medium of action (which undergoes a massive transformation with the mastery of language), simultaneously widens and integrates this dialectic. Each individual has the right - varying in content in manifold ways in different contexts - to maintain a distance from others by preserving bodily privacy and an integrity of self. But the self has to submit to social engagement, given that this is done with proper deference to the tactful recognition of the needs of others. The infant does not yet know this, nor its connection with face. Face, as Becker puts it, is 'the positive feeling of self-warmth turned to the world for others' scrutiny and potential sabotage'."

As the foundation of a tension-management system, the trust/mistrust polarity is organized around relations between projection and introjection as mechanisms of personality. Infantile introjection, as Freud holds, assimilates outer goodness and inner certainty; projection treats an inner harm as external malevolence." Themselves based on identification, these mechanisms become overlain by a variety of more mature psychic forms. But they come to the fore again in situations of extreme threat or crisis. The physical maturation of the body subsequently sets the stage for the transition to a new phase of development. Erikson suggests that this is not best understood in terms of a shift between pleasure zones on the surface of the body, as Freud holds, although fixations may become centred on these. 'Holding on' and 'letting go' are obviously

applicable to control of the waste products of the body but are expressed in a much more

generic way through the hands and arms. Holding on and letting go are the behavioural correlates of the main polarity on which this stage is centred, autonomy versus doubt or shame. As with the prior phase, with which it can stand in a relation of generalized tension, the polarity can be resolved in a relatively benign or more disruptive way. To hold on as a greedy mode of retention can represent a cruel self-absorption or can be a pattern of care expressing autonomy. Letting go can similarly be a hostile expression of aggressive impulses or a more relaxed attitude to 'letting things pass'. It seems important to emphasize the significance of the psychodynamics of shame as contrasted with guilt. Many psychoanalysts, following hints given by Freud, have treated shame as specifically connected to fear of genital exposure. This certainly helps to indicate one aspect of anxiety, about bodily 'appearance', which (as will shortly be indicated) Goffman shows to be so important. But the phenomenon of shame is surely much more pervasive than Freud's comments would lead us to believe."

The prevalence of feelings of shame or self-doubt is indicated by the frequency with which being 'ashamed' and comparable terms ('mortified', 'humiliated', etc.) appear in ordinary talk. The idea, suggested by some writers, that guilt is 'private' while shame is 'public' seems difficult to sustain. Shame bites at the roots of self-esteem and clearly is closely related to the rather milder experience of 'embarrassment'. Both shame and embarrassment are located psychologically in the intersection of engagement and disengagement, the failure to 'bring off' certain aspects of performance through being 'caught out' in various ways. Unlike 'guilt', 'shame' and 'embarrassment' capture both sides of encounters: that is to say, the latter two terms can be used by the individual about his or her own conduct or that of others. I can be ashamed of myself, of something which I have done, or embarrassed about it. But I can also be ashamed of the conduct of someone else, as well as embarrassed for him or her. Here we seem to detect a difference between the two emotions. To be ashamed of

somebody else's behaviour indicates a tie with that other, signalling a certain recognition of association with, or even responsibility for, the other. To be embarrassed for someone, rather than expressing an alienation from his or her conduct, reveals a certain complicity with it, a sympathy for someone wh

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has been unnecessarily `exposed'.

It is especially interesting, in the light of Goffman's pre-occupation with like happenings, to note that Erikson links shame in the infant (having strong residual traces in the security system of the adult) to bodily posture and to `front' and `back' regions of the body. Here we can see a mode in which Freud's theory of anal retention can be expressed in a much more socialized form. The `front' and `back regions' in which encounters occur, and in the context of which social occasions are staged, perhaps relate directly to the more primal experience of the front/back regionalization of the body. To sustain `front' in social life is to avoid the anxieties provoked by shame, and loss of front leads precisely to shame or embarrassment. For the infant `behind' means `the behind':

> the small being's dark continent, an area of the body which can be magically dominated and effectively invaded by those who would attack one's power of autonomy . . . This stage, therefore, becomes decisive for the ratio of love and hate, co-operation and wilfulness, freedom of self-expression and its suppression. From a sense of self-control without loss of self-esteem comes a lasting sense of good will and pride; from a sense of loss of self-control and of foreign overcontrol comes a lasting propensity for doubt and shame."

The third phase, the one that culminates in, and coincides with, the mastery of syntactically developed language, focalizes a polarity of initiative versus guilt. This is the phase of Oedipal transition which, whatever its obscurities and complexities, appears as a universal crisis phase in human psychological development. So far as the body is concerned, it is marked by the mastery of an upright stance and ambulatory movement in that stance, and by the maturation of infantile genitality. The dramatic potential of this phase for later personality development is given by the conjunction of the demand for repression of early attachment to the mother (in both boys and girls), coupled with the capabilities that become part of this process as it coincides with a vast leap forward in linguistic skills. It is a phase of initiative because the accomplishment of the Oedipal transition allows the child the internal control necessary to venture forth from the immediate confines of the family into peer relationships.

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But this is purchased at the price of repression, which in some individuals and in some circumstances can have crippling costs in forms of anxiety stemming from guilt.

> For here the child becomes forever divided in itself. The instinct fragments which before had enhanced the growth of his infantile body and mind now become divided into an infantile set which perpetuates the exuberance of growth potentials, and a parental set which supports and increases self-observation, self-guidance, and self-punishment."

Put together, the three, phases represent a progressive movement towards autonomy, which should be understood as the foundation of the capability for the reflexive monitoring of conduct. But `autonomy' does not mean the shedding of the anxiety-provoking stimuli or the modes of coping with anxiety which comprise the security system of the adult personality. The motivational components of the infantile and the adult personality derive from a generalized orientation to the avoidance of anxiety and the preservation of self-esteem against the `flooding through' of shame and guilt.

We may presume that the mechanisms of the security system remain on an unconscious level because they are pre-linguistic — although the Oedipal phase is the very time at which the child learns to constitute itself as an `I'.

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modes and psychological mechanisms. If tracing out individual differences were at issue, it would imply thinking through the empty boxes, which would become filled in so far as infantile fixations or modes of regression exert a pervasive influence over the motivation of behaviour.

Research into child development suggests rather strongly that the formation of capabilities for autonomous action meshes closely with understanding others to be agents. Three main steps in the formation of concepts of agency can be distinguished, coinciding with the stages described by Erikson. One is the recognition of what has been called `simple agency' — that others can causally intervene in a sequence of events to as to change them.[25] The infant's awareness that its body is a locus of action goes along with the attribution of like qualities to the bodies of others. At quite an early age infants react differently in their interaction with `agent-like' others, although the aspects of the conduct of such figures to which response is made are relatively simple and clear-cut.[26] Other agents are, however, still treated instrumentally, as a special type of object in the environment, rather than as physically separate beings from the self, who can go away and return. The emotional competence associated with trust seems closely connected with the cognitive understanding of agency as a property of distinct beings. But specifically `human' properties, generalized to human agents rather than attributed to particular parental figures, mark a transition to a third stage.

Vygotsky, among others, has demonstrated the close relation between locomotor skills (the mastery of the body as a locus of action) and the syntactical mastery of language. His work scarcely answers the `Chomskyan problem' — how does the child, relatively suddenly, manage successfully to co-ordinate syntactic structures? — but it does elucidate important aspects of the association of agency and speech. Language use, in differentiated form, depends upon the expansion of the `practical intelligence' of the child — in other words, upon definite aspects of practical consciousness.[27] The development of `practical intelligence' accelerates, it can be suggested, from the period of the resolution of the third phase in Erikson's scheme, since it involves the exploration of the body as a medium of action. But the initial emergence of `practical intelligence' dates from the first exploratory movements of the very young infant; mastery of syntactical speech *converges* with the growth of practical mastery

at the key phase of development. It is striking how closely some of Vygotsky's observations about what to an adult would appear to be a 'dissociation' between speech and conduct resemble those made by Merleau-Ponty in respect of brain-damaged patients (see pp. 65-7). For instance, a child may be able to carry out a fairly complex task only on condition that it verbally describes each movement as it goes along. Children, like many of the 'mentally ill', are not reluctant to talk to themselves in public - a phenomenon which has to be distinguished from Piaget's identification of 'egocentric speech'.

Having appealed to Erikson a good deal, I should perhaps make it clear that my appropriation of some of his ideas is intended to be strictly limited and qualified. I consider the least interesting areas of Erikson's work to be those for which he is probably most famed - to do with the formation of 'ego-identity' and with the importance of developmental stages in personality that stretch up to adolescence and beyond. Erikson is critical of Freud's formulations about the 'ego' and its relations to society." This is partly because of their sociological inadequacies. Freud drew upon highly inadequate sociological texts (such as contemporary discussions of crowd psychology) in his writings. At the same time, psychoanalytic method was based on individual case histories. Between these there is a large gap. No satisfactory account of a differentiated society was worked out by Freud or many of his epigones; 'the concept of social *organization* and its bearing on the individual ego' was 'shunted off by patronizing tributes to the existence of "social factors"'." The concept of the ego was thus established by Freud, Erikson points out, in relation to its opposites in the lawless nature of the crowd and the primeval instincts of the id. In order to try to take account of the embattled moral sensibility of human beings, Freud introduced the super-ego or ego-ideal - also, however, thinking of it in terms primarily of a burden which the ego has to bear. Erikson wants to compensate for this one-sided emphasis. Rather than concentrating upon what is denied to the infant by social organization, we should be concerned also with how the child benefits from it, and we should give greater consideration to the influence of differentiated types of social organization. Erikson's notion of ego-identity is intended to complement the traditionally established psychoanalytic concepts.3°

I am largely in accord with Erikson's critical comments on

Freud. But the term 'ego-identity' is not a satisfactory one. The term 'ego', as I have indicated, does too much conceptual work in psychoanalytic theory. That of 'ego-identity' tends only to compound the confusions that already exist. Even Erikson admits that it has at least four connotations. Sometimes it refers to a 'conscious' sense of individual identity. It can also mean 'an unconscious striving for a continuity of personal character'. A third meaning is 'a criterion for the silent doings of ego synthesis'. A fourth sense is 'a maintenance of an inner solidarity with a group's ideals and identity'." None of these single uses, it might be remarked, is particularly lucid, let alone the concept that embraces them all!

Routinization and Motivation

Rather than employing the concept of ego-identity, in what follows I shall make use of Erikson's ideas of the origins and nature of bodily autonomy and of trust. A sense of trust in the continuity of the object-world and in the fabric of social activity, I shall suggest, depends upon certain specifiable connections between the individual agent and the social contexts through which that agent moves in the course of day-to-day life. If the subject cannot be grasped save through the reflexive constitution of daily activities in social practices, we cannot understand the mechanics of personality apart from the routines of day-to-day life through which the body passes and which the agent produces and reproduces. The concept of *routinization,* as grounded in practical consciousness, is vital to the theory of structuration. Routine is integral both to the continuity of the personality of the agent, as he or she moves along the paths of daily activities, and to the institutions of society, which *are* such only through their continued reproduction. An examination of routinization, I shall claim, provides us with a master key to explicating the characteristic forms of relation between the basic security system on the one hand and the reflexively constituted

processes inherent in the episodic character of encounters on the other.

We can probe the psychological nature of the routine by considering the results of situations where the established modes of accustomed daily life are drastically undermined or shattered - by studying what may be called 'critical situations'. There is a

sense in which critical situations, for specific individuals or clusters of individuals, are themselves built into the regularity of social life by the very nature of the intersection between the life process or 'cycle' of the individual, the *durée* of activity on the one hand and the *ion gue durée* of institutions on the other. These are the crises typically marked by rites of passage, beginning for the individual with birth and terminating in death. However, forming as they do an intrinsic part of the continuity of social life, even though they are discontinuities for individuals, such situations tend themselves to have a definitely routinized character.

By 'critical situations' I mean circumstances of radical disjuncture of an unpredictable kind which affect substantial numbers of individuals, situations that threaten or destroy the certitudes of institutionalized routines. I am concerned at this point not with analysing the social origins of such circumstances but with their psychological consequences, and with what those consequences indicate about the generality of routine social life. Since I have discussed critical situations in a certain amount of detail elsewhere," I shall mention here only one - a famous portrayal of a wholly infamous episode in recent history. This is Bettelheim's discussion in *The In Heart,* a description and analysis of the experiences of the author and others in Dachau and Buchenwald. In the camps, he writes, 'I ... saw fast changes taking place, and not only in behaviour but personality also; incredibly faster and often much more radical changes than any that were possible by psychoanalytic treatment."' The concentration-camp experience was marked not only by confinement but also by extreme disruption of accustomed forms of daily life, deriving from the brutalized conditions of existence, ever-present threat or actuality of violence from the camp guards,

scarcity of food and other elementary provisions for the sustenance of life.

The changes in personality described by Bettelheim -experienced by all prisoners who were interned in the camp over a period of years - followed a certain sequence of stages. The sequence was quite evidently a regressive one. The very process of initial imprisonment was traumatic for most of the inmates. Torn away from family and friends, usually with little or no prior warning, many prisoners were subjected to torture during their transportation to the camps. Those from middle-class or professional backgrounds, who mostly had had no previous

contact with the police or the prison system, experienced the greatest dislocation in the initial stages of transportation and 'initiation' into camp life. According to Betteiheim, the suicides that took place in prison and transportation were confined mainly to this group. The vast majority of new prisoners, however, sought to distance themselves psychologically from the dreadful pressures of camp life and tried to maintain the modes of conduct associated with their previous lives. But this proved impossible to do. The 'initiative' of which Erikson writes as lying at the core of human autonomy of action was very rapidly corroded; the Gestapo in some degree deliberately forced the prisoners to adopt childlike behaviour.

The vast majority of prisoners went through the camp without a public flogging, but the screamed threat that they were going to get twenty-five on the behind rang in their ears several times daily.

Threats like these, and also the curses thrown at prisoners by both the SS and prisoner foremen, were almost exclusively connected with the anal sphere. 'Shit' and 'asshole' were so standard that it was rare when a prisoner was addressed otherwise. 34

The guards exerted strict but wilfully erratic control over toilet, in the sense both of elimination and of general cleanliness. All these activities were carried on in public. The camps destroyed virtually all differentiation between 'front' and 'back regions', making the latter physically and socially a central preoccupation of camp life.

Betteiheim places particular emphasis upon the general unpredictability of events in the camps. The feeling of autonomy of action that individuals have in the ordinary routines of day-today life in orthodox social settings was almost completely dissolved. The 'futural' sense in which the *durée* of social life ordinarily occurs was destroyed by the manifestly contingent character of even the hope that the next day would arrive. The prisoners, in other words, lived in circumstances of radical ontological insecurity: 'it was the

senseless tasks, the lack of almost any time to oneself, the inability to plan ahead because of sudden changes in camp policies, that was so deeply destructive."' Some prisoners became 'walking corpses' *(Muselmänner, socalled) because they surrendered fatalistically to whatever the future might hold. They no longer behaved as though they were*

human agents, avoiding eye contact with others, making only gross movements of the body and shuffling their legs when they walked. These men and women soon died. Only prisoners who managed to maintain some small sphere of control in their daily lives, which they still regarded as their 'own', were able to survive. They preserved, as Bettelheim says, 'the mainstay of a radically reduced but still present humanity'. None the less, they were unable to avoid a range of childlike attitudes, a very marked diminution in time sense, in the capacity to 'think ahead', and volatile mood swings in response to entirely trivial happenings.

All these things refer to the behaviour of prisoners who had been in the camps for no more than a year (which included Bettelheim). The 'old prisoners', those who had survived in the camps for several years, behaved differently. They had lost altogether any orientation to the world outside and had, as it were, reconstituted themselves as agents by integrating themselves into camp life as participants in the very rituals of degradation which, as new prisoners, they had found so offensive. They were often unable to recall names, places and events in their previous lives. The end result, found in most but not all old prisoners, was a reconstructed personality based upon identification with the oppressors themselves, the camp guards. Old prisoners aped the activities of their captors, not merely to curry favour with them but also, Bettelheim suggests, because of an introjection of the normative values of the SS.

How should we interpret these events? The sequence of stages seems fairly clear (although not set out in this way by Bettelheim himself). The disruption and the deliberately sustained attack upon the ordinary routines of life produce a high degree of anxiety, a 'stripping away' of the socialized responses associated with the

security of the management of the body and a predictable framework of social life. Such an upsurge of anxiety is expressed in regressive modes of behaviour, attacking the foundation of the basic security system grounded in trust manifested towards others. Those who are ill-equipped to face these pressures succumb and go under. Some are able to sustain a minimal sphere of control and self-esteem that allows them to survive for a longer period. But eventually, in most of the old prisoners at least, a process of 'resocialization' takes place in which an attitude of trust (limited and highly ambivalent)," involving identification with authority

figures, is re-established. Such a sequence of heightened anxiety, regression, followed by a reconstruction of typical patterns of action, appears in a range of critical situations in otherwise very different contexts, such as responses to being under fire on the battlefield for prolonged periods of time, forced interrogation and torture in prisons and other conditions of extreme stress."

Ordinary day-to-day social life, by contrast - in greater or lesser degree, according to context and the vagaries of individual personality - involves an ontological security founded on an autonomy of bodily control within predictable routines and encounters. The routinized character of the paths along which individuals move in the reversible time of daily life does not just 'happen'. It is 'made to happen' by the modes of reflexive monitoring of action which individuals sustain in circumstances of co-presence. The 'swamping' of habitual modes of activity by anxiety that cannot be adequately contained by the basic security system is specifically a feature of critical situations. In ordinary social life actors have a motivated interest in sustaining the forms of tact and 'repair' which Goffman analyses so acutely. However, this is not because social life is a kind of mutually protective contract into which individuals voluntarily enter, as Goffman on occasion suggests. Tact is a mechanism whereby agents are able to reproduce the conditions of 'trust' or ontological security within which more primal tensions can be canalized and managed. This is why one can say that many of the specific features of dayto-day encounter are not directly motivated. Rather, there is a generalized motivational commitment to the integration of habitual practices across time and space.

Presence, Co-Presence and Social Integration

The routines of day-to-day life are fundamental to even the most elaborate forms of societal organization. In the course of their daily activities individuals encounter each other in situated contexts of interaction - interaction with others who are physically co-present.

The social characteristics of co-presence are anchored in the spatiality of the body, in orientation to others and to the experiencing self. Goffman has devoted considerable care to analysing this phenomenon, particularly with regard to 'face', but

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perhaps the most telling reflections on the matter are to be found in Merleau-Ponty. I shall begin by considering these; they lead us directly into Goffman's observations. The body, Merleau-Ponty points out, does not 'occupy' time-space in exactly the same sense as material objects do. As he puts it, 'The outline of my body is a frontier which ordinary spatial relations do not cross.' 38 This is because the body, and the experience of bodily movement, is the centre of forms of action and awareness which really define its unity. The time-space relations of presence, centred upon the body, are geared into not a 'spatiality of position', in MerleauPonty's words, but a 'spatiality of situation'. The 'here' of the body refers not to a determinate series of coordinates but to the situation of the active body oriented towards its tasks. Much as Heidegger says: 'if my body can be a "form" and if there can be, in front of it, important figures against indifferent backgrounds, this occurs in virtue of its being polarized by its tasks, of its *existence towards* them, of its collecting together of itself in pursuit of its aims; the body image is finally a way of stating that my body is in-the-world.'39

The observations of Goldstein and others on brain-damaged patients provide graphic illustration of how this is so.4° Thus some such individuals are not able to carry out movements which abstract from the visually present *milieu.* A person can point to a part of the body only if he or she is able to watch the movement carried out and actually touch that part of the body. From observations such as these it becomes apparent that, while both are seemingly 'positional' phenomena, 'touching' is not the same as 'pointing'. The difference indicates the importance of bodily space as an extraordinarily complex field of matrices of habitual action. The brain-damaged patient, asked to perform a given movement of the body, assumes a general position of the whole body to carry out the task. It is not cut down, as in the normal individual, to a minimal gesture. Thus, asked to salute, the patient takes up a formal stance of the whole body -

the individual manages to make the gesture only by adopting the generalized situation to which the movement corresponds. The normal individual, by contrast, sees the situation as a test or as play. He or she is, as Merleau-Ponty says, 'using the body as a means to play acting'." It is the dilemma of the patient which provides most insight into the ordinary integration of the body into the

durée of activity. For the body operates, and is understood as a 'body' by its owner, only in the contextualities of action. Wittgenstein's question, 'What is the difference between my raising my arm and my arm going up?', has here created many difficulties, whatever he may have wanted the inquiry to draw our attention to. For it seems to treat as typical just that case of a test or a playful command; and the theory of action then can be taken, misleadingly, to hinge on contrasts between 'movements' and 'actions', as discrete operations, rather than on the timespace contextuality of bodily activity in the flow of daily conduct. Such activity of the body, in the flow of action, is immediately involved in the ontological security or attitude of 'trust' towards the continuity of the world and of self implicated in the *durée* of day-to-day life. For the brain-damaged patient a thorough physical examination of an object is required before it can be identified as, say, a 'key'. Normal individuals would engage in such a scrutiny of an object only in unusual circumstances - where, for example, they were playing a party game in which there were definite reasons to suppose that objects might not be as they appear. The continuity of ordinary life would be impossible were we to attempt to submit all objects to such detailed inspection. From this we see that Garfinkel's 'etcetera clause' applies not just to language or conversation but also to bodily activities in physical relation to the external world. All this is in turn intrinsically involved with time and time-sense. Let me quote again from Merleau-Ponty:

> Whereas in the normal person every event related to movement or sense of touch causes consciousness to put up a host of intentions which run from the body as the centre of potential action either towards the body itself or towards the object, in the case of the patient, on the other hand, the tactile impression remains opaque and sealed *up* .... The normal person *reckons with* the possible, which thus, without shifting from its position as a possibility, acquires a sort of actuality. In the patient's case, however, the field of actuality is limited to what is met with in the shape of a real contact or *is* related to these data by some explicit process of deduction. 42

The body, of course, is not an undifferentiated unity. What Gehien calls the 'eccentric' posture of human beings - standing upright and 'outward' towards the world - is no doubt the result

of biological evolution. We need not transpose biological into a presumptively parallel form of social evolution to see the implications of this for human social processes in circumstances of co-presence. In human beings the face is not simply the proximate physical origin of speech but the dominant area of the body across which the intricacies of experience, feeling and intention are written. In banal but very significant ways the face in human social relationships influences the spacing of individuals in circumstances of co-presence. Positioning 'facing' the other or others who are being addressed assumes a distinctive importance as compared with positioning in most animal societies. The numbers of people who can directly participate in face-to-face encounters is inherently strictly limited, save in those types of situation where one or a few individuals address a crowd or an audience facing them. But such circumstances, of course, demand that those in the crowd or audience sacrifice continuous face-toface contact with one another. The primacy of the face as a medium of expression and of communication has moral implications, many of which are very acutely teased out by Goffman. To turn one's back on another while the other is speaking is in most (perhaps all?) societies a gesture of indifference or contempt. Moreover, most (all?) societies tend to recognize a linguistic similarity between the face as a term referring to physiognomy and face as concerning the maintenance of self-esteem. No doubt there are a range of cultures, such as traditional Chinese culture or sectors of it, which place an especial emphasis upon the preservation of face in most settings. No doubt also this may have something to do with the famous differentiation made by Benedict and others between 'shame' and 'guilt' cultures, even if this differentiation seems to have been drawn much too crudely. But aspects of the preservation and 'saving' of face are almost certainly generic to a whole diversity of transcultural contexts of social encounters.

The twin themes of the control of the body in fields of action in co-presence and the pervasive influence of face are essential to the

whole of Goffman's writings. How should we understand the term 'co-presence'? As Goffman uses it, and as I employ it here also, co-presence is anchored in the perceptual and communicative modalities of the body. What Goffman calls 'the full conditions of co-presence' are found whenever agents 'sense that

they are close enough to be perceived in whatever they are doing, including their experiencing of others, and close enough to be perceived in this sensing of being perceived'." Although the 'full conditions of co-presence' exist only in unmediated contact between those who are physically present, mediated contacts that permit some of the intimacies of co-presence are made possible in the modern era by electronic communications, most notably the telephone.44 In contemporary societies, and in differing formats in other cultures, the space contained in a room - with exceptions, such as parties, in which the whole house may be 'opened up' - ordinarily defines expected boundaries of copresence. Of course, there are many 'public places', in jostling crowds on the streets and so on, in which there is no clear physical circumscribing of the conditions of co-presence.

Goffman: Encounters and Routines

Because Goffman has so persistently devoted himself to analysing the routines of day-to-day life, his writings offer many illuminations about the character of social integration. Several misunderstandings about Goffman's writings need to be countered before these insights can most profitably be developed. He has to be rescued here from the importunate embrace of his admirers. Goffman is often thought of as an idiosyncratic observer of social life, whose sensitivity to the subtleties of what I have called practical and discursive consciousness derives more from a combination of an acute intelligence and a playful style than from a co-ordinated approach to social analysis." This is very misleading and one reason why Goffman has not generally been recognized as a social theorist of considerable stature. I want to say, in any case, that Goffman's writings have a highly systematic character, and this is in no small degree what gives them their intellectual power. Another misunderstanding, which Goffman himself has hardly been concerned to forestall, is that his writings are relevant only to a form of 'microsociology', which can be cleanly severed from 'macrosociological' issues. A much more interesting way to

approach Goffman's works is treat them as being concerned to map out the intersections of presence and absence in social interaction. The mechanisms of social and system integration, to repeat, necessarily interlace with one

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another. Goffman's writings are certainly relevant to both, even if he has had a guarded stance towards problems of long-term institutional process or development.

Finally, it is frequently supposed that not only are Goffman's writings confined in their relevance to contemporary societies but they directly express features of conduct which are peculiarly modern, even distinctively American. Thus Gouldner, commenting upon Goffman's work, says:

> it dwells upon the episodic and sees life only as it is lived in a narrow interpersonal circumference, ahistorical and non-institutional, an existence beyond history and society .... lIti reflects the new world, in which a stratum of the new middle class no longer believes that hard work is useful or that success depends upon diligent application. In this new world there is a keen sense of the irrationality of the relationship between individual achievement and the magnitude of reward, between actual contribution and social regulation. It is the world of the high-priced Hollywood star and of the market for stocks, whose prices bear little relation to their earnings. 46

Gouldner explicitly contrasts this standpoint with what he calls a 'structural' approach, to the detriment of the former. The social world Goffman portrays is not simply highly culturally specific but deals only with the transient, not with the enduring institutional forms that mould people's lives. One could not say that such an indictment of Goffman - in so far as it is an indictment - is wholly unjustified. But Gouldner's critique also reveals once more just that dualism which I have previously suggested is so pervasive in the social sciences. The fixity of institutional forms does not exist in

spite of, or outside, the encounters of day-to-day life but *is implicated in those very encounters.*

The evanescence of encounters expresses the temporality of the *durée* of daily life and the contingent character of all structuration. But Goffman makes a very persuasive case for arguing that the 'fading away' inherent in the syntagmatic ordering of social interaction is consistent with a very marked fixity of form in social reproduction. Although he does not, to my knowledge, anywhere claim this, I think that his writings disclose features of co-presence that are found in all societies, however

relevant those same writings indeed may be to identifying novel characteristics of the contemporary era. Goffman's work holds up a mirror to many worlds, not just to one. In using ideas formulated therein, nevertheless, I do not want to endorse all of Goffman's own emphases.

Goffman's writings comprise a major contribution to an exploration of the relations between discursive and practical consciousness in the contexts of encounters. However, he has little to say about the unconscious and may, indeed, reject the idea that such a phenomenon has any importance at all in social life. Moreover, Goffman's analyses of encounters presume motivated agents rather than investigating the sources of human motivation, as many of his critics have complained. The lack is a serious one and one of the main reasons (the other being a disinterest in long-term processes of institutional transformation) why Goffman's work has something of an 'empty' feel to it. For why do the agents whose reflective monitoring of conduct is described with so much subtlety follow the routines that they do? The question could be answered, up to a point, if it were the case that the individuals portrayed by Goffman were represented in a voluntaristic fashion as cynical agents who adapt to given social circumstances in a purely calculated and tactical way. But although many have interpreted Goffman in such a fashion, this is not the main implication which I wish to draw from the terrain of study which he has opened up. A stress upon the prevalence of tact in social encounters, the repair of strains in the social fabric and the sustaining of 'trust' suggest, rather, a predominant concern with the protection of social continuity, with the intimate mechanics of social reproduction.

Goffman develops a typology of the contours of interaction, and I shall employ several of his concepts, modifying them somewhat, in what follows. The range of concepts can be set out as follows:

(co-presence]
gatherings social
occasions

unfocused
interaction
focused
interaction:

encounters (face engagements)

routines (episodes)

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Gatherings refer to assemblages of people comprising two or more persons in contexts of co-presence. By the term 'context' (Goffman prefers that of 'situation') I mean those 'bands' or 'strips' of time-space within which gatherings take place. Anyone entering such a band of time-space makes himself or herself 'available' for moving into that gathering or may actually form it if it is dyadic in character. Gatherings presume the mutual reflective monitoring of conduct in and through co-presence. The contextuality of gatherings is vital, in a very intimate and integral fashion, to such processes of monitoring. Context includes the physical environment of interaction but is not something merely 'in which' interaction occurs (see pp. 118). Aspects of context, including the temporal order of gestures and talk, are routinely drawn upon by actors in constituting communication. The importance of this for the formulation of 'meaning' in gestures and in talk, as Garfinkel has done more than anyone else to elucidate, can scarcely be exaggerated .41 Thus linguists have very often sought to analyse semantic problems either in terms of the 'internal' linguistic competence of individual speakers or by examining the properties of isolated speech acts. But the 'closure of meaning' of the polyvalent terminologies of everyday language achieved in discourse can be grasped only by studying the contextual ordering of whole conversations.

Gatherings may have a very loose and transitory form, such as that of a fleeting exchange of 'friendly glances' or greetings in a hallway. More formalized contexts in which gatherings occur can be called social occasions. Social occasions are gatherings which involve a plurality of individuals. They are typically rather clearly

bounded in time and space and often employ special forms of fixed equipment - formalized arrangements of tables and chairs and so on. A social occasion provides the 'structuring social context' (Goffman's term) in which many gatherings 'are likely to form, dissolve and re-form, while a pattern of conduct tends to be recognized as the appropriate and (often) official or intended one'." A whole variety of routinized aspects of daily life, such as the work day in a factory or office, are of this sort. But there are also many more irregular social occasions, including parties, dances, sports events and a diversity of other examples. Of course, a sector of physical space may simultaneously be the site or locale of several social occasions, each involving multiple gatherings. But more often than not there is a normatively sanctioned

overriding social occasion' to which others are supposedly subordinated in a particular sector of time-space.

The contextual characteristics of gatherings, whether or not these occur on social occasions, can be divided into two main forms. Unfocused interaction relates to all those gestures and signals which can be communicated between individuals simply because of their co-presence within a specific context. The physical properties of the body and the limited scope of the positioning of the face are major constraints here. Actors' generalized awareness of the presence of others may range subtly over a wide spatial extension, even including those standing behind them. But such 'cueings of the body' are very diffuse compared with those that are possible, and are chronically utilized, in face-to-face interaction. Focused interaction occurs where two or more individuals co-ordinate their activities through a continued intersection of facial expression and voice. However much the participants might monitor whatever else is going on in the wider gathering, focused interaction in some part introduces an enclosure of those involved from others who are co-present. A unit of focused interaction is a face engagement or an encounter. Encounters are the guiding thread of social interaction, the succession of engagements with others ordered within the daily cycle of activity. Although Goffman does not include this formally within his schema of concepts, I think it highly important to emphasize the fact that encounters typically occur as routines. That is, what from the angle of the fleeting moment might appear brief and trivial interchanges take on much more substance when seen as inherent in the iterative nature of social life. The routinization of encounters is of major significance in binding the fleeting encounter to social reproduction and thus to the seeming 'fixity' of institutions.

I have defined social integration as systemness in circumstances of co-presence. Several phenomena suggest themselves as being most immediately relevant to the constitution of social integration thus defined. First, in order to grasp the connection of encounters with social reproduction stretching away over time and space, we must emphasize how encounters are formed and reformed in the *durée* of daily existence. Second, we should seek to identify the

main mechanisms of the duality of structure whereby encounters are organized in and through the intersections of practical and

discursive consciousness. This in turn has to be explicated in terms both of the control of the body and of the sustaining or rules or conventions. Third, encounters are sustained above all through talk, through everyday conversation. In analysing the communication of meaning in interaction via the use of interpretative schemes, the phenomenon of talk has to be taken very seriously, as constitutively involved in encounters. Finally, the contextual organization of encounters must be examined, since the mobilization of time-space is the 'grounding' of all the above elements. I shall undertake this latter task in terms of several basic notions, those of 'presence-availability', 'locale' and the relation of 'enclosure/disclosure'. Rather than discussing these latter three concepts in this chapter, however, I shall defer them until later.

Seriality

Encounters are sequenced phenomena, interpolated within, yet giving form to, the seriality of day-to-day life. The systematic properties of encounters can be traced to two principal characteristics: opening and closing, and turn-taking. Let me look briefly at each of these. The *durée* of daily life, as lived by each individual, is a continuous flow of activity, broken only (but regularly) by the relative passivity of sleep. The *durée* of activity can be 'bracketed' or 'conceptually segmented', as Schutz says, by a reflexive moment of attention on the part of the subject. This is what happens when someone is asked by another to supply 'a reason' or 'reason' for, or otherwise to explicate, certain features of his or her activity. But the *durée* of daily life is also 'bracketed' by the opening and closing of encounters. In Goffman's words, 'One may speak, then, of opening and closing temporal brackets and bounding spatial brackets."' Fond as he is of dramaturgical metaphors and analogies, Goffman gives as an example the devices which are employed in the opening and closing of theatrical spectacles. To signal the opening of a play, a bell rings, the lights go down and the curtain is raised. At the conclusion the auditorium lights go on again as the curtain falls. Most social occasions use some type of formal cueing devices for opening and closing a

characteristic of ritual occasions as much in traditional cultures as in
the variety of more secular

social occasions characteristic of contemporary societies. The bracketing of initiation ceremonies, for example, typically cues a dramatic change in the manner of conduct within the frame of the occasion - markers indicating, as it were, a shift from the profane to the sacred. Caillois has demonstrated in this regard the parallels between, as well as the directly historical influences upon, the spheres of religion and 'play'."

One might hazard the guess that bracketing markers tend to be regarded by everyday actors as particularly important when the activities that occur during the encounter, or upon a social occasion, are treated by the parties involved as particularly divergent from the normal expectations of everyday life. Goffman gives this example. In a medical examination of the naked body, or in the drawing of the same object in an art class, the individual does not usually shed his or her clothes in the presence of the other or others, or dress again in their presence at the conclusion of the encounter. Undressing and dressing in private allow the body to be suddenly exposed and hidden, both marking the boundaries of the episode and conveying that the actions stand separate from sexual or other connotations that might otherwise be read into them. This is part of what Goffman calls the 'keying' of encounters and suggests a close connection with Wittgenstein's discussions of the interweaving of forms of life. The occurrence of encounters, marked and given a definite social 'hue' or 'ethos', allows for transformations of a multiplicity of episodes into divergent 'types'.

> We (and a considerable number of theys) have the capacity and inclination to use concrete, actual activity - activity that is meaningful in its own right - as a model upon which to mark transformations for fun, deception, experiment, rehearsal, dream, fantasy, ritual, demonstration, analysis and charity. These lively shadows of events are geared into the ongoing world but not in quite the close way that is true of ordinary, literal activity."

Most of the encounters that comprise the seriality of social life take place either outside (in time-space) or against the backdrop of the gatherings found on social occasions. Face engagements in

many of these contexts do not involve clear enclosures which cut off the interaction from non-participants. In such circumstances the reflexive monitoring of the body, of gesture and positioning,

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are characteristically used to produce a 'conventional engagement closure'." That is to say, a normatively sanctioned 'barrier' separates those engaged in the encounter from others who are copresent. This is a collaborative work, in which participants in the face engagement and bystanders - often, of course, involved in their own engagements with other parties - sustain a sort of 'civil inattention' towards one another. Goffman indicates various ways in which this may be achieved and how it may be dislocated. As in all areas of the mutual monitoring of interaction, there are extraordinarily complex features even to the manifestation of 'inattention'. Thus bystanders are usually expected not only not to exploit a situation of proximity of presence, whereby they could follow what is going on in other face engagements, but also actively to demonstrate inattention. This can be problematic. For if inattention is too studied, the effect may be to suggest that the individual is in fact eavesdropping.

All sorts of complications of these phenomena are possible. There may be many circumstances in which an individual may be interested in overhearing the content of an encounter and may very deliberately simulate inattention. However, this runs the risk of being noticed because of an artificiality of posture or because of a host of other traits that can give away what is going on. The point of this should not be taken to suggest, as many interpreters of Goffman have tended to do, that most of the marvelously subtle intricacies of interaction are studied or cynically manipulative. The opposite is the case. What is striking about the interaction skills that actors display in the production and reproduction of encounters is their anchoring in practical consciousness. Tact rather than cynicism is inherent in the structuration of encounters. While the content of what counts as 'being tactful' may vary widely, the significance of tact in otherwise very different societies or cultures is impossible to dispute. Tact - a latent conceptual agreement among participants in interaction contexts - seems to be the main mechanism that sustains 'trust' or ontological security over long

time-space spans. Tact in the sustaining of conventional engagement enclosure becomes clearly pointed up in circumstances which threaten to fracture such closure. Thus in very constricted spaces, such as lifts, it is virtually impossible to sustain a posture of not listening. In Anglo-American society, at least, the tendency in such a situation is to suspend

communication, with perhaps only the occasional comment that indicates that an encounter is suspended rather than broken off. Similarly, if three people are talking and one is interrupted to take a phone call, the others cannot feign complete inattention and may carry on a sort of hesitant, limp conversation.53 Contexts of encounters such as these may directly express asymmetries of power. Thus if, say, two individuals in a lift continue to carry on their talk regardless of their surroundings of overly close proximity to others, it may very well be that they thereby demonstrate to those who are their subordinates or inferiors their indifference to the sustaining of civil inattention in such a context. However, they may nevertheless betray a certain concern about deviating from a norm that ordinarily would be observed, and hence they may talk even more loudly than they would in other circumstances.

Encounters involve 'spacing', as regards both the position of bodies in relation to one another, inside and outside the region of face engagement, and the serial spacing of contributions to the encounter in terms of seriality or turn-taking. Collaborative spacing within locales is obviously relevant to the bracketing of encounters (and, I shall try to indicate later, is subject to what Hagerstrand calls 'coupling constraints' and 'packing constraints'). The generalized normative sanctions influencing acceptable proximity of individuals in public places does vary cross-culturally, as do sanctions affecting the limits of acceptable bodily contact between persons in varying contexts. 54 But spacing can be effectively organized only within the limits of 'easy talk' - not so far apart that participants have to shout and not so close that the ordinary cues of facial expression, which help to monitor the sincerity and authenticity of what is said, cannot be observed. Face engagements, when others are co-present, are almost always carried on with some turning of the body away from those who are not party to the engagement, and the arrangement of bodies is such that there is no physical barrier to the free exchange of glances or visual contact. This may be difficult to achieve in crowded situations in which there is quite a lot of movement - at a party, for instance, or in a crowded train. In such contexts there may be some transitory relaxation of the sanctions which ordinarily control excessive mobility of the limbs. A person may quite acceptably sway the body about in this situation, if at the

same time it is made clear to others that this is in order to sustain eye contact in an engagement where the positioning of others threatens to block the view. Such movements may be carried on in an exaggerated fashion, in fact, thus indicating to others that the actor making them is aware that such body motion would usually be looked upon as odd.

Turn-taking in encounters has been much studied by writers of an ethnomethodological bent." Their work is often decried as trivial. But this is a short-sighted assessment indeed. For turntaking is rooted in the most general properties of the human body and hence expresses fundamental aspects of the nature of interaction. Moreover, turn-taking is one major feature of the serial character of social life, hence connecting with the overall character of social reproduction. Turn-taking is one form of 'coupling constraint', deriving from the simple but elemental fact that the main communicative medium of human beings in situations of co-presence - talk - is a 'single-order' medium. Talk unfolds syntagmatically in the flow of the *durée* of interaction, and since only one person can speak at one time if communicative intent is to be realized, contributions to encounters are inevitably serial. It should be said that the empirical study of conversations shows that they have a much less symmetrical form than might be supposed. The managing of turn-taking rarely happens in such a way that participants finish sentences. There is a plethora of hesitation phenomena; speakers break into what another is saying, such that there are no clear divisions in the taking of turns and so on."

Turn-taking may apply to the seriality of encounters as well as to the interaction between agents within encounters and may be again closely bound up with differentials of power. All organizations involve the co-ordination of interaction in flows of timespace relations 'channelled' through regularized contexts and locales (see pp. 119ff). Thus the process of organizing trials in the daily life of the courtroom has a formalized serial character, in which one case is heard, and bracketed as a definite social occasion, while the parties involved in the next are lined up in the adjoining waiting room.

There are very many similar examples in societies of broad time-space distanciation. Sartre's discussion of seriality here has a direct connection with the seeming triviata of conversational turn-taking. Sartre points out that a banal example

of seriality, a queue for a bus, can be used to demonstrate the mutual coupling of time-space relations of presence and absence:

> these separate people form a group, *in so far as* they are all standing on the same pavement, which protects them from the traffic crossing the square, *in so far as* they are grouped around the same bus stop, etc . . . . They are all, or nearly all, workers, and regular users of the bus service; they know the timetable and frequency of the buses; and consequently they all wait for the *same bus: say, the 7.49. This object in so far as they are dependent upon* it (breakdowns, failures, accidents) *is in their present interest.* But this present interest - since they all live in the district - refers back to fuller and deeper structures of their general interest: improvement of public transport, freezing of fares, etc. The bus they wait for unites them, being their interest as individuals who this morning have business on the *rive droite;* but, as the 7.49, it is *their interest as commuters;* everything is temporalized: the traveller recognizes himself as a *resident* (that is to say, he is referred to the five or ten previous years), and then the bus becomes characterized by its daily eternal return (it is actually *the very same* bus, with the same driver and conductor). The object takes on a structure which overflows its pure inert existence; as such it is provided with a passive future and past, and these make it appear to the passengers as a fragment (an insignificant one) of their destiny."

Talk, Reflexivity

Goffman's most telling contributions to understanding the sustaining and reproduction of encounters are to do with the relation between the reflexive control of the body - that is to say, the reflexive self-monitoring of gesture, bodily movement and posture - and the mutual co-ordination of interaction through tact

and respect for the needs and demands of others. The prevalence of tact, trust or ontological security is achieved and sustained by a bewildering range of skills which agents deploy in the production and reproduction of interaction. Such skills are founded first and foremost in the normatively regulated control of what might seem, even more than **turn-taking, to be the tiniest, most insignificant details** of bodily movement or expression. This is readily demonstrated when these are lacking or are corn-

promised, in a generic way among the 'mentally ill' and transitorily in bodily and verbal lapses or slips.

For Goffman 'mental illness', even the most serious forms of 'psychotic disturbance', are exemplified above all in inability, or unwillingness, to accept the diversity of minute (although wholly untrivial) forms of monitoring of bodily movement and gesture which are the normative core of day-to-day interaction. Madness is a cluster of 'situational improprieties'." Psychotic behaviour diverges from, or actively clashes with, the public ordering of time-space relations, via the body and its media, whereby human beings 'get on with one another' in circumstances of co-presence. The 'mentally ill' do not conform to the extremely tight (and continuous) bodily control demanded of 'normal individuals'; they do not respect the intricacies of the formulae governing the formation, maintenance, breaking off or suspension of encounters; and they fail to contribute the manifold forms of tact that sustain 'trust'." Individuals are very rarely expected 'just' to be co-present in gatherings and never are permitted to act thus in encounters. The reflexive monitoring of action, in contexts of co-presence, demands a sort of 'controlled alertness': as Goffman expresses it, actors have to 'exhibit presence'. This is exactly what many 'mental patients' - from those in a state of apparent catatonic stupor to those who move only mechanically, as if driven by some force, rather than being ordinary human agents - do not do."

The exhibiting of presence takes quite artfully deliberate forms but is undeniably exemplified first and foremost in practical consciousness. Consider personal appearance and the visible marks

of dress and bodily adornment. Concern with appearance is manifest, for example, in the care with which an individual selects and arranges types of clothing or adornment in relation to participation in particular contexts of activity. But it would be very misleading to suppose that such care is the prototypical mode of sustaining bodily idiom. More basic, more complex, is the chronic monitoring of the arrangement of clothing, in relation to bodily posture, in the presence of others. Thus 'mental patients' may sit slackly, their clothing disarranged or crumpled; women may not observe the usual expectation in Western societies, to keep the legs closely together when wearing skirts, and so on. There is a fundamental difference between bohemians or hobos, who flout the conventions of the wider society in their modes of

dress and other modes of conduct, and the 'mentally ill'. For the normative expectations in which bodily control and appearance are grounded concern not merely the trappings of adornment or gross parameters of motor behaviour but precisely the kind of 'sustained control' which simultaneously 'carries' and demonstrates agency.

That such chronic self-monitoring is not undemanding is indicated by the pervasive importance of 'back regions' - found in varying contexts in all societies - in which control of bodily posture, gesture and apparel can be in some degree relaxed. But even when alone an individual may maintain presentability. For someone who is discovered inadvertently 'unassembled' cedes to others aspects of self that are perhaps only visible at such moments." The point is that the sustaining of 'being seen as a capable agent' is intrinsic to what agency is, and that the motives which prompt and reinforce this connection as inherent in the reproduction of social practices are the same as those which order such reproduction itself. The strongly sanctioned character of these phenomena is well brought out in the following observations:

> Bodily idiom, then, is conventionalized discourse. We must see that it is, in addition, a normative one. That is, there is typically an obligation to convey certain information when in the presence of others and an obligation not to convey other impressions
>
> Although an individual can stop talking, he cannot stop communicating through body idiom... Paradoxically, the way in which he can give least information about himself - although this is still appreciable - is to fit in and act as persons of his kind are expected to act.62

Many 'mental patients' have difficulty with, or flout, the norms associated with the opening and closing of encounters. Thus a person on the ward of an asylum may hold one of the staff in an encounter no matter how many indications the staff member may give that he or she wishes to move on. The patient may pursue the other closely, regardless of how rapidly the person walks, and

might then try to accompany the orderly through the door at the end of the ward, even if it is a locked ward. At such a point the staff member may have physically to restrain the patient from following, perhaps tearing himself or herself away from the other's

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grasp. Such events, which are characteristic features of daily life on the wards, tend to run counter to the presumption of general communality of interest which staff ordinarily wish to foster. The final precipitous departure of the staff member exemplifies circumstances which, in the world outside, are likely to occur only where the individual attempting to leave in such a manner is demonstrating rejection of a strong moral tie - e.g. a love relationship - to which the pursuer lays claim. Such an implication, of course, is not necessarily lost upon the 'mental patient' on the ward of a hospital. Indeed, many apparently bizarre elements of encounters between the sane and the mad seem to represent 'experiments' which the latter carry out upon the usual frameworks of encounters. 'Schizophrenics', as Laing says, are perhaps aptly regarded as taking seriously, on the level of practical consciousness and in their actual conduct, some of the questions that philosophers pose hypothetically in the solitude of their studies. They really worry about, and build their activities around, heterodox solutions to questions such as 'In what sense am I a person?', 'Does the world only exist in so far as I perceive it?' and so on." But most of the 'experimental activities' of the mad, significantly, are to do with the cueings and the normative sanctions associated with the complexities of bodily control within the immediacies of encounters. Garfinkel's 'experiments with trust' duplicate some of the jarring feelings of disquietude which 'normal' individuals experience when the routines of daily life are called in question.64

Many of these considerations apply to talk as the discursive medium of communicative intent in contexts of co-presence. Discussion of 'response cries' (forms of utterance that are not talk) can provide an appropriate transition to the study of talk. Such cries demonstrate once more that what may seem entirely trivial and wholly 'spontaneous' characteristics of human conduct are tightly ordered normatively. Response cries transgress the normative

sanctions against not talking to oneself in public. Consider **loops!**
161 'Oops!' might be thought of as a pure reflex, a mechanical response like blinking the eyes when someone moves a hand sharply towards another's face. But this seemingly involuntary reaction lends itself to detailed analysis in terms of agency and the body. When someone exclaims 'Oops!' on dropping something or knocking something over it might appear

at first sight as if the sound advertises a loss of control, thus drawing attention to an inference which the person would wish to avoid, a dislocation in the routine forms of control that indicate reflexively monitored agency. But the exclamation in fact shows to others that the occurrence in question is a mere accident, for which the individual cannot be held responsible. 'Oops!' is used by the agent to display that the lapse is only that, a momentary and contingent event, rather than a manifestation of either a more generalized incompetence or some opaque intent. But this also hides a range of other subtle shadings and possibilities. Thus, for example, 'Oops!' is used - and is known to be used - only in situations of minor failure rather than in those of major calamity. Hence 'Oops!', spontaneous and immediate though it may be, demonstrates care and attention to the implications of the sudden occurrence and therefore indicates overall competence which overrides what is thereby exhibited to be only a minor slip.

There is more. 'Oops!' can be construed as a warning to others. A hazard exists in the milieu of co-presence, and others in the vicinity would do well to take care. When someone has a minor mishap the exclamation 'Oops!' may sometimes be offered by a participant rather than by the individual experiencing it. The 'Oops!' perhaps sounds a warning to the other at the same time as conveying the assurance that the slip will not be treated by the observer as compromising the other's competence as a responsible agent. 'Oops!' is normally a curt sound. But the 'oo' in it may be more prolonged in some situations. Thus someone may extend the sound to cover a part of a task or enterprise in which a particular hazardous moment has to be overcome for its successful execution. Or a parent may utter an extended 'Oops!' or 'Oopsadaisy!' when playfully tossing a child in the air, the sound covering the phase when the child may feel a loss of control, reassuring it and perhaps at the same time helping to facilitate a developing understanding of the nature of response cries."

'Oops!' thus turns out to be not as distant from talk as might initially be supposed, since it participates in that very public character of communication, intersecting with practices, which Wittgenstein identifies as the foundation of language use. In the

light of the preceding discussion in this chapter, it should be clear that the indexicality of ordinary language is a 'problem' neither for lay speakers nor for philosophical analysis. 'Indexicality' means

'contextuality': the contextuality of talk, like the contextuality of bodily posture, gesture and movement, is the basis upon which such phenomena are co-ordinated as encounters extending in time-space. Talk is an intrinsic feature of nearly all encounters and also displays similarities of systemic form. Talk ordinarily manifests itself as conversation. 'Conversation' admits of a plural, which indicates that conversations are episodes having beginnings and endings in time-space. Norms of talk pertain not only to what is said, the syntactical and semantic form of utterances, but also to the routinized occasions of talk. Conversations, or units of talk, involve standardized opening and closing devices, as well as devices for ensuring and displaying the credentials of speakers as having the right to contribute to the dialogue. The very term 'bracketing' represents a stylized insertion of boundaries in writing. Let me give Goffman the last word in the bracketing that constitutes this section. What is talk, viewed interactionally? 'It is an example of that arrangement by which individuals come together and sustain matters having a ratified, joint, current, and running claim upon attention, a claim which lodges them together in some sort of intersubjective, mental world."'

Positioning

Social systems, I have emphasized, are organized as regularized social practices, sustained in encounters dispersed across timespace. The actors whose conduct constitutes such practices are 'positioned', however. All actors are positioned or 'situated' in time-space, living along what Hagerstrand calls their time-space paths, and they are also positioned relationally, as the very term 'social position' suggests. Social systems only exist in and through the continuity of social practices, fading away in time. But some of their structural properties are best characterized as 'positionpractice' relations."

Social positions are constituted structurally as specific intersections of signification, domination and legitimation which relates to the typification of agents. A social position involves the specification of a definite 'identity' within a network of social relations, that identity, however, being a 'category' to which a particular range of normative sanctions is relevant.

Since Linton the concept of social position has ordinarily been associated with that of role, and the latter has received far more

discussion and analysis than the former." I do not intend to survey this discussion, only to emphasize some reservations about the notion of role. The concept is connected with two apparently opposed views, about each of which I have some unease. One is that of Parsons, in whose theory role is fundamental as the point of connection between motivation, normative expectations and 'values'. This version of the role concept is much too closely bound up with the Parsonian theorem of the dependence of societal integration upon 'value consensus' to be acceptable. The other is the dramaturgical viewpoint fostered by Goffman, about which more will be said in the next chapter, for here we reach the limits of his views. The two conceptions might seem to be contrary to one another but actually have a definite affinity. Each tends to emphasize the 'given' character of roles, thereby serving to express the dualism of action and structure characteristic of so many areas of social theory. The script is written, the stage set, and actors do the best they can with the parts prepared for them. Rejecting such standpoints does not mean dispensing with the concept of role entirely, but it does imply regarding the 'positioning' of actors as a more important idea. For definitional purposes I shall adopt the formulation I have offered in a previous work. A social position can be regarded as 'a social identity that carries with it a certain range (however diffusely specified) of prerogatives and obligations that an actor who is accorded that identity (or is an "incumbent" of that position) may activate or carry out: these prerogatives and obligations constitute the roleprescriptions associated with that position.'7°

'Position' is best understood as 'positioning', allowing the second of these terms to mine a rich vein of meanings. Actors are always positioned in respect of the three aspects of temporality around which the theory of structuration is built. The positioning of agents in circumstances of co-presence is an elemental feature of the structuration of encounters. Positioning here involves many subtle modalities of bodily movement and gesture, as well as the more general motion of the body through the regional sectors of daily routines. The positioning of actors in the regions of their daily time-space paths, of course, is their simultaneous positioning within the broader regionalization of societal totalities and within

intersocietal systems whose broadcast span is convergent with the geopolitical distribution of social systems on a global scale. The

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significance of positioning in this most rudimentary sense is obviously closely bound up with the level of time-space distanciation of societal totalities. In those societies in which social and system integration are more or less equivalent, positioning is only thinly 'layered'. But in contemporary societies individuals are positioned within a widening range of zones, in home, workplace, neighbourhood, city, nation-state and a worldwide system, all displaying features of system integration which increasingly relates the minor details of daily life to social phenomena of massive time-space extension.

Positioning in the time-space paths of day-to-day life, for every individual, is also positioning within the 'life cycle' or life path. The formation of an 'I' is perhaps founded on the original narcissism of a 'mirror phase' in personality development. The child forms the capability of becoming a reflexive agent through the positioning of the body in relation to its image. The very connotation of 'I' as a shifter necessarily relates self to positioning within the seriality of discourse and action. Positioning along the life path, of course, is always closely related to the categorizing of social identity. 'Childhood' and 'adulthood', among a number of other possible forms of age grading, always mingle biological and social criteria of ageing. Differential positioning on the life path is the major constraining condition influencing the fundamental significance of the family in conjoining physical and social reproduction. A human society in which all members were born as a single age cohort would be impossible, since the human infant has such a long period of more or less complete dependency upon the ministrations of its elders."

But it is the intersection between these forms of positioning and that within the *tongue durée* of institutions which creates the overall framework of social positioning. Only in the context of such intersection within institutionalized practices can modes of time-space positioning, in relation to the duality of structure, be

properly grasped. In all societies it seems to be the case that age (or age grade) and gender are the most all-embracing criteria of attributes of social identity. But although it is common in the sociological literature to speak of age roles, gender roles and so on in a generic way, I shall not follow such usage. Social identity conferred by age or gender - and other supposedly 'ascriptive' characteristics, such as skin pigmentation - tend to be the focus

It is of the first importance to emphasize that a theory of routine is not to be equated with a theory of social stability. The concern of structuration theory is with 'order' as the transcending of time and space in human social relationships; routinization has a key role in the explication of how this comes about. Routine persists through social change of even the most dramatic type, even if, of course, some aspects of taken-for-granted routines may be compromised. Processes of revolution, for example, no doubt usually dislocate the daily activities of multitudes of people who either are caught up in the fervour of revolt or are the luckless victims of social events which they have had no part in initiating. But it is in circumstances in which the texture of dayto-day life is attacked frontally and systematically deformed - as in the concentration camps - that the hold of routine is more substantively broken. Even here, as Betteiheim demonstrates so well, routines, including those of an obnoxious sort, are reestablished.

It is instructive to see the rules implicated in encounters, as Goffman suggests, as being clustered in frameworks or 'frames'. Framing may be regarded as providing the ordering of activities and meanings whereby ontological security is sustained in the enactment of daily routines. Frames are clusters of rules which help to constitute and regulate activities, defining them as activities of a certain sort and as subject to a given range of sanctions. Whenever individuals come together in a specific context they confront (but, in the vast majority of circumstances, answer without any difficulty whatsoever) the question 'What is going on here?' 'What is going on?' is unlikely to admit of a simple answer because in all social situations there may be many things 'going on' simultaneously. But participants in interaction address this question characteristically on the level of practice, gearing their conduct to that of others. Or, if they pose such an question discursively, it is in relation to one particular aspect of the situation that appears puzzling or disturbing. Framing as constitutive of, and constricted by, encounters 'makes sense' of the activities in which participants engage, both for themselves and for others. This includes the 'literal' understanding of events but also the criteria by which it is made plain that what is going on is humour, play, theatre and so on.

Primary frameworks of daily activity can be seen as those

generating 'literal' languages of description both for lay participants in encounters and for social observers. Primary frameworks vary widely in their precision and closure. Whatever its level of organization, a primary framework allows individuals to categorize an indefinite plurality of circumstances or situations so as to be able to respond in an appropriate fashion to whatever is 'going on'. Someone who finds that what is going on at a particular time and place is, say, a party, may be able to bring into play conduct of an apposite kind even if some aspects of the contexts are unfamiliar. Most of Goffman's work is to do with rules which allow for transitions to be made between primary and secondary frameworks. Thus the 'keys' in transformations are the formulae whereby an activity that is already meaningful in a primary framework is given a meaning in a secondary one 74 For example, a fight can be 'play', an apparently serious comment a joke. But exactly the same kind of analysis could be carried out to indicate the rules involved in transitions between different primary frameworks.

It would not be relevant to pursue the detail of Goffman's analysis of framing any further in this context. Let me instead briefly consider the significance which the discursive formulation of rules can have by taking a different piece of work, that of Wieder on 'telling the code' .71 Wieder's research reports the results of a participant observation study in a residential unit for rehabilitating paroled prisoners. The inmates spoke of the existence of rules of conduct which they called the 'code'. The code was explicitly verbalized but not, of course, formalized in written form as it was established and co-ordinated by inmates, not the staff. No inmate could apparently recite all the maxims making up the code, but all could mention some, and the code was frequently discussed. It was made up of such rules as: do not 'snitch' (inform about other inmates to staff); do not 'cop out' (i.e., admit guilt or responsibility for an act defined by staff as illegitimate); do not steal from other inmates; share with others any unexpected gifts or benefits which might be received; and so on. Staff knew the code too and made use of it in their dealings with inmates. As Wieder says, 'It was used as a wide-reaching scheme of interpretation which "structured" their environment."' But, as he also points out, its verbalization meant

that it was invoked in ways that implicitly formulated rules cannot be. It

formed a 'vocabulary of motive' whereby both staff and inmates interpreted actions, especially deviant or problematic ones. It was not treated simply as a description of what was tacitly acknowledged; rather, the circumstances in which the code was called upon could be altered by the fact of invoking it. 'Telling the code' meant, as the phrase sounds, not only reporting upon what the code is but reprimanding those who contravened it; it exhibited the code as a control device, that exhibiting being part of how it in fact operated as such. I would suggest that this is characteristic of 'rule interpretations' discursively offered in many social contexts.

Rules applied reflexively in circumstances of co-presence are never limited in their implications to specific encounters but apply to the reproduction of the patterning of encounters across time and space. The rules of language, of primary and secondary framing, of the conduct of interpersonal interaction all apply over large arenas of social life, although they cannot be taken as necessarily coextensive with any given 'society'. Here we have to give some attention to conceptually differentiating between 'social interaction' and 'social relations' (although I shall not always be particularly careful to separate them subsequently). Social interaction refers to encounters in which individuals engage in situations of co-presence, and hence to social integration as a level of the 'building blocks' whereby the institutions of social systems are articulated. Social relations are certainly involved in the structuring of interaction but are also the main 'building blocks' around which institutions are articulated in system integration. Interaction depends upon the 'positioning' of individuals in the time-space contexts of activity. Social relations concern the 'positioning' of individuals within a 'social space' of symbolic categories and ties. Rules involved in social positions are normally to do with the specification of rights and obligations relevant to persons having a particular social identity, or belonging in a particular social category. The normative aspects of such rules, in other words, are particularly pronounced, but all the previously stated characteristics of rules apply to them

too. They may, for example, be tacitly followed rather than discursively formulated. There are many such cases in the anthropological literature. An instance is cultures in which there is unilateral cross-cousin marriage. Although the members of these cultures

obviously have some ideas which they put into effect about who marries who, the rules of eligibility that they are in fact following in their behaviour are tacit rather than explicit.

Goffman demonstrates that social integration depends upon the reflexively applied procedures of knowledgeable agents, but he does not indicate in any effective way what are the limits or the bounds of such knowledgeability, nor does he indicate the forms which such knowledgeability takes. I want to pose such a question here: in what sense are agents 'knowledgeable' about the characteristics of the social systems they produce and reproduce in their action?

Let us presume that 'knowledge' equals accurate or valid awareness - I do not say 'belief', because beliefs are only one aspect of knowledgeability. It does not make sense to treat practical consciousness as exhaustively constituted by propositional beliefs, although some elements could in principle be thus formulated. Practical consciousness consists of knowing the rules and the tactics whereby daily social life is constituted and reconstituted across time and space. Social actors can be wrong some of the time about what these rules and tactics might be - in which cases their errors may emerge as 'situational improprieties'. But if there is any continuity to social life at all, most actors must be right most of the time; that is to say, they know what they are doing, and they successfully communicate their knowledge to others. The knowledgeability incorporated in the practical activities which make up the bulk of daily life is a constitutive feature (together with power) of the social world. What is known about the social world by its constituent actors is not separate from their world, as in the case of knowledge of events or objects in nature. Testing out just what it is that actors know, and how they apply that knowledge in their practical conduct (which lay actors engage in as well as social observers), depends upon using the same materials - an understanding of recursively organized practices - from which hypotheses about that knowledge are derived. The measure of their 'validity' is supplied by how far actors are able to co-ordinate their activities with others in such a way as to pursue the purposes engaged by their behaviour.

There are, of course, potential differences between knowledge of the rules and tactics of practical conduct in the milieux in which the agent moves and knowledge about those which apply

in contexts remote from his or her experience. How far the agent's social skills allow immediate ease in culturally alien contexts is obviously variable - as, of course, is the meshing of different forms of convention expressing divergent boundaries between cultures or societies. It is not just in knowledge - or belief claims - which agents are able to formulate discursively that they display awareness of broader conditions of social life over and above those in which their own activities take place. It is often in the manner in which routine activities are carried on, for example, that actors in circumstances of marked social inferiority make manifest their awareness of their oppression. Goffman's writings are replete with commentaries on this type of phenomenon. But in other respects when we speak of 'the knowledge actors have of the societies of which they are members' (and others of which they are not), the reference is to discursive consciousness. Here there is no logical difference between the criteria of validity in terms of which belief-claims (hypotheses, theories) are to be judged in respect of lay members of society and social observers.

What - on a general plane, at any rate - are the types of circumstance that tend to influence the level and nature of the 'penetration' actors have of the conditions of system reproduction? They include the following factors:

(1) the means of access actors have to knowledge in virtue of their social location;

(2) the modes of articulation of knowledge;

(3) circumstances relating to the validity of the belief-claims taken as 'knowledge';

(4) factors to do with the means of dissemination of available knowledge.

Of course, the fact that all actors move in situated contexts within larger totalities limits the knowledge they have of other contexts which they do not directly experience. All social actors know a great deal more than they ever directly live through, as a result of the sedimentation of experience in language. But agents whose lives are spent in one type of milieu may be more or less ignorant of what goes on in others. This applies not only in a 'lateral' sense - in the sense of spatial separation - but also in a 'vertical' one in larger societies. Thus those in elite groups may

know very little about how others in less privileged sectors live, and vice versa. However, it is worth mentioning that vertical segregation of *milieux* is nearly always also a spatial segregation. In category (2) above I mean to refer both to how far belief claims are ordered in terms of overall 'discourses' and to the nature of different discourses. Characteristic of most commonsense, everyday claims to knowledge is that they are formulated in a fragmentary, dislocated way. It is not only the 'primitive' who is a *bricoleur:* much day-to-day talk among lay members of all societies is predicated upon claims to knowledge that are disparate or left unexamined. The emergence of discourses of social science, however, clearly influences all levels of social interpretation in societies where it has become influential. Goffman has a large audience, not limited to his professional sociological colleagues.

So far as (3) is concerned, it is enough to point out that **individuals** may operate with false theories, descriptions or accounts both of the contexts of their own action and of the characteristics of more encompassing social systems. There are obvious sources of possible tension here between practical and discursive consciousness. These can have psychodynamic origins, in repressions which separate off or muddle the reasons why people act as they do and what they are inclined or able to say about those reasons. But obviously there can be more systematic social pressures that can influence how far false beliefs are held by the members of a society about features of that society. Particularly influential in respect of (4), it is almost needless to say, are the relations, historically and spatially, between oral culture and the media of writing, printing and electronic communication. All of the latter have made a difference not only to stocks of available knowledge but also to types of knowledge produced.

Critical Notes: Freud on Slips of the Tongue

As an example of some of the notions analysed in this chapter I propose to consider interpretations of slips of the tongue in discourse. What Freud calls 'parapraxes' *(Fehileistun gen)* refer not

just to verbal infelicities but to miswriting, misreading, mishearing and to the temporary forgetting of names and other items. Freud treats these as belonging together in some part because the terms designating them have a similar root in German, all beginning with the syllable *Ver- (Versprechen, Verlesen, Verhören, Vergessen). All* parapraxes involve errors, but most refer to seemingly unimportant ones which are without lasting significance in the activities of the individuals who commit them. 'Only rarely', Freud writes, 'does one of them, such as losing an object, attain some degree of practical importance. For that reason, too, they attract little attention, give rise to no more than feeble emotions, and so on." In fact, he tries to demonstrate, these minor infractions supply clues to key characteristics of the psychodynamics of personality.

Whether or not parapraxes do actually form a single class of errors I shall not be concerned to discuss here. I shall concentrate only upon slips of the tongue. Employing a classification established by the linguist Meringer and by Mayer, a psychiatrist (with whose views he otherwise disagrees), Freud mentions the following types of verbal error: *transpositions* (the 'Milo of Venus' instead of the 'Venus of Milo'); *pre-sonances* or *anticipations* ('es war mir auf der Schwest... auf der Brust so schwer' - 'Schwest' is a nonexistent word); *post-sonances* or *perseverations* ('ich fordere Sie *au* f, *auf* das Wohl unseres Chefs aufzutossen', rather than 'anzustossen'); *contaminations* ('er setzt sich auf den Hinterkopf', a combination of 'er setzt sich einen Kopf auf' and 'er stellt sich auf die Hinterbeine'); and *substitutions* ('ich gebe die Praparate in den Briefkasten', instead of 'Brütkasten').2

Meringer tried to explain these in terms of phases of neutral

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*References may be found on p. 109.

excitation. When a speaker utters the first word of a sentence, a process of excitation, connected with anticipating the form of the utterance, is set in being. This process sometimes has the effect of disturbing later sounds in the utterance. Some sounds are physically more intense than others, and these can affect other sounds or words. To discover the source of slips of the tongue we therefore have to look for those sounds or verbalizations which have the highest physical valence. One way of doing this, according to Meringer, is to consider what is involved in searching for a forgotten word, such as someone's name. The first sound to come back into consciousness is always the one of greatest intensity before the word was forgotten. This is often, for example, the initial sound in the word or the vowel which is particularly accentuated. Freud will have little of this. In the case of forgotten words it is very rarely true that either the initial sound or the accentuated vowel is the first to be recalled. Speakers may sometimes believe this to be the case but in fact are usually wrong; Freud asserts that in the vast majority of instances the initial sound which the speaker utters in attempted recall is the wrong one.

As an instance of the latter phenomenon Freud's famous discussion of his own lapse of memory about the name of the painter Signorelli can be mentioned. Talking about the frescoes of the 'Four Last Things', Death, Judgement, Hell and Heaven, in Orvieto Cathedral, Freud found himself unable to recall the name of the artist. Rather than finding the name he was trying to remember, he could think only of the names 'Botticelli' and 'Boltraffio'. On being told the correct name by another person, he recognized it without any hesitation. The forgetting is not to be explained in terms of anything distinctive about the painter's name itself or any definite psychological aspect of the context in which Freud was trying to recall it. Freud was as familiar with one of the substitute names, 'Botticelli', as with 'Signorelli', and more familiar with 'Signorelli' than with the other mistaken name that occurred to him, 'Boltraffio'. Freud's inability to recall the word happened in the course of a casual conversation with a stranger while driving from Ragusa in Dalmatia to a place in Herzegovina.

Freud offers the following analysis of the phenomenon. The forgetting of the name was connected with the preceding topic which had been discussed in the conversation. Just prior to

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mentioning Orvieto, Freud and his travelling companion had been talking about the customs of the Turkish people living in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Freud was telling the other of the fatalistic attitude with which the Turks approach sickness and death. If a doctor tells them nothing can be done to save someone who is ill, their response is 'Herr [Sir I, what is there to be said? If he could be saved, I know you would have saved him." The words 'Bosnia', 'Herzegovina' and 'Herr' have an unconsciously charged association with 'Signorelli', 'Botticelli' and 'Boltraffio'. A second anecdote lay close to the first in Freud's mind. In contrast to their quiescence in the face of death, the Turkish people in question display great agitation when afflicted by sexual disorders. Thus one said: 'Herr, you must know that if that comes to an end, then life is of no value.' Freud had suppressed this anecdote from his account, since he was talking to a stranger. He thereby diverted his attention from thoughts which might have been provoked in his mind by the themes of death and sexuality. He had recently received an unfortunate piece of news while staying at Trafoi, a small village in the Tyrol. One of his patients, to whom Freud had devoted considerable attention and who was suffering from what Freud refers to as an 'incurable sexual disorder' ,4 had committed suicide. The similarity of the words 'Trafoi' and 'Boltraffio' indicated that this event had made itself felt psychologically in spite of Freud's decision not to mention it.

Having established this resemblance, Freud asserts, it is no longer possible to regard the forgetting of 'Signorelli' as a chance event; it was something that was (unconsciously) motivated. The item which Freud deliberately chose not to mention became displaced on to another element, the painter's name.

The connections established here' indicate that the name 'Signorelli' became divided in two. One of the pairs of syllables, 'elli' occurs in unaltered form in one of the two names which came

to Freud's mind. The other has become involved in a network of connections by means of the translation of 'Signor' into 'Herr'. A displacement has occurred between the names 'Herzegovina and Bosnia - two places often spoken of together in the same phrase. Most of the connections which produced the forgetting have been forged below the level of consciousness. The suppressed topic and the factors that have brought to mind the substitute names do not have any manifest connections. The

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Figure 4

similarities involved do depend partly upon common sounds which the words possess, but these can be pieced together only when we understand that the forgetting is a result of repression. Not all instances of the forgetting of names, of course, are of this sort: 'By the side of simple cases where proper names are forgotten there is a type of forgetting which is motivated by repression."

A mechanism similar to his, Freud goes on to argue, exists in instances of slips of the tongue. Verbal errors may be of the type analysed by Meringer and Mayer, where one component of an utterance influences another, or they may be like the 'Signorelli' example, where the influences that produce the error come from outside the utterance and the immediate circumstances in which it is made. Both have their origins in a kind of 'excitation', but in the one case this is internal to the utterance or to the situation in which the words are said; in the other it is external to them. Only in the first type is there any possibility of explaining slips of the tongue in terms of a mechanism linking sounds and words to one another so that they influence articulation. Moreover, subjected to further scrutiny, the first type in fact evaporates. Slips of the tongue that seem at first blush to be simply the result of a 'contact effect of sounds' actually turn out on further investigation to depend upon outside (that is, motivated) influences.

Freud lists many examples of slips of the tongue, including the following:

(1) On the part of a woman patient: 'I shut up like a

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Tassenmescher [a nonexistent word] - I mean *Taschen*

messer (pocket-knife).' Freud recognizes that there are difficulties of articulation with the word, but he points out the error to the patient and associates it with a name that impinges on unconscious anxieties.

Another woman patient, asked how her uncle is, answers: 'I don't know. Nowadays I only see him *in flagrante.'* The phrase she meant to use is *en passant.* The term said in error is shown to relate to an episode in the patient's past.

A young man addresses a woman in the street with the words: 'If you will permit me, madam, I should like to *begleit-digen* you.' He wants to accompany *(begleiten)* her but fears his offer would insult *(beleidigen)* her. As in the 'Signorelli' case, a concealed intention - the request not being a wholly innocent one on the man's part - leads to an unconsciously motivated slip of the tongue.

During a disputatious meeting the chairman says: 'We shall now *streiten* (quarrel, instead of *schreiten,* proceed) to point four on the agenda.' The speaker's true view, which he intends to suppress, manifests itself in his verbal mistake.

Someone is asked, 'What regiment is your son with?' The answer given is: 'With the 42nd Murderers' *(Morder,* instead of *MOrser,* 'Mortars').

A guest at a social occasion advances the opinion: 'Yes a woman must be pretty if she is to please men. A man is much better off; as long as he has his five straight limbs he needs nothing more!' This is one of numerous examples of what Meringer and Mayer called contaminations but which Freud regards as instances of the psychological process of condensation. The utterance is a fusion of two turns of phrase resembling each other in meaning: 'as long as he has his four straight limbs' and 'as long as he has his five wits about him'. Freud notes that, as in many slips of the tongue, the remark could pass as a joke. The difference lies simply in whether or

not the speaker consciously intended the words to come out as they did.

(7) Reanalysis of one of the Meringer and Mayer examples: 'Es war mir auf der Schwest ... auf der Brust so schwer.' This cannot be adequately explained by the anticipation of sounds. The slip of the tongue is probably to be interpreted

in terms of an unconscious association between 'Schwester' (sister), 'Bruder' (brother) and perhaps 'Brust der Schwester' (sister's breast).

Freud concludes: 'There must be a reason for every mistake in speaking." This includes other forms of speech disturbance besides slips of the tongue, such as stammering or stuttering. These phenomena are all symptoms of internal conflict which manifests itself as deformations of speech. Speech disturbances, Freud claims, do not appear in circumstances in which an individual is heavily engaged, such as a well-prepared address or a declaration of love.

Ce qu'on conçoit bien

S'énonce clairement
Et les mots pour le dire
Arrivent aisément.8

Does unconscious motivation exist in all cases of slips of the tongue? Freud believes such to be the case, for 'every time one investigates an instance of a slip of the tongue an explanation of this kind is forthcoming."

Let me now compare Freud on slips of the tongue with Goffman on radio talk" - a comparison which might seem unpromising but is actually very instructive for structuration theory. Goffman's concerns in his discussion are quite divergent from those of Freud, and rather than following the themes of his own argument I shall try to tease out its implications for assessing Freud's views on errors of speech. Radio and TV announcing is substantially different from ordinary conversation but just for that reason allows considerable insight into those circumstances. Announcers are not the authors of the scripts they read out. Their talk occurs as part of pre-planned sequences, from which they are not free to depart in anything save minor ways. At the same time announcers are expected to convey an impression of 'fresh talk' and to keep alive a sense of spontaneity in what they do. Meeting these inconsistent requirements is difficult, since they have to deliver their lines in a technically

error-free way. The broadcaster's task is 'the production of seemingly faultless fresh talk'."

Yet announcers do, of course, make slips of the tongue. Among the examples given by Goffman it is easy to find instances of the errors listed by Meringer and Mayer:

(1) 'In closing our TV Church of the Air, let me remind all of

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our listeners that time wounds all heals' (transposition or Spoonerism).

(2) 'You are listening to the mucous of Clyde Lucas' (pre-sonance).

(3) 'And now coming into the ball game for the Reds is number forty-four, Frank Fuller, futility infielder' (perseveration).

(4) 'This is the Dominion network of the Canadian Broad Corping Castration' (contamination).

(5) 'Word has just reached us that a home-made blonde exploded in the Roxy Theatre this morning' (substitution).

There are also numerous examples close to those listed by

Freud, such as:

(1) 'Viceroys - if you want a good choke.'

(2) 'Beat the egg yolk and then add the milk, then slowly blend in the sifted flour. As you do you can see how the mixture is sickening.'

(3) 'And now, audience, here is our special TV Matinee guest that we've all been waiting for - world-famous author, lecturer and

world traveller, a man about town. Mr, er, Mr.... Oh! What the hell is his name?'

(4) 'So, friends, be sure to visit Frankie's restaurant for elephant food and dining.'

Most of these slips are humorous 12 and aptly reinforce Freud's

point that joking and slips of the tongue have a close affinity. Although it is not possible to demonstrate this directly, such examples fit quite closely with Freud's interpretation of verbal parapraxes. The mispronounced or substituted words do not look simply like non-specific alternatives to those which should have been uttered. They are embarrassing in respect of the view that the broadcaster is supposed to convey; some have the 'only too true' connotations to them to which Freud calls attention; and others have a self-evidently sexual character. But consider two other forms of slips in radio talk:

(1) 'Ladies who care to drive by and drop off their clothes will receive prompt attention.'

(2) 'Folks, try our comfortable beds. I personally stand behind every bed we sell.'

(3) 'The loot and the car were listed as stolen by the Los Angeles Police Department.'

(4) 'And here in Hollywood it is rumoured that the former movie starlet is expecting her fifth child in a month.'

(1) 'Turns will give you instant relief and assure you no indigestion or distress during the night .... So try Turns and go to sleep with a broad ... [turns page] smile.'

(2) 'It's time now, ladies and gentlemen, for our featured guest, the prominent lecturer and social leader, Mrs Elma Dodge...]Superman cut-in] who is able to leap buildings in a single bound.'

(3) A local TV station showing a boxing match from Madison Square Garden interrupted the programme to report the death of a local politician. On cutting back to the fight, the announcer was saying: 'That wasn't much of a blow, folks!'

In these cases no slip of the tongue is involved, but they do otherwise take the form of parapraxes. Something has gone awry with what the speaker intended to convey. The second set of examples is interesting because if we did not know the circumstances in which they occurred, it would seem as though they contain typical 'only too true' utterances. No motive for them can be imputed, unless the producers responsible for cutting from one programme to the other somehow (consciously or otherwise) organized the sequencing to have the effects noted. The first category of slips are more difficult to interpret. It may be the case that these are unconsciously motivated ambiguities. But this seems unlikely. It is more probable that their ambiguous character would pass unnoticed by speakers and listeners alike if they were uttered within ordinary, everyday conversations. The point is not just that their ambiguous meanings are not immediately apparent but also that in everyday talk meanings other than those intended by speakers tend to be ruled out by contextual features of the conversation. Speakers are able to address themselves to the

specific people with whom they are engaged, pre-selecting words and phrases so that possible alternative readings are excluded. Radio or TV announcers cannot do this because they speak to a generalized audience, that audience not being co-present with them.

Now, it would clearly be mistaken to regard radio talk as typical of talk in general. There are two reasons why slips of the

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tongue stand out much more prominently in radio talk than in day-to-day conversations. First, the discourse does not take place between co-present communicants. Disentangled from other cues, what is said becomes a more 'witnessable' phenomenon than it is when embedded in everyday activities. This is also true of many of Freud's examples of slips of the tongue, culled as they are from the therapeutic situation. The therapeutic encounter, after all, hardly exemplifies ordinary talk any more than broadcasting does. The words of the patient are treated as having a special significance, to be carefully scrutinized. Second, announcers are specialists in the production of flawless speech and are expected to be such by the nature of their profession. The main task of the performer is to present the script fluidly and clearly. It is only when we recognize how distinctive and unusual this relatively flawless speech mode is that we can begin to appreciate the contingencies of ordinary day-to-day talk. Both lay participants and linguists usually regard everyday talk as much more 'perfected' and 'ordered' than in fact it is. Summarizing recent work on the empirical study of conversations, Boomer and Laver comment:

> It is important to recognize that in speech 'normal' does **not mean 'perfect'. The norm for spontaneous speech is demonstrably imperfect.** Conversation is characterized by frequent pauses, hesitation sounds, false starts, misarticulations and corrections .... In everyday circumstances we simply do not hear many of **our own tongue-slips nor those made by**

others. They can be **discerned in running speech only by adopting a specialized 'proof-reader'** mode of listening."

In most circumstances of day-to-day conversations it is, in fact, very difficult indeed to distinguish slips of the tongue from the fragmented nature of virtually all the talk that goes on. As Goffman points out, for a particular utterance to be tested as a slip or as 'faulty', it has to be of a sort which the speaker would alter were he or she to begin the utterance again (or, of course, one that actually is altered or 'remedied'). It will not do to identify slips of the tongue by reference to an idealized model of enunciation or discourse. Moreover, to understand the character of day-to-day talk, we have to look at the other types of fault that may intrude. What are the implications of this?

First, as regards slips of the tongue, it may be argued that Meringer and Mayer were not as far off the mark as Freud tended to argue. Fromkin has demonstrated that mispronunciation of words manifests properties similar to those characteristic of 'correct' word production. 14 This does not show that such faults are not brought about by unconscious promptings, but it does suggest that there is usually no 'interruption' in the reflexive monitoring of speech production that necessarily needs to be invoked to explain slips of the tongue. The phenomena of presonances and perseverations are also presumably directly bound up with the reflexive monitoring of speech. Words must characteristically be transferred from the brain to speech as syntagmatically ordered groupings, or else such speech disturbances would not occur at all.

A second large category of faults concerns not individual speech production as such but turn-taking. A speaker may begin to talk before the utterance of another is concluded, either 'overlapping' with or directly interrupting the other; two participants might begin speaking simultaneously; each may 'back off' from speaking, producing an unwanted gap in the conversational flow. Just as in the case of individual speech faults, most such disjunctions pass completely unnoticed by speakers engaged in ordinary conversation. They are 'heard' only when, for example, a strip of speech is recorded so that they can be deliberately attended to. Here again day-to-day talk is not like radio talk, where overlaps, double uptakes, etc., are very noticeable. It is more often than not the case in conversations that overlap occurs, so that one speaker is beginning an utterance while another is finishing. But participants filter these out so that contributions to the conversation are heard as separate strips of talk.

Third, faulty talk which is recognized as such usually involves remedial procedures initiated either by the speaker or by the listeners. Correction by others seems relatively rare, partly because many imperfections which are phonological or syntactical slips when judged against an idealized grammatical model are not heard as such, but partly also because tact is exercised in respect of what might be taken to be the incompetencies of speakers. Remedial

work done by speakers nearly always concerns turntaking difficulties rather than slips of the tongue.

These observations tell us a good deal about what everyday

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speech is like and confirm that verbal parapraxes cannot be interpreted against an idealized conception of 'correct' speech. Announcers' talk differs from the day-to-day use of language in so far as it does approximate to such a conception. The talk and the activities of announcers when they are on set in fact comes close to how human social life would be if it were actually like the portrayals given by objectivist social scientists. Most of what is said is programmed prior to transmission or screening and can be modified only in marginal ways by the agent following the script. The actor here does appear merely as a 'bearer' of pre-given patterns of social organization - or, as Goffman puts it, an 'animator', a 'sounding box from which utterances come'." The vast majority of situations of talk (and of interaction) are simply not like this. The 'loose' or flawed character of day-to-day talk, or what appears as such when compared with an idealized model, is actually generic to its character as enmeshed in human praxis. What is remarkable, to put it another way, is not lack of technical polish in talk but the fact that conversations and the (always contingent) reproduction of social life have any symmetry of form at all. In day-to-day interaction the normative elements involved in communication in talk as the production of 'good speech' are hardly ever the main impelling interest of participants. Rather, talk is saturated with the practical demands of the routine enactment of social life.

Accepting this means recasting Freud's view. According to Freud, every slip of the tongue has a motivated origin and could in principle be explained if sufficient knowledge of the psychological make-up of the individual in question were available. Here we clearly discern an implied picture of well-ordered speech, from which slips of the tongue lead the speaker to depart. The standpoint I am advocating in effect turns this around. 'Wellordered' speech, in the context of day-to-day conversations at least, is geared to the overall motivational involvements which speakers have in the

course of pursuing their practical activities. 'Correct speech', in common with many other aspects of such activities, is not usually directly motivated - unless one is an announcer. It should be pointed out in parenthesis that on occasion disturbed speech may be so motivated. Thus in circumstances of mourning, a bereaved person who maintained ordinary standards of speech production might be thought hard

hearted and unfeeling. Where there are sanctions implying that people should manifest emotional agitation, speech disturbances, or alterations in normal modes of speech, may be one way of 'bringing off' such states."

If most particular forms of language use are not directly motivated, then it follows that most slips of the tongue cannot be traced to unconscious motivation. Where does this leave us, then, as regards Freud's theory of verbal parapraxes? I would make the following suggestion. Freud's interpretation probably applies only in circumstances rather different from those he had in mind when formulating it. In Freud's view, slips of the tongue tend to be made above all in casual or routine situations, where nothing much hangs on what is said. On such occasions, the unconscious is likely to 'break through', as it were, and disturb the utterances that a speaker produces. I would hold that on these occasions -which make up most of social life - unconscious elements are actually least prone to influencing directly what is said. Routinization, involving the continual 'regrooving' of the familiar in circumstances of substantial ontological security, is the main condition of the effective reflexive monitoring by human beings of their activities. Anxiety concerning the actual form of speech will be heightened only when the actor has a specific interest in getting what he or she says 'exactly right'. This is what radio and TV announcers have to do. It is likely to be the case in a declaration of love, contrary to Freud's supposition. We can also readily make sense of the 'Signorelli' example and the forgetting of proper names generally as a motivated phenomenon. Proper names have a special significance which other words do not. To mispronounce someone's name or to call someone by the wrong name causes personal affront in a way that other vagaries of pronunciation do not. There is thus a special premium on getting names right, which perhaps means that the recall of names impinges more immediately on sources of anxiety than do other linguistic items. As I have pointed out, something similar applies to the therapeutic encounter as well.

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References: Consciousness, Self and Social Encounters

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9 Ulric Neisser, *Cognition and Reality* (San Francisco: Freeman, *1976), p. 22.* See also idem, *Memory Observed* (San Francisco: Freeman, *1982);* John Shotter, "Duality of structure" and "intentionality" in an ecological psychology', *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, vol. 13, 1983.*

10 Neisser, *Cognition and Reality, p. 29.*

M. Wertheimer, 'Psychomotor coordination of auditory and visual space at birth', *Science, vol. 134, 1962.*

Neisser, *Cognition and Reality, p. 72.*

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vol. 25, 1953.

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15 J. A. Deutsch and D. Deutsch, "Attention": some theoretical considerations', *Psychological Review, vol. 70, 1963.*

16 Neisser, *Cognition and Reality, pp. 84-5.*

17 CPST, pp. 120-3.

18 Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: Norton, 1963),

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19 Ibid., p. 247.

20 Ernest Becker, *The Birth and Death of Meaning* (New York: Free Press, 1962), p. 95.

21 See also Erikson, *Childhood and Society, p.* 249; Harry Stack Sullivan, *The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry* (London: Tavistock, 1955), chapter 4. I do not accept Erikson's claim that these psychological phenomena can be directly related to the form of social institutions.

22 G. Piers and M. B. Singer, *Shame and Guilt* (Springfield: Addison, 1963). Here I repeat some observations originally made in relation to the theory of suicide; cf. SSPT, p. 393, footnote 32.

23 Erikson, *Childhood and Society, p.* 251.

24 Ibid., p. 256.

25 Dennie Wolf, 'Understanding others: a longitudinal case study of

the concept of independent agency', in George E. Forman, *Action*

and Thought (New York: Academic Press, 1982).

26 T. B. Brazelton *et al.,* 'The origins of reciprocity', in M. Lewis and L. Rosenblum, *The Infant's Effects on the Caregiver* (New York: Wiley, 1974).

27 L. S. Vygotsky, *Mind in Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University

Press, 1978), pp. 20ff.

28 Erik H. Erikson, *Identity, Youth and Crisis* (London: Faber & Faber, 1968), chapter 5; idem, *Identity and the Life Cycle* (New York: International Universities Press, 1967).

29 Erikson, *Identity and the Life Cycle, p.* 19.

30 See ibid., chapter 3, 'The problem of ego-identity'.

31 Ibid., p. 102.

32 See CPST, pp. 123-8.

33 Bruno Bettelheim, *The Informed Heart* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960), p. 14. Goffman's work on 'total institutions' overlaps at many points with the analysis given by Bethelheim: Goffman, *Asylums (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961).*

34 Bettelheim, *The Informed Heart, p.* 132.

35 Ibid., p. 148.

36 'Since old prisoners had accepted, or been forced to accept, a childlike dependency on the SS, many of them seemed to want to feel that at least some of the people they were accepting as allpowerful father images were just and kind', ibid., p. 172.

37 See the examples collected in William Sargant, *Battle for the Mind*

(London: Pan, 1959).

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38 M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (London: Routledge, 1974).

Ibid., p. 101.

L. Goldstein, *Language and Language Disturbances* (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1948).

41 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception, p.* 104.

42 Ibid., p. 109.

43 Erving Goffman, *Behaviour in Public Places* (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 17; idem, *Interaction Ritual* (London: Allen Lane, 1972), p. 1.

44 Cf. Ithiel De Sola Pool, *The Social Impact of the Telephone* (Cambridge, Mass.; MIT Press, 1981).

45 This seems to be the prevalent notion, for instance, in most of the contributions to Jason Ditton, *The View from Goffman* (London: Macmillan, 1980). See also Alasdair Maclntyre, *After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1981), pp. 108-9. Cf. R. Harré and P. F.* Secord, *The Explanation of Social Behaviour* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972), chapter 10.

46 Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (London: Heinemann, 1971), pp. 379-81.

47 CPST, pp. 83-4, and *passim.*

48 Goffman, *Behaviour in Public Places, p.* 18.

49 Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis* (New York: Harper, 1974), p. 252.

50 Roger Caillois, *Man, Play and Games* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1962); see also the famous work by Jan Huizinga, *Homo Ludens* (London: Routledge, 1952).

51 Goffman, *Frame Analysis, p.* 560. I shall not discuss here the epistemological questions which are broached, but hardly resolved, in Goffman's discussion in this book. They share a good deal in common with Schutz's ponderings over the nature of 'multiple realities', and with many other currents in modern philosophy concerned with the apparently relativistic implications of the mediation of frames of meaning. See *NRSM,* chapter 4.

52 Goffman, *Behaviour in Public Places, pp.* 156ff.

53 Ibid.

54 This theme, of course, has been much explored. The best-known work is Edward T. Hall, *The Silent Language* (New York: Doubleday, 1959); see also the same author's *The Hidden Dimension (London: Bodley Head, 1966).*

55 Harvey Sacks and Emmanuel A. Schegloff, 'A simplest systematics for the organisation of turn-taking in conversation', *Language, vol.* 50, 1974.

56 Cf. George Psathas, *Everyday Language: Studies in Ethnometho-*

dology (New York: Irvington, 1979).

57 Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (London: New Left Books, p. 259).

58 Goffman, *Interaction Ritual, pp.* 141ff.

59 Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Han delns* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981), vol. I, section 3.

60 Goffman, *Behaviour in Public Places, p.* 25.

61 Cf. the general discussion of politeness in Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson, 'Universals in language use: politeness phenomena', in Esther N. Goody, *Questions and Politeness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

62 Goffman, *Behaviour in Public Places, p.* 35. cf. John Blacking, *The*

Anthropology of the Body. (London: Academic Press, 1977).

63 'I take many bodily feelings to be private. If I have a burn on my arm, I take the pain to be private, the sight to be public. This is not always so. Some people feel that they can actually *feel* another person's pain, or think directly another's thoughts, and may feel that other people can feel their bodily feelings, or actually be thinking their thoughts', R. D. Laing, *Self and Others* (London: Penguin, 1971), p. 34.

64 Harold Garfinkel, 'A conception of, and experiments with, "trust" as a condition of stable concerted actions', in 0. J. Harvey, *Motivation and Social Interaction* (New York: Ronald Press, 1963).

65 Erving Goffman, *Forms of Talk* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), pp. 101ff.

66 Ibid., p. 103.

67 Ibid., pp. 70-1.

68 Roy Bhaskar, *The Possibility of Naturalism* (Brighton: Harvester, 1979), pp. 51-2.

69 For a recent example - among very many others - see Bruce J. Biddle, *Role Theory* (New York: Academic Press, 1979).

70 CPST, p. 117.

71 Ibid.

72 A point often made in the controversy over role theory in Germany some two decades ago. A contribution that retains its interest is F. H. Tenbruk: 'Zur deutschen Rezeption der Rollenanalyse', Kölner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie, vol. 3, 1962.

73 Cf. Nigel Thrift, 'Flies and germs: a geography of knowledge', in

Derek Gregory and John Urry, *Social Relations and Spatial*

Structures (London: Macmillan, 1984).

74 Cf. William Labov, 'Rules for ritual insults', in David Sudnow, *Studies in Social Interaction* (New York: Free Press, 1972).

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75 D. Lawrence Wieder, 'Telling the code', in Roy Turner, *Ethnomethodology* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974).

76 Ibid., p. 149.

Critical Notes: ***Freud on Slips of the Tongue***

i Sigmund Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), p. 51.

2 R. Meringer and C. Mayer, *Versprechen und Verlesen* (Vienna, 1895).

3 Freud, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), p. 39.

4 Ibid., p. 40.

5 Originally published in Freud's article, 'The physical mechanism of forgetfulness' (1890); see the Standard Edition, vol. 3. Freud, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, p.* 44. Ibid., p. 135.

Boileau, *Art poétique,* quoted in ibid., p. 148.
Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, p.* 71.

Erving Goffman, 'Radio talk: a study of the ways of our errors', in *Forms of Talk* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981).

Ibid., p. 242.

They were no doubt selected for this reason. Most of Goffman's material comes from collections of 'bloopers' edited by Kermit Schafer, such as *Prize Bloopers* (Greenwich: Fawcett, 1965).

Donald S. Boomer and John D. M. Laver, 'Slips of the tongue', *British Journal of Disorders of Communication,* vol. 3, 1968, p. 2.

Victoria A. Fromkin, 'The non-anomalous nature of anomalous utterances', *Language,* vol. 47, 1971.

Goffman, *Forms of Talk, p.* 226.
As indicated by Goffman. ibid., pp. 223ff.

3. Time, Space and Regionalization

Time-Geography

I have concentrated in the preceding chapter upon specifying certain psychological qualities of the agent and upon analysing interaction in situations of co-presence. The positioning of actors in contexts of interaction, and the interlacing of those contexts themselves, is elemental to such concerns. But to show how these matters relate to broader aspects of social systems it is necessary to consider how social theory should confront - in a concrete rather than an abstractly philosophical way - the 'situatedness' of interaction in time and space.

Most social analysts treat time and space as mere environments of action and accept unthinkingly the conception of time, as mensurable clock time, characteristic of modern Western culture. With the exception of the recent works of geographers - of which more in a moment - social scientists have failed to construct their thinking around the modes in which social systems are constituted across time-space. As I have indicated earlier, investigation of this issue is one main task imposed by the 'problem of order' as conceptualized in the theory of structuration. It is not a specific type or 'area' of social science which can be pursued or discarded at will. It is at the very heart of social theory, as interpreted through the notion of structuration, and should hence also be regarded as of very considerable importance for the conduct of empirical research in the social sciences.

Fortunately, we do not need to tackle these issues *de novo.*

Over the past few years there has taken place a remarkable convergence between geography and the other social sciences, as a result of which geographers, drawing upon the various

established traditions of social theory, have made contributions to social thought of some significance. Most such writings, I think it would be true to say, remain unknown to the majority of those working in the rest of the social sciences, although they contain ideas of very general application. Some of these contributions are to be found in the work of Hagerstrand, but they are by no means confined to his writings and those of his immediate colleagues.'* In previous analyses of the theory of structuration I have mentioned the significance of this approach without confronting it directly or trying to point out its limitations. But in this expanded exposition I shall do so.

Time-geography, as formulated by Hagerstrand, takes as its starting-point the very phenomenon which I have much stressed - the routinized character of daily life. This is in turn connected with features of the human body, its means of mobility and communication, and its path through the 'life-cycle' - and therefore with the human being as a 'biographical project'. As I have mentioned before, Hagerstrand's approach is based mainly upon identifying sources of constraint over human activity given by the nature of the body and the physical contexts in which activity occurs. Such constraints provide the overall 'boundaries' limiting behaviour across time-space. Hagerstrand has formulated these in various different ways, but his characteristic emphasis is upon the following factors.'

(2)

The indivisibility of the human body, and of other living and inorganic entities in the *milieux* of human existence. Corporeality imposes strict limitations upon the capabilities of movement and perception of the human agent.

The finitude of the life span of the human agent as a 'being towards death'. This essential element of the human condition gives rise to certain inescapable demographic parameters of

interaction across time-space. For this reason if no other, time is a scarce resource for the individual actor.

(3) The limited capability of human beings to participate in more than one task at once, coupled with the fact that every task has a duration. Turn-taking exemplifies the implications of this sort of constraint.

((footnote))

References may be found on pp. 158-61.

(4) The fact that movement in space is also movement in time.
(5) The limited 'packing capacity' of time-space. No two human bodies can occupy the same space at the same time; physical objects have the same characteristic. Therefore any zone of time-space can be analysed in terms of constraints over the two types of objects which can be accommodated within it.

These five facets of 'time-geographic reality', according to Hagerstrand, express the material axes of human existence and underlie all contexts of association in conditions of co-presence.' Examined as resources (and thus, I would say, implicated in both the generation and the distribution of power), such factors condition the webs of interaction formed by the trajectories of the daily, weekly, monthly and overall life paths of individuals in their interactions with one another. The trajectories of agents, as Hagerstrand puts it, 'have to accommodate themselves under the pressures and the opportunities which follow from their common existence in terrestrial space and time 1.4

Hagerstrand's generalized conception of time-geography originated in a long-term series of studies of a local parish in Sweden. The area in question boasted comprehensive population statistics, enabling him to trace all the individuals who had lived there, and had moved in and out of the area, for a period of something like a hundred years. Ordering these data as lifetime biographies, he sought to analyse them as composing life paths in time-space that could be charted using a particular form of notation. The typical patterns of movement of individuals, in other words, can be represented as the repetition of routine activities across days or longer spans of time-space. Agents move in physical contexts whose properties interact with their capabilities, given the above constraints, at the same time as those agents interact with one another. Interactions of individuals moving in time-space compose 'bundles' (encounters or social occasions in Goffman's terminology) meeting at 'stations' or definite time-space locations within bounded regions (e.g. homes, streets, cities, states, the outer limit of terrestrial space being the earth as a whole - save for the odd space traveller or two in the current age of high technology).

Hagerstrand's dynamic 'time-space maps' are of definite interest and provide a graphic form that has relevance to situations well beyond those for which they have been used so far.

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Figure 5a

Figure 5b

Figures Sa and Sb show this in its simplest guise. Two individuals, say, live a mile apart in a neighbourhood; their time-space paths across the course of the day bring them into contact in an encounter of short duration in, say, a coffee house or restaurant, following which their activities again diverge. If the daily activities of a specific individual are recorded, it is easy to build up a gross characterization of his or her routine activities, in so far as these comprise trajectories in time and space. As a portrayal of a life path, this would involve generalized patterns of time-space movement within the 'life-cycle'. A person may live in the house of his or her parents, for example, until establishing a new residence on marriage. This may be associated with a change of job, such that both home and workplace, as 'stations' along the daily trajectory, become altered. Mobility within the housing market, marital separation or career progression, amid a host of other possible factors, may influence typical life paths.

The encounters into which individuals enter in the trajectories of daily life are subject to constraints deriving from the list indicated above. Hagerstrand acknowledges, of course, that agents are not merely mobile bodies but intentional beings with purposes, or what he calls 'projects'. The projects which individuals seek to realize, if they are to be actualized, have to utilize the inherently limited resources of time and space to overcome constraints which they confront. 'Capability constraints' are those of the sort listed above. Some affect primarily time distribution: for example, the need for sleep or for food at regular intervals ensures certain limits to the structuration of daily

activities. 'Coupling constraints' refer to those that condition activities undertaken jointly with others. The volume of timespace available to an individual in a day is a prism bounding the pursuance of projects. Prisms of daily conduct are not just geographical or physical boundaries but have 'time-space walls on all sides'. The size of such prisms, of course, is also very strongly influenced by the degree of time-space convergence in the means of communication and transformation available to agents.

The notion of time-space convergence was introduced by another geographer, Janelle, to refer to the 'shrinking' of distance in terms of the time needed to move between different locations.6 Thus the time taken to travel from the East Coast to the West Coast of the United States, in terms of available media, can be calculated as follows. On foot the journey would take more than two years; on horseback eight months; by stagecoach or wagon, four months; by rail in 1910, four days; by regular air services today, five hours; by the fastest jet transport, just over two hours. Time-space convergence can be plotted to describe the outer bounds of daily prisms. However, it is obvious that there are major discrepancies between and within social communities in terms of the constraints on mobility and communication affecting different groups and individuals. Seriality and turn-taking are built into most forms of transportation. Thus, for instance, an express train may connect two cities in a time of three hours. But the availability of seats may be limited, even for those able and willing to pay. Moreover, if a person misses the train, there may be only local trains for several hours until the next express, giving time-space convergence a 'palpitating' character.' Finally, for those in most societies, and for most of the days in an individual's life, mobility takes place within relatively constricted time-space prisms.

Palm and Pred provide one example, among many that exist in the literature, of an application of Hagerstrand's ideas: to the daily prism of 'Jane', an unmarried mother.8 Figure 6 offers a representation of the prism of Jane's day-to-day activities. Jane cannot leave home for work before a certain hour of the day because of her child's dependence on her for feeding and other

needs, and because the sole accessible nursery is not yet open. Jane has no car and hence is faced with severe capability and

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time

coupling constraints in reaching the two 'stations' of the nursery (Ni), and her place of work (Wi). Her choice of jobs is restricted by these constraints, and reciprocally the fact that she has little chance of acquiring or holding down a well-paid occupation reinforces the other constraints she faces in the trajectory of her

path through the day. She has to collect her child in midafternoon, before the nursery closes, and is thus effectively restricted to part-time employment. Suppose she has a choice of two jobs, one better-paid and offering the chance to run a car (W2), making it possible for her to take her child to a nursery (N2) further away from her home. On taking the more remunerative job, she finds that the time expended in driving to the nursery, to and from work and then back home (H) again does not allow her time to do other necessary tasks, such as shopping, cooking and housework. She may therefore feel herself 'forced' to leave the job for a low-paid, part-time alternative nearer home (Wi).

Hagerstrand has made a particular effort to employ time-geography to grasp the seriality of the life paths or 'life biographies' of individuals. A life biography, he says, is made up of 'internal mental experiences and events', 'related to the interplay between body and environmental phenomena'.' The conduct of an individual's day-to-day life entails that he or she successively associates with sets of entities emanating from the settings of interaction. These entities are: other agents, indivisible objects (solid material qualities of the milieu of action), divisible materials (air, water, minerals, foodstuffs) and domains. Domains

refer to what I prefer to call the regionalization of time-space: the movement of life paths through settings of interaction that have various forms of spatial demarcation. But the properties of domains can be subjected to direct study in terms of the coupling constraints which a given distribution of 'stations' and 'activity bundles' creates for the overall population whose activities are concentrated within those domains. Thus the nature of interacting social patterns within domains of time-space is limited by the overall organization of capability and coupling constraints. There are 'ecological' constraints which, as Carlstein has tried to show in detail, derive from three modes of 'packing':

(1) the packing of materials, artefacts, organisms and human populations in settlement space-time;

(2) the packing of time-consuming activities in population time-budgets;

(3) the packing of bundles of various sizes, numbers and durations in the population system, i.e. group formation because of the indivisibility and continuity constraints of individuals."'

Critical Comments

The interest of time-geography to the theory of structuration is surely evident." Time-geography is concerned with the constraints that shape the routines of day-to-day life and shares with structuration theory an emphasis upon the significance of the practical character of daily activities, in circumstances of co-presence, for the constitution of social conduct. We are able to begin to flesh out the time-space structuring of the settings of interaction which, however important Goffman's writings may be, tend to appear in those writings as given milieux of social life. Hagerstrand's concentration upon everyday social practices is very pronounced and clear; he wishes to use time-geography, he insists, to understand 'the impact of the ordinary day of the ordinary person'

upon the overall organization of social systems." But time-geography has some very distinct shortcomings, some of which, I hope, are apparent from the preceding discussion in this book.

The main reservations one must have about time-geography are the following. First, it operates with a naive and defective conception of the human agent. In stressing the corporeality of

the human being in structured time-space contexts, Hagerstrand's ideas accord closely with those I have sought to elaborate previously. But he tends to treat 'individuals' as constituted independently of the social settings which they confront in their day-to-day lives. Agents are regarded as purposive beings in the sense that their activities are guided by 'projects' which they pursue. But the nature and origin of projects is left unexplicated. Second, Hagerstrand's analyses therefore tend to recapitulate the dualism of action and structure, albeit in rather novel form because of his pre-eminent concern with time and space. 'Stations', 'domains', etc., are themselves taken as givens, the outcome of uninterpreted processes of institutional formation and change. Unsurprisingly, in this type of viewpoint little emphasis is placed on the essentially transformational character of all human action, even in its most utterly routinized forms. Third, concentration solely upon constraining properties of the body, in its movement through time-space, is unwarranted. All types of constraint, as I have said, are also types of opportunity, media for the enablement of action. The specific way in which Hagerstrand tends to conceptualize 'constraint', moreover, betrays a certain culture-bound element in his views. For capability constraints, coupling constraints and so on are typically discussed by him in terms of their operation as scarce resources. It is not difficult to see here once more a possible link with a version of historical materialism. There is more than a hint in Hagerstrand's writings of the notion that allocation of scarce resources of the body and its media has some sort of determining effect upon the organization of social institutions in all types of society. Such is a feasible proposition, I think, only in the case of contemporary societies, in which a premium is placed upon the

'efficient' use of resources." Finally, time-geography involves only a weakly developed theory of power. Hagerstrand does talk of 'authority constraints', which he links to capability and coupling constraints. But these are both vaguely formulated and invoke a zero-sum conception of power as a source of limitations upon action. If power is conceived of as generative, on the other hand, the 'constraints' of which Hagerstrand speaks are all modalities for the engendering and sustaining of structures of domination.

In order to develop such ideas more adequately in respect of considerations explored earlier in this book we have to look again

at the notion of 'place' as ordinarily used by geographers. Hagerstrand's time-geography suggests a very effective critique of 'place' in respect of demonstrating the significance, in studying human social conduct, of analysing the organization of timespace. But his emphasis is very much upon integrating temporality into social theory. He does not subject the notions of place or location to a close conceptual scrutiny and uses such terms in a relatively unexamined fashion. The term 'place' cannot be used in social theory simply to designate 'point in space', any more than we can speak of points in time as a succession of 'nows'. What this means is that the concept of presence - or, rather, of the mutuality of presence and absence - has to be explicated in terms of its spatiality as well as its temporality. In developing the theory of structuration I have introduced two notions that are of some relevance here: the concepts of *locale* and of *presence availability* as involved in the relations between social and system integration. 14

Locales refer to the use of space to provide the *settings* of interaction, the settings of interaction in turn being essential to specifying its *contextuality.* The constitution of locales certainly depends upon the phenomena given pride of place by Hagerstrand: the body, its media of mobility and communication, in relation to physical properties of the surrounding world. Locales provide for a good deal of the 'fixity' underlying institutions, although there is no clear sense in which they 'determine' such 'fixity'. It is usually possible to designate locales in terms of their physical properties, either as features of the material world or, more commonly, as combinations of those features and human artefacts. But it is an error to suppose that locales can be described in those terms alone - the same form of error made by behaviourism with regard to the description of human action. A 'house' is grasped as such only if the observer recognizes that it is a 'dwelling' with a range of other properties specified by the modes of its utilization in human activity.

Locales may range from a room in a house, a street corner, the shop floor of a factory, towns and cities, to the territorially demarcated areas occupied by nation-states. But locales are typically internally *regio nalized,* and the regions within them are

of critical importance in constituting contexts of interaction. Let me develop a little further the notion of context. One of the

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reasons for using the term 'locale' rather than 'place' is that properties of settings are employed in a chronic way by agents in the constitution of encounters across space and time. An obvious element of this is the physical aspect of what Hagerstrand calls 'stations' - i.e. 'stopping places', in which the physical mobility of agents' trajectories is arrested or curtailed for the duration of encounters or social occasions - as locales in which the routine activities of different individuals intersect. But the features of settings are also used, in a routine manner, to constitute the meaningful content of interaction: demonstration of the manifold ways in which this occurs ranks among the major contributions of Garfinkel and of Goffman. Context thus connects the most intimate and detailed components of interaction to much broader properties of the institutionalization of social life.

Modes of Regionalization

'Regionalization' should be understood not merely as localization in space but as referring to the zoning of time-space in relation to routinized social practices. Thus a private house is a locale which is a 'station' for a large cluster of interactions in the course of a typical day. Houses in contemporary societies are regionalized into floors, halls and rooms. But the various rooms of the house are zoned differently in time as well as space. The rooms downstairs are characteristically used most in daylight hours, while bedrooms are where individuals 'retire to' at night. The division between day and night in all societies used to be perhaps the most fundamental zoning demarcation between the intensity of social life and its relaxation - ordered also, obviously, by the need of the human organism for regular periods of sleep. Night time was a 'frontier' of social activity as marked as any spatial frontiers have ever been. It remains a frontier, as it were, that is only sparsely settled. But the invention of powerful, regularized modes of artificial lighting has dramatically expanded the potentialities of interaction settings in night hours. As one observer has remarked:

The last great frontier of human immigration is occurring in time: a spreading of wakeful activity throughout the twenty-four hours of the day. There is more multiple shift factory work, more police

coverage, more use of the telephone at all hours. There are more hospitals, pharmacies, aeroplane flights, hostels, always-open restaurants, car rental and gasoline and auto repair stations, bowling alleys, and radio stations, always active. There are more emergency services such as auto-towing, locksmiths, bail bondsmen, drug and poison and suicide, gambling 'hot lines' available incessantly. Although different individuals participate in these events in shifts, the organizations involved are continually active."

Zerubavel's study of the temporal organization of a modern hospital, where zoning is very tightly controlled, is relevant here. Most of the services of medical care in the hospital he studied are provided by rotating nursing staff. The majority of nurses work for set periods on different wards, moving around the different sectors of the hospital, and they also are called upon to alternate day and night shift work. The cycle of movement between wards coincides with that between day and night work, so that when someone 'goes to days' he or she also changes to another sector. The scheduling of these activities is complex and detailed. While nurses' work is regulated in standardized four-weekly periods, the rotation of interns and residents is variable. Nurses' rotations always begin on the same day of the week, and since they are of twenty-eight days, they do not coincide with calendar months. The activities of house staff, on the other hand, are organized in terms of calendar months and hence begin on different days of the week.

Weekly and daily zones are also punctiliously categorized. Many routines occur at precise, seven-day intervals, especially those involving nurses. Nurses' 'time off' is also counted against a weekly schedule. Time off can be split into a number of segments taken separately, but each segment has to be a multiple of seven days, and each has to begin on Sunday and to end on Saturday to co-ordinate with the rotations of work activities. 'Weekdays' are not identical to 'weekend' days, however, because although operating upon a continuous basis, various kinds of services are restricted in the hospital during the weekend. As laboratories are closed, for example, the hospital staff know that they cannot get certain sorts of

tests carried out. They try to admit as few new patients as possible at weekends and to avoid initiating new treatment programmes for existing inmates. Saturdays and Sundays are usually 'quiet' days; Monday is the busiest day of the

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week. In day-to-day life in the hospital the alternation of 'day' and 'night' resembles the division of the week into weekdays and weekends. As the author notes, the fact that working at nights is still considered unusual, and unusually demanding, is indicated by the term used to refer to it: 'night duty'. There is no corresponding term 'day duty'."

A useful classification of modes of regionalization might be offered by figure 7. By the 'form' of regionalization I mean the

form of the boundaries that define the region. In most locales the boundaries separating regions have physical or symbolic markers. In contexts of co-presence these may allow a greater or lesser number of the features of 'presencing' to permeate adjoining regions. As has been mentioned, in social gatherings the regionalization of encounters is usually indicated only by body posture and positioning, tone of voice and so on. In many such gatherings, as regionally bounded episodes, encounters may be nearly all of very short duration. Walls between rooms, on the other hand, may demarcate regionalization in such a way that none of the ordinary media of co-presence can penetrate. Of course, where walls are thin various kinds of interruptions or embarrassments to the closure of encounters can occur. Aries, Elias and others have pointed to the ways in which the internal differentiation of the houses of the mass of the population since the eighteenth century has been interrelated with changing aspects

of family life and sexuality." Prior to the eighteenth century in Western Europe the homes of the poor frequently had only one or two rooms, in which various communal living and sleeping arrangements were found. The grander houses of the aristocracy had many rooms, but these usually connected directly with one another, without the hallways which in modern houses permit types of privacy that were formerly difficult to achieve for all classes of society.

Regionalization may incorporate zones of great variation in span or scale. Regions of broad spans are those which extend widely in space and deeply in time. Of course, the intersection of 'spans' of space and time may vary, but regions of considerable span necessarily tend to depend upon a high degree of institutionalization. All regions, as defined here, involve extension in time as well as space. 'Region' may sometimes be used in geography to refer to a physically demarcated area on a map of the physical features of the material environment. This is not what I mean by the term, which as used here always carries the connotation of the structuration of social conduct across timespace. Thus there is a strong degree of regional differentiation, in terms of class relationships and a variety of other social criteria, between the North and the South in Britain. 'The North' is not just a geographically delimited area but one with long-established, distinctive social traits. By the 'character' of regionalization I refer to the modes in which the time-space organization of locales is ordered within more embracing social systems. Thus in many societies the 'home', the dwelling, has been the physical focus of family relationships and also of production, carried on either in parts of the dwelling itself or in closely adjoining gardens or plots of land. The development of modern capitalism, however, brings about a differentiation between the home and the workplace, this differentiation having considerable implications for the overall organization of production systems and other major institutional features of contemporary societies.

Front Regions, Back Regions

One aspect of the character of regionalization is the level of presence-availability associated with specific forms of locale. The notion of 'presence-availability' is an essential adjunct to that of

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co-presence. The 'being together' of co-presence demands means whereby actors are able to 'come together'. Hagerstrand's time-geography draws our attention to some of the factors typically involved here. Communities of high presence-availability in all cultures, prior to only some hundred years ago, were groupings of individuals in close physical proximity to one another. The corporeality of the agent, the limitations upon the mobility of the body in the trajectories of the *durée* of daily activity, together with the physical properties of space, ensured that this was so. The media of communication were always identical to those of transportation. Even with the use of fast horses, ships, forced marches, etc., long distance in space always meant long distance in time. The mechanization of transport has been the main factor leading to the dramatic forms of time-space convergence noted previously as characteristic of the modern age. But the most radical disjuncture of relevance in modern history (whose implications today are very far from being exhausted) is the separation of media of communication, by the development of electronic signalling, from the media of transportation, the latter always having involved, by some means or another, the mobility of the human body. Morse's invention of the electromagnetic telegraph marks as distinctive a transition in human cultural development as the wheel or any other technical innovation ever did.

The different aspects of the regionalization of locales indicated above shape the nature of presence-availability in varying ways. Thus the rooms of a dwelling may ensure that encounters can be sustained in different parts of the building without intruding upon one another, providing a particular symmetry, perhaps, with the routines of the day for its incumbents. But living in close proximity within the house also means, of course, high presence-availability: co-presence is very easily secured and sustained. Prisons and

asylums are often associated with enforced continuity of copresence among individuals who are not ordinarily accustomed to such routines of daily life. Prisoners who share the same cell may rarely be out of each other's presence for the whole of the day and night. On the other hand, the 'disciplinary power' of prisons, asylums and other types of 'total institution' is based upon disrupting the gearing of presence-availability into the routines of daily trajectories 'outside'. Thus the very same inmates

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who are forced into continuous co-presence are denied the avilability of easy encounters with other groups in the prison, even though those others may be physically only on the other side of the walls of the cell. The enforced `sequestration' of prisoners from the `outside world', limiting the possibilities of co-presence to those within a single locale, is, of course, a defining feature of a `total institution'.

We can further draw out the relevance of regionalization to the structuration of social systems by considering how zoning is accomplished in different settings. `Face' and `front' are related

first of all to the positioning of the body in encounters. The regionalization of the body, so important to psychoanalysis — which, in Lacan's phrase, explores `openings on the surface' of the body — has a spatial counterpart in the regionalization of the contexts of interaction. Regionalization encloses zones of time-space, enclosure permitting the sustaining of distinctive relations between `front' and `back' regions, which actors employ in organising the contextuality of action and the sustaining of ontological security. The term `facade' in some part helps to designate the connections between face and front regions.[18] It hints, however, that frontal aspects of regionalization are inherently inauthentic, and that whatever is real or substantial is hidden behind. Goffman's discussion of front and back regions also tends to have the same implication: that whatever is `hidden

away' expresses the real feelings of those who enact role performances 'up front'. While obviously this may often be the case, I think here we come up against the limitations of the dramaturgical model that Goffman employs, especially in his earlier writings, and we see again the consequences of the lack of a general interpretation of the motivation of the routines of daily life. If agents are only players on a stage, hiding their true selves behind the masks they assume for the occasion, the social world would indeed be largely empty of substance. Why, in fact, should they bother to devote the attention they do to such performances at all? Players in genuine theatre, after all, have a motivation to impress the audience with the quality of their performances, since they are specialists in those very performances as professionals. But this is a very particular situation, not in fact one generic to social life. To regard it as such is to make something of the same mistake which Goffman himself identifies in analysing talk. The 'faultless speech' of the newscaster is exceptional, and bound up with the presumed expertise of one who is a specialist in the production of smooth talk; in most contexts of day-to-day life agents are not motivated to produce this kind of speech.

The sustaining of ontological security could not be achieved if front regions were no more than façades. The whole of social life would be, in Sullivan's phrase, a desperate search to put on 'security operations' to salvage a sense of self-esteem in the staging of routines. Those who do feel this way characteristically display modes of anxiety of an extreme kind. It is precisely because there is generally a deep, although generalized, affective involvement in the routines of daily life that actors (agents) do not ordinarily feel themselves to be actors (players), whatever the terminological similarity between these terms. Theatre can challenge social life by its very mimicry in pantomime. This is presumably what Artaud means in saying, 'The true theatre has always seemed to me the exercise of a terrible and dangerous act, in which, moreover the idea of theatre and performance is eradicated.. .'11 Consider also Laing's discussion of the hysteric:

Unless one is depressed, it is the others who complain of self's lack of genuineness or sincerity. It is regarded as pathognomic of the hysteric's characteristic strategy that his or her actions should be

false, that they should be histrionic, dramatized. The hysteric, on the other hand, often insists that his feelings are real and genuine. It is we who feel they are unreal. It is the hysteric who insists on the seriousness of his intention of committing suicide while we speak of a mere 'gesture' towards suicide. The hysteric complains that he is going to pieces. It is just in so far as we feel that he is not going to pieces, except in that he is pretending or making believe that he is, that we call him an hysteric.

Thus the differentiation between front and back regions by no means coincides with a division between the enclosure (covering up, hiding) of aspects of the self and their disclosure (revelation, divulgence). These two axes of regionalization operate in a complicated nexus of possible relations between meaning, norms and power. Back regions clearly often do form a significant resource which both the powerful and the less powerful can utilize reflexively to sustain a psychological distancing between their own interpretations of social processes and those enjoined by 'official' norms. Such circumstances are likely to approximate most closely to those in which individuals feel themselves to be playing parts in which they do not really 'believe'. But it is important to separate out two types of situation in which this may hold, because only one approximates at all closely to the dramaturgical metaphor. In all societies there are social occasions which involve ritual forms of conduct and utterance, in which the normative sanctions regulating 'correct performance' are strong. Such episodes are usually set apart regionally from the rest of social life and differ from it specifically in requiring homology of performance from occasion to occasion. It seems especially in these circumstances that individuals are likely to feel they are 'playing roles' in which the self is only marginally involved. Here there is likely to be tension in the style and continuity of performance, and style may be accentuated much more than in most day-to-day social activity.

Disclosure and Self

Back regions involved in ritualized social occasions probably often do quite closely resemble the 'backstage' of a theatre or the 'off-camera' activities of filming and television productions. But this backstage may very well be 'on stage' so far as the ordinary

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routines of social life, and the ordinary proprieties, go. For these sorts of occasion do involve fixed performances for audiences, though there is no necessary implication that those in the back regions are able to relax the usual courtesies of tact or 'repair'. The level of enclosure between front and back regions is nevertheless likely to be very high, since it often holds that the more ritualized the occasion, the more it has to be presented as an autonomous set of events, in which the backstage props are kept entirely out of view of audiences or observers. It is worth pointing out that there is much more to the distinction between 'public' and 'private' activities than might appear from the seemingly mutually exclusive nature of these categories. Ceremonial occasions are distinctively, prototypically public events, often involving 'public figures'. But the backstage of such occasions is not a 'private sphere': the chief figures in the drama may be able to relax even less when, leaving the ceremonial arena, they move among their inferiors, the individuals who are merely 'behind the scenes'.

Ritual occasions seem for the most part distinctively different from the range of circumstances in which back regions are zones within which agents recover forms of autonomy which are compromised or threatened in frontal contexts. These are often situations in which sanctions are imposed upon actors whose commitment to those norms is marginal or nonexistent. The forms of enclosure and disclosure which allow agents to deviate from, or flout, those norms are important features of the dialectic of control in situations involving surveillance. Surveillance, as I have pointed out elsewhere, connects two related phenomena: the collation of information used to co-ordinate social activities of subordinates, and the direct supervision of the conduct of those subordinates. In each

respect the advent of the modern state, with its capitalist-industrial infrastructure, has been distinguished by a vast expansion of surveillance." Now 'surveillance', by its very nature, involves disclosure, making visible. The garnering of information discloses the patterns of activity of those to whom that information refers, and direct supervision openly keeps such activity under observation in order to control it. The minimization or manipulation of conditions of disclosure is thus ordinarily in the interests of those whose behaviour is subject to surveillance - the more so according to how far what

they are called upon to do in such settings is regarded as uninteresting or noxious.

Back regions in, say, settings of the shop floor include 'odd corners' of the floor, tea rooms, toilets and so on, as well as the intricate zonings of displacement of contact with supervisors which workers can achieve through bodily movement and posture. Descriptions of the use of such zoning in order to control properties of the setting (and thereby to sustain modes of autonomy in power relationships) are legion in the literature of industrial sociology. For instance, here is a worker talking about a characteristic incident on the floor of a car factory:

I was working on one side of the car and the boot lid dropped. It just grazed the head of the fella working opposite me. I can see it now. He stopped working, had a look round to see if anyone was watching. I was pretending not to look at him - and then he held his head. He'd had enough like. You could see him thinking, 'I'm getting out of this for a bit.' He staggered, I could see him looking round. You know what it was like in there. Paint everywhere. He wasn't going to fall in the paint... so he staggered about ten yards and fell down with a moan on some pallets. It was bloody funny. One of the lads saw him there and stopped the line. The supervisor came chasing across. 'Start the line... start the line .. . .' He started the line and we had to work. We were working one short as well. It took them ages to get him out of there. They couldn't get the stretcher in. It must have been half an hour before they got him. Him lying there, y'know, with his one eye occasionally opening for a quick look round: 'What's happening? 122

Derogation of those in authority is obviously extremely common in such situations. The incident described here, however, emphasizes the fact that defamatory action of this sort is not always kept confined to the back region, to activities closed off from the presence of those who are the targets.

The regional zoning of activities in many contexts of this sort connects closely, of course, with the seriality of encounters in time-space. But again it does not clearly converge with a division between public and private activity. The worker makes no attempt to disguise to his workmate that the act of malingering is directed towards temporarily escaping from the pressures of the assembly line. Such front/back differentiations - ordinarily occurring in circumstances of marked imbalances of power - can in a general

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way be **distinguished from those** in which the situational proprieties of interaction are weakened or allowed to lapse. These are situations in which front, the details of bodily control and some 'repair' procedures of care for others can all be relaxed. At least one connotation of 'privacy' is the regional isolation of an individual - or of individuals, for privacy does not seem inevitably to imply solitude - from the ordinary demands of the monitoring of action and gesture, whereby 'infantile' types of conduct are permitted expression. The zoning of the body seems in most (all?) societies to be associated with the zoning of activities in time-space in the trajectories of the day within locales. Thus eating usually occurs in definite settings at definite times, and is usually also 'public' in the restricted sense of involving gatherings of family members, friends, colleagues and so on. The dressing or adornment of the body may not be universally treated as 'private' but at least in most cultures seems to be so regarded. In spite of Elias's claims that sexual activity was carried on in an unconcealed way in medieval Europe," genital sexuality seems everywhere to be zoned as a back-region phenomenon, with many variations, of course, in intersecting modes of public and private behaviour.

It seems plausible. to suppose that the intersections between regionalization and the expressions of bodily care are intricately bound up with the sustaining of the basic security system. Back regions which allow the individual complete solitude from the presence of others may be less important than those which allow the expression of 'regressive behaviour' in situations of copresence. Such regions may permit

profanity, open sexual remarks, elaborate griping . . . rough informal dress, 'sloppy' sitting and standing posture, use of dialect or substandard speech, mumbling and shouting, playful aggressivity and 'kidding', inconsiderateness for the other in minor but potentially symbolic acts, minor physical self-involvements such as humming, whistling, chewing, nibbling, belching and flatulence."

Far from representing a diminution of trust, these types of behaviour might help to reinforce the basic trust in the presence of intimates originally built up in relation to the parental figures. They are marked not by the sort of upsurge of anxiety brought about by critical situations but the reverse a dissipation of tensions deriving from the demands of tight bodily and gestural control in other settings of day-to-day life.

Regionalization as Generic

The differentiations between enclosure, disclosure, back and front regions, apply across large spans of time-space, not only in the contexts of co-presence. These are, of course, unlikely to be as directly monitored reflexively by those whom they affect, although such may be the case. Regionalization within urban areas in contemporary societies has been much studied since the early work of the Chicago sociologists Park and Burgess. In most Western societies, the zoning of cities into neighbourhoods with markedly different social characteristics is strongly influenced by the operation of housing markets, and by separations between individually owned homes and state-operated housing sectors. Neighbourhoods may not be zoned as symmetrically as some of the 'ecological' urban analysts suggested, but their distribution has the consequence of creating various sorts of front/back contrasts. Industrial areas in northern towns and cities in England were once the most visible features of the built environment -factories and mills, as it were, proudly displayed. But the tendency in urban planning in recent years has been to treat such areas as unsightly, as back regions to be hidden away in enclosed enclaves, or transferred to the edge of town. Examples can easily be multiplied. The access of those in more affluent sectors of housing markets to relatively easy transfer of property underlies the 'flight to the suburbs', changing city centres from regions of frontal display to back regions of urban decay, which the 'respectable classes' avoid. Ghetto areas may be rendered 'invisible' by their regional enclosure in neighbourhoods having very low rates both of property transfer and of daily mobility in and out of those neighbourhoods. As always, various types of time-series phenomena underlie such spatial regionalization.

Regionalization across long spans of time-space has been analysed by many writers in terms of familiar notions such as 'uneven development' and distinctions between 'centre' (or 'core') and 'periphery'. These notions, however, can be applied across the

whole range of the settings of locales, from large to small. Rather than discussing the theme of uneven development here, I shall develop the differentiation of centre and periphery by relating it to embeddedness in time. If the world economy has its

centres, and cities have their centres, so too do the daily trajectories of individual actors. In modern societies, for the majority of males at least, the home and workplace form the two main centres in which the day's activities tend to be concentrated. Locales also tend to be centred regionally. Some rooms in a house, such as spare bedrooms, for example, may be used only 'peripherally'.

Centre/periphery distinctions tend frequently to be associated with endurance over time." Those who occupy centres 'establish' themselves as having control over resources which allow them to maintain differentiations between themselves and those in peripheral regions. The established may employ a variety of forms of social closure" to sustain distance from others who are effectively treated as inferiors or outsiders.

established

outsiders

Figure 9

peripheral

ons

The 'established' industrial nations of the Western 'core' maintain a central position in the world economy on the basis of

their temporal precedence over the 'less developed' societies. The geopolitical regionalization of the world system may be changing - with, for example, shifts in centres of manufacturing

production to erstwhile peripheral zones in the East - but the factor of priority in time has so far decisively influenced preeminence in space. Within nation-states centre/periphery regionalization seems everywhere to be associated with the existence of 'establishments' that lie at the core of the structuration of

dominant classes. 17 Of course, there are a variety of complex relations involved in these phenomena, and I offer these examples as purely illustrative.

Time, Space, Context

Let me at this point offer a summary of the main points in this chapter so far. The discussion has been concerned with the *contextuality* of social life and social institutions. All social life occurs in, and is constituted by, intersections of presence and absence in the 'fading away' of time and the 'shading off' of space. The physical properties of the body and the *milieux* in which it moves inevitably give social life a serial character, and limit modes of access to 'absent' others across space. Time-geography provides an important mode of notation of the intersection of time-space trajectories in day-to-day activity. But it has to be inserted within a more adequate theorization both of the agent and of the organization of the settings of interaction. In proposing the ideas of locale and of regionalization I want to formulate a scheme of concepts which help to categorize contextuality as inherently involved in the connection of social and system integration."

daily time-space paths distribution of encounters regionalization of locales contextuality of regions

intersection of locales

The graphic techniques developed in time-geography have already proved their fruitfulness in several areas of research. There

is no reason at all why those working in a range of fields in the social sciences should not adopt, and adapt, Hagerstrand's method of notation. But the limitations of time-geography, as indicated above, must certainly also be borne in mind. Moreover, 'clock time' should not be accepted simply as an unquestioned dimension of the construction of topographical models, but must be regarded as itself a socially conditioned influence upon the

nature of the time-space paths traced out by actors in modern societies. The point may, on the face of things, appear to be a banality but is actually very far from being so. What is at issue is not just different means of reckoning time, but divergent forms of the structuration of daily activities.

Consider, for instance, Bourdieu's well-known discussion of time and time-reckoning in Kabylia. Here the year is considered to run from autumn towards summer and the day from evening towards noon. This scheme expresses, however, a conception of time as eternal recurrence, which is in turn part of the basic composition of day-to-day activities. Night is symbolically a time of death, marked by regular taboos - against bathing, coming into contact with stretches of water, looking in a mirror, anointing the hair or touching ashes .2" The morning is not just 'daybreak' but a triumph in the struggle between day and night: to be 'in the morning' is to be open to the light, to the beneficence that is associated with it. The 'opening' of the day is thus a time for going out, when people pour from their houses to their work in the fields. Getting up early means putting oneself under favourable auspices, to 'do honour to the angels'. It is not just a transition in time but a keying of events and practices. Nevertheless, the creative potential of the day must be fostered by magic or other malignant forces can intervene, particularly following the zenith of the sun's rise. For after this the day goes into decline, signalling the imminent return of the decadence and decay of night, 'the paradigm of all forms of decline'."

Bearing this example in mind, let me develop some of the main notions considered in this chapter, taking as an illustration schooling

in contemporary societies. There is no doubt that mapping the time-space patterns followed by pupils, teachers and other staff in a school is a useful topological device with which to begin to study that school. Rather than using the exact forms of representation formulated by Hagerstrand and his co-workers, however, I propose to emphasize the 'reversible time' of day-today routine conduct. Hagerstrand usually portrays time-space paths as having a 'linear' movement through the day. But a more accurate representation of the repetitive character of day-to-day social life is given if we see that most daily time-space paths involve a 'return'. Instead of adopting the form of figure lOa we might take as examplary that of figure lOb.

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Figure lOb

Figure lOa is of the sort favoured by Hagerstrand, in which we look at time-space 'laterally' and the 'time' arrow makes out a specific temporal sequence (usually equivalent to the working day). I propose not to abandon this type of notation but to supplement it - certainly conceptually, if not figuratively - with figure lOb, in which we are looking 'down', as it were, rather than laterally. The lines marked with the arrows represent paths of time-space movement. The length of the lines refers to the amount of time, measured chronologically, spent moving between 'stations' in the course of a particular day by a particular or typical individual; the degree of elongation of the boxes indicates how long is spent within a specific locale. Thus a child's day in school term looks something like the scheme indicated in the diagram. The child may spend three discrete periods in the home (H) per day - sleeping there from the middle of the evening until the early morning, returning there from school (S) in the late afternoon and coming back again after having been out to the cinema (C) in the evening. Some aspects of the child's day are no doubt strongly routinized (the journey to school and back), whereas others (going out to the cinema) may be less so. The most routinized types of activity can be represented as a profile of time-space paths embedded in reversible time.

A school, in Hagerstrand's terms, is a 'station' along the converging paths traced by clusters of individuals in the course of the day. He is right to point out that the conditions which make it possible for individuals to come together within a single locale cannot be taken for granted but have to be examined directly. But a locale is, of course, more than a mere stopping-point.

Space

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'Stations' tend to be black boxes, as it were, in time-geography, because the main focus is upon movement between them. As a type of social organization, concentrated upon a locale having definite physical characteristics, the characteristics of a school can be understood in terms of three features: the distribution of encounters across time and space occurring within it, the internal regionalization that it displays, and the contextuality of the regions thus identified.

Modern schools are disciplinary organizations, and their bureaucratic traits clearly both influence and are influenced by the regions they contain. Like all forms of disciplinary organization, the school operates within closed boundaries, its physical borders being cut off rather clearly from day-to-day interaction outside. A school is a 'container', generating disciplinary power. The enclosed nature of school life makes possible a strict co-ordination of the serial encounters in which inmates are involved. The segments of children's time that are spent in school are spatially and temporally sealed off from potentially intrusive encounters outside. But this is also true, usually at least, of the divisions between different classes. Schools are internally partitioned. There may be some areas in a school, and some times, when heterogeneous or unfocused forms of interaction tend to occur - e.g. at the beginning and end of classes. But for the most part the distribution of encounters within a school contrasts dramatically with sectors of social life in which the normative regulation of activity is looser. Disciplinary spacing is part of the architectural character of schools, both in the separation of classrooms and in the regulated spacing of desks that is often found inside them. There is no doubt that spatial divisions of this sort facilitate the routinized specification and allocation of tasks.

The school timetable is fundamental to the mobilization of space as co-ordinated time-space paths. School administrators normally do not face the same problems of 'packing' as their counterparts in hospitals do. But, like all disciplinary organizations, schools operate with a precise economy of time. It is surely right to trace the origins of school discipline in some part to the regulation of time and space which a generalized transition to 'clock time' makes possible. The point is not that the widespread use of clocks makes for exact divisions of the day; it is that time enters into the calculative application of administrative authority.

The contextual features of classrooms, as the main 'areas of application' of disciplinary power, obviously vary widely. But in more severe forms of classroom spacing the specification of bodily positioning, movement and gesture is usually tightly organized. The spatial positioning of teacher and pupils in the context of a class is quite different from that of most other situations in which face engagements are carried on. Indeed, it usually signals a collapse of the teacher's control if such situations come into being. The seeming minutiae of bodily posture and mobility to which Goffman draws attention are once more far from incidental here.

The classroom, like the school, is a 'power container'. But it is not one that merely churns out 'docile bodies'. Contexts of copresence, as I have emphasized, can be described as settings, and settings have to be reflexively activated by authority figures in the course of making that authority count. Discipline through surveillance is a potent medium of generating power, but it none the less depends upon the more or less continuous compliance of those who are its 'subjects'. The achievement of such compliance is itself a fragile and contingent accomplishment, as every teacher knows. The disciplinary context of the classroom is not just a 'backdrop' to what goes on in the school class; it is mobilized within the dialectic of control. A school class is a face engagement which has to be reflexively managed, like any other.

Consider the following strip of interaction, described and discussed by Pollard:

Bell for 9. 0 a.m. goes, about half class in, mostly reading books.

Teacher enters breezily: 'Morning - ah, that's good, getting those books out.' Teacher sits at desk, tidies up, gets register out. Meanwhile most of the other children have come into the classroom. The later arrivals talk, swap some football cards, occasionally glance at the teacher.

TEACHER: Right, let's do the register, then, hurry up and sit down you football maniacs - I see that Manchester United lost again.

MANCHESTER UNITED SUPPORTERS: Oh yeah, well they're still better than Liverpool.

TEACHER: (Jokey sarcasm in voice) Really? It must be all the spinach they don't eat. Now then... Martin... Doreen... Alan... Mark (calls register and children answer).

A child comes in late, looking sheepish, and walks to his seat. Other children point and laugh.

CHILD: Hey, Duncan, what are you doing? TEACHER: Duncan, come here. You're late again, three minutes late to be exact. Why? DUNCAN: Sorry, Sir. TEACHER: I said, 'Why?' DUNCAN: I slept in, sir. TEACHER: Well, are you awake now? (Other children laugh.) DUNCAN: Yes, Sir. TEACHER: Well you'd better stay behind for three minutes at 4 o'clock and don't go to sleep again after that.

More laughter, Duncan sits down. Teacher finishes register."

What is going on here? We have to recognize, as the teacher does, that registration has a particular significance for the ordering of the day's activities. It is a marker that signals the opening of the brackets in an encounter, and it is the first salvo fired in a battle that is joined daily between teacher and pupils. The teacher recognizes it as the first occasion to test the mood of the children, as the children do in respect of the teacher. The teacher's maintenance of directive control depends upon ensuring that the children assume the routines involved in the classroom setting. On entry to the classroom in the morning the children are expected to sit in their assigned places, get out their reading books and answer to their names when they are called out. Pollard interprets the teacher's joking and teasing as a front performance, which is intended to set the tone of the day as one of co-operative work. However, this strategy has its risks, as is indicated by the response to a late arrival of one of the children. Another feels able to tease the latecomer. The teacher at once recognizes this as the first test case of the day, in respect of which his superior authority must be demonstrated. His bantering rebuke to

Duncan mixes appeal with firmness, a tactic shown to be successful by the laughter of the children. Thus the events of the day move on. If the teacher had been more overtly disciplinarian and had sent the miscreant to the head, the response could have been judged too severe by the rest of the children. The result then might have been an escalation of threat and punishment

less effective in sustaining routine than the 'effort bargain' which teacher and pupils have implicitly concluded as part of a more co-operative atmosphere.

The very nature of classrooms, in which most things both teachers and children do are visible each to the other, means that back regions usually have a strong temporal as well as spatial definition. For children these lie in some part along the narrow temporal boundaries between classes, whether or not they involve physical movement from one classroom to another. Although the weight of discipline normally bears down most on the children, it is sometimes felt more oppressively by teachers. Teachers usually have a back region to which they can retreat, the staff room, which children ordinarily do not enter. The staff room is no doubt a place for unwinding and relaxation. But it is also somewhere in which tactics of coping with teaching tend endlessly to be discussed, formulated and reformulated.

It is in the nature of disciplinary organizations that the intensity of surveillance inside inhibits direct control from outside. This is a phenomenon which can be seen both in the internal regionalization of the school and in its situation as a locale within other locales. Inside the school the concentration of disciplinary authority in separately partitioned classrooms is the condition of the high level of control over bodily positioning and activity which can be achieved. But this circumstance also acts against the direct supervision of the supervisor. The head is 'in authority' over the teaching staff, but such authority cannot be exercised in the same way as teachers endeavour to control the conduct of children in their classes. Schools therefore tend to have a rather sharply opposed 'double line' of authority. The control which teachers seek to exercise over their pupils is immediate, involving the teacher's continuous face-to-face presence with the children. Supervision of the activity of teachers, however, is necessarily indirect and proceeds by other means. One might hazard a guess that it is only in organizations in which a considerable amount of autonomy from direct supervision is given that a graduated line of authority can be achieved. The enclosed nature of the school, and its clear separation

in time and space from what goes on in surrounding locales, also inhibits supervisory control from the outside, however. Thus inspectors may visit schools regularly to check upon their operation; boards of governors and parents'

associations may make their power felt in influencing policies that help to shape the life of the school. But it is intrinsic to disciplinary power that what goes on in the 'power container' of the school has a significant degree of autonomy from the very outside agencies whose ethos it expresses.

Against 'Micro' and 'Macro': Social and System Integration

The foregoing considerations are of some importance in examining the relations between social and system integration. I do not employ the more familiar terms, 'micro-' and 'macrosociological' study, for two reasons. One is that these two are not infrequently set off against one another, with the implication that we have to choose between them, regarding one as in some way more fundamental than the other. In Goffman's studied refusal to be concerned with issues of large-scale social organization and history, for example, there seems to lurk the idea that in what he sometimes calls microsociology is to be found the essential reality of social life. On the other hand, advocates of macrosociological approaches are prone to regard studies of day-to-day social activity as concerned with trivia - the most significant issues are those of broader scope. But this sort of confrontation is surely a phoney war if ever there was one. At any rate, I do not think that there can be any question of either having priority over the other. A second reason why the micro/macro division tends to conjure up unfortunate associations is that, even where there is no conflict between the two perspectives, an unhappy division of labour tends to come into being between them. Microsociology is taken to be concerned with the activities of the 'free agent', which can safely be left to theoretical standpoints such as those of symbolic interactionism or

ethnomethodology to elucidate; while the province of macrosociology is presumed to be that of analysing the structural constraints which set limits to free activity (see pp. 211). I have made it clear previously that such a division of labour leads to consequences that are at best highly misleading.

Why should the issue of the relation between 'micro-' and 'macrosociological' study be seen as so problematic by many writers? The conceptual division of labour just referred to is presumably the main reason. Reinforced by a philosophical dualism, it demands a more thoroughgoing reformulation of social

theory than most authors are able, or willing to contemplate. It will help to develop this point to look briefly at one of the more interesting recent discussions of the issue, that offered by Collins." Collins points out that the schism between micro- and macro-sociological approaches, as these terms are ordinarily understood, has become accentuated over the past decade or so. While social theory was dominated by functionalism and Marxism, or some combination of the two, social relations in situations of co-presence were typically regarded as substantially determined by broader, `structural' factors. However, as led especially by ethnomethodology, microsociology has become a burgeoning field of interest and one in which the presumptions of the above approaches have been taken to task in a fairly radical fashion. In Collins's view, `the newer, radical microsociology is epistemologically and empirically much more thorough than any previous method. . . . I would suggest that the effort coherently to reconstitute macrosociology upon radically empirical micro-foundations is the crucial step toward a more successful sociological science.'[33]

According to Collins, the proper way forward is via a programme of the `microtranslation' of `structural phenomena'. Such translation is likely to eventuate in theories which have a stronger empirical basis than existing macrosociological theories. Those who are concerned with macrosociological issues are called upon not to abandon their endeavours but to recognize that their work is theoretically incomplete. There are, in Collins's eyes, only three `pure macrovariables': time, space and number. Thus a concept such as `centralization of authority' can be translated into accounts of microsituations — how situated actors actually exert authority in describable contexts. However the `pure macrovariables' enter in as the number of situations of such a sort, in time and in space. `Hence structural variables often turn out to be sheer numbers of people in various kinds of microsituations.'[34] `Social reality', then, is `micro-experience'; it is the numerical temporal and spatial aggregations of such experience which make up the macrosociological level of analysis. The `structural' qualities of social systems are the `results', Collins says, of conduct in microsituations, in so far as they do not depend upon number, time and space.

Although Collins's concept of `structural variables' is somewhat

similar to that advocated by Blau (see pp. 208-10), Collins quite rightly questions the sort of version of 'structural sociology' which Blau and many others propose. But in other respects, Collins's view is wanting. As I have consistently stressed, to treat time and space as 'variables' is to repeat the characteristic error of most forms of orthodox social science. Moreover, why should we assume that 'structure' is relevant only to macrosociological issues? Both in the more precise and in the vaguer senses of the term I have distinguished activity in microcontexts has strongly defined structural properties. I take this, in fact, to be one of the main claims which ethnomethodological research has successfully sustained. Moreover, why hold that time as a 'variable' is relevant only to macrosociological concerns? Temporality is as inseparable from a small strip of interaction as it is from the longest of *longues durées*. Finally, why propose that structural properties consist only of three dimensions, time, space and number? The reason, I assume, is that Collins still has in mind that 'structure' must refer to something 'outside' the activities of social agents if it is to have any sense at all in social science. Dispersion in time and space seems the only phenomenon left, given that Collins accepts a good deal of the criticisms that have been levelled by those whom he calls 'radical microsociologists' against the collective concepts with which their macrosociological antagonists usually operate.

But the most important confusion in Collins's account is the assumption that 'macroprocesses' are the 'results' of interaction in 'microsituations'. According to Collins, the 'macrolevel' consists only of 'aggregations of micro-experiences'. Now, it can be agreed that generalizations in the social sciences always presuppose -and make at least implicit reference to - the intentional activities of human agents. However, it does not follow from this that what is described as the 'macrolevel' has a rather sham existence. This only takes us back to the phoney war. Social institutions are not explicable as aggregates of 'microsituations', nor fully describable in terms that refer to such situations, if we mean by these circumstances of co-presence. On the other hand, institutionalized patterns of behaviour are deeply implicated in even the most fleeting and limited of 'microsituations'.

Let us pursue this thought by indicating why the micro/macro distinction is not a particularly useful one. What is a 'micro

situation'? The response might be: a situation of interaction confined in space and time - seemingly Collins's view. But this is not very helpful. For not only do encounters 'slide away' in time but also once we start being concerned with how encounters are carried on by their participating actors, it becomes clear that no strip of interaction - even if it is plainly bracketed, temporally and spatially - can be understood on its own. Most aspects of interaction are sedimented in time, and sense can be made of them only by considering their routinized, repetitive character. Moreover, the spatial differentiation of the micro and macro becomes imprecise once we start to examine it. For the forming and reforming of encounters necessarily occurs across tracts of space broader than those involved in immediate contexts of faceto-face interaction. The paths traced by individuals in the course of the day break off some contacts by moving spatially to form others, which are then broken off and so on.

What is normally talked about under the heading of micro/ macro processes is the positioning of the body in time-space, the nature of interaction in situations of co-presence, and the connection between these and 'absent' influences relevant to the characterization and explanation of social conduct. These phenomena - the anchoring concerns, in fact, of structuration theory - are better dealt with as concerning the relations between social and system integration. Now, some of the questions at issue in the micro/macro debate are conceptual problems to do with the long-standing controversy over methodological individualism. These I shall leave aside until the next chapter. Other aspects, however, do not rest upon solely conceptual considerations. They can be resolved only by directly analysing particular types of society. Because societies differ in their modes of institutional articulation, the modes of intersection of presence and absence that enters into their constitution can be expected to vary. I shall indicate this briefly here, introducing at the same time material to be expanded upon in the next chapter.

Social integration has to do with interaction in contexts of co-presence. The connections between social and system integration can be traced by examining the modes of regionalization which

channel, and are channelled by, the time-space paths that the members of a community or society follow in their day-to-day activities. Such paths are strongly influenced by, and also

reproduce, basic institutional parameters of the social systems in which they are implicated. Tribal societies (see pp. 182-3) tend to have a heavily segmental form, the village community being overwhelmingly the most important locale within which encounters are constituted and reconstituted in time-space. In these societies relations of co-presence tend to dominate influences of a more remote kind. It makes sense to say that in them there is something of a fusion of social and system integration. But obviously such a fusion is never complete: virtually all societies, no matter how small or seemingly isolated, exist in at least loose connection with wider 'intersocietal systems'.

Since we now live in a world where electronic communication is taken for granted, it is worth emphasizing what is otherwise a self-evident feature of traditional societies (of all societies, in fact, up to a little over a century ago). This is simply that all contacts between members of different communities or societies, no matter how far-flung, involve contexts of co-presence. A letter may arrive from an absent other, but of course it has to be taken physically from one place to another. Very long journeys were made by specialized categories of people - sailors, the military, merchants, mystics and diverse adventurers - in the traditional world. Nomadic societies would roam across vast tracts of land. Population migrations were common. But none of these phenomena alters the fact that contexts of co-presence were always the main 'carrying contexts' of interaction.

What made possible the larger time-space 'stretch' involved in what I shall call class-divided societies was above all the development of cities. Cities establish a centralization of resources - especially administrative resources - that makes for greater time-space distanciation than is typically the case in tribal orders. The regionalization of class-divided societies, however complicated

it may be in detail, is always formed around the connections, of both interdependence and antagonism, between city and countryside.

We tend to use the term 'city' in an encompassing fashion to refer both to urban settlements in traditional societies and to those convergent with the formation and spread of capitalistindustrialism. But this is an obfuscating usage if it is taken to imply that in modern times we merely have more of the same -that today's urbanism is only a denser and more sprawling version

of what went before. The contextualities of traditional cities are in many respects different from those of modern urbanism. Rykwert, for example, points out the symbolic form that many cities had, in widely removed parts of the world, prior to modern times:

It is difficult [for us today] to imagine a situation where the formal order of the universe could be reduced to a diagram of two intersecting coordinates in one place. Yet this is exactly what did happen in antiquity: the Roman who walked along the *cardo* knew that his walk was the axis around which the sun turned, and that if he followed the *decumanus,* he was following the sun's course. The whole universe and its meaning could be spelled out of his civic institutions - so he was at home in it.35

Such cities, we could say, do not yet exist in commodified time and space .31 The buying and selling of time, as labour time, is surely one of the most distinctive features of modern capitalism. The origins of the precise temporal regulation of the day may perhaps be found in the chime of the monastery bell, but it is in the sphere of labour that its influence became embedded in such a way as to spread throughout society as a whole. The commodification of time, geared to the mechanisms of industrial production, breaks down the differentiation of city and countryside characteristic of class-divided societies. Modern industry is accompanied by the spread of urbanism, but its operation is not necessarily fixed in any particular type of area. The traditional city, on the other hand, is both the main locus of disciplinary power in class-divided societies and, as such, set off from the countryside - very often, physically and symbolically, by the city walls. Together with the transformation of time, the commodification of space establishes a 'created environment' of a very distinctive character, expressing new forms of institutional articulation. Such new forms of institutional order alter the conditions of social and system integration and thereby change the nature of the connections between the proximate and remote in time and space.

Critical Notes: Foucault on Timing and Spacing

Foucault's various discussions of the origins of disciplinary power demonstrate a persistent concern with temporal and spatial distribution. According to Foucault, disciplinary power has as its focus the manipulation of the body, regarded essentially as a machine that can be finely tuned. The forms of administration associated with the disciplinary organizations which have mushroomed from the eighteenth century onwards are different from the mass mobilization of labour power found in large-scale projects in agrarian civilizations. Such projects - road-building, the construction of temples, public monuments and so on -often involved large numbers of people. But their activities were co-ordinated only in a gross fashion. The new forms of discipline are tailored precisely to movements, gestures and attitudes of the individual body. Unlike monastic discipline, which is one of its main historical forerunners, the new techniques of power connect discipline directly with utility. The control of the body is part of the novel 'political anatomy' and as such, Foucault says, increases the output of the body while also reducing its independence of orientation.

Discipline can proceed only via the manipulation of time and of space. It ordinarily requires enclosure, a sphere of operations closed off and closed in upon itself. Foucault makes a great deal of the concept of 'confinement', the more or less forcible separation of individuals from the rest of the population in the early hospitals, in mental asylums and in prisons. However, other less embracing disciplinary organizations also involve enclosure. The factors leading to the establishment of closed areas may vary, but the end result is similar in all of them, in some degree because similar models were followed by the individuals and authorities responsible for setting them up. Enclosure is a generalized basis of disciplinary power, but taken alone it is not enough to permit the detailed management of the movements and activities of the body. This can be achieved only through internal regional division or 'partitioning'. Each individual has his

or her 'proper place' at any particular time of the day. The partitioning of disciplinary time-space has at least two consequences. It helps to avoid the formation of large groups which might be a source of independent will formation or of opposition, and it allows for the direct manipulation of individual activities, avoiding the flux and indeterminacy which casual encounters tend to have. What is involved here, according to Foucault, is an 'analytical space', in which individuals can be watched and assessed, their qualities measured. The partitioning of disciplinary space may have been influenced by the example of the monastic cell, but often originated also in architectural forms that were established for purely practical purposes. In France the naval hospital at Rochefort served as a model. It was set up as part of an attempt to cope with the contagious disorders rife in a port teeming with numerous disparate groupings of people engaged in war or trade. Controlling the spread of disease involved other kinds of supervisory regulation of transient populations -that of the military over deserters and of the local administration over the flow of goods, rations and raw materials. This led to pressure for the rigorous control of space, which first involved caring for valuable commodities rather than organizing human beings. But the practice of tagging goods, categorizing and controlling their distribution was later applied to patients. Case records began to be kept. The overall number of patients was carefully regulated; restrictions were placed on their movement and the times at which they were visited. The emergence of 'therapeutic spacing' thus was developed from 'administrative and political' spacing.'*

The partitioning of space came about in rather different circumstances in factories in the late eighteenth century. Here the tendency was also to distribute individuals in demarcated space, but this distribution had to be directed towards the co-ordination of machinery. Thus the arrangement of bodies in space had to correspond to the technical demands of production. But this 'articulation of production space' can also be shown to have been infused with disciplinary power. Foucault quotes the

Oberkampf manufactory at Jouy as an example. The manufactory was constructed of a series of workshops identified according to the type of production operation. Toussaint Barré designed the

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*References may be found on pp. 160-1.

largest of the buildings, which was 110 metres long, with three storeys. On the ground floor block printing was carried out. There were 132 tables, set up in two rows running the length of the workshop; two employees worked at each table. Supervisors would walk up and down the central aisle, being thereby able to supervise the labour process in general and the activities of each individual worker in particular. Workers could be compared for their speed and productivity and their activities correlated with one another. By assorting workers according to strict principles of classification, each element of the labour task could be characterized and related to discrete motions of the body. The doctrines of Frederick Taylor are not much more than a late formulation of the disciplinary power that accompanied the rise of large-scale industry over a century earlier.

The character of disciplinary space, according to Foucault, derives primarily not from the association of an organization with a specific piece of territory but from the farming of space. Lines, columns, measured walled intervals are its distinguishing features. It is not any particular part of the building that matters, but its overall relational form. The classroom exemplifies this phenomenon. In the eighteenth century, in France and elsewhere, classes come to be divided intervally into clearly delimited rows, externally separated by a connecting system of corridors. These are curricular as well as spatial

divisions. Individuals move through such partitions not only in the course of the day but also during their educational careers.

In organizing 'cells', 'places' and 'ranks', the disciplines create complex spaces that are at once architectural, functional and hierarchical. It is spaces that provide fixed positions and permit circulation; they carve out individual segments and establish operational links; they mark places and indicate values; they guarantee the obedience of individuals, but also a better economy of time and gesture.'

Discipline depends upon the calculative division of time as well as space. The monastery, after all, was one of the first places in which the day was temporally regulated in a precise and ordered fashion. The religious orders were the masters of the methodical control of time, and their influence, diffuse or more direct, was felt everywhere. As in most aspects of disciplinary power, the

army provides an apt illustration. Soldiers had long been trained to march in regular formations. The Dutch were the early pioneers of the precise timing of military manoeuvres.3 By the end of the sixteenth century a method had been developed in the Dutch army whereby troops were trained programmatically to manoeuvre in an ordered way while maintaining a steady and continuous rate of fire. This was accomplished by timing the various movements of the body. The method was later applied to the gestures involved in loading, firing and reloading weapons and to many other aspects of military organization. It was in relation to such developments, in fact, that the term 'discipline' underwent a change in meaning. In its original sense it referred to a learning process and was regarded as a trait of the 'disciplined'. However, in the armed forces it came to be applied as ordinarily it is today, as to do with an overall mode of regulation rather than with the process of instruction itself.'

The timing of activities is more than their subordination to measured temporal intervals. It is perhaps the most basic condition of the 'co-ordination of the body and the gesture'. Disciplinary power does not consist only in the imposition of control over specific gestures, but is maximized where gestures are related to the positioning of the body as a whole. The efficient use of the body means that nothing remains idle or unused; attention must be focused wholly upon the act with which the individual is concerned. A disciplined body is a trained body: in this, one might say, the traditional sense of 'discipline' persists. The positioning of the body is the main mediating factor between two temporally articulated sequences. One is the disaggregation of the gesture into a timed series of movements, specifying the parts of the body to be used. Thus Maurice of Orange broke down the handling of the musket into a series of forty-three separate movements, that of the pike into twenty-three, coordinated within a formation of soldiers in a battle unit.' However, the parts of the objects handled are also specified and integrated with the gesture. Precise timing is essential for this, since weaponry and machinery have increasingly become designed to operate in a sequential way, each step in its operation being a prerequisite to what is done next. Disciplinary power depends upon

not just the exploitation of pre-given materials but also the establishment of a 'coercive link with the apparatus of production'.

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Timing also stretches across the progression of careers. Foucault compares two phases in the development of the manufactory school of the Gobelins. The manufactory was established by royal edict in 1667; a school for apprentices was planned as part of the scheme. The superintendent of royal buildings was to select sixty scholarship children for participation in the school, the educational process being organized along the typical lines of guild apprenticeship. The pupils were first of all the responsibility of a master, later serving six years' apprenticeship. Following further service lasting four years and the successful passing of an examination, they were able to set up their own workshops. Here there was a diffuse process of transmission of knowledge, involving an exchange of services between masters and apprentices. The temporal organization of the apprentices' lives - by the standards of what was to follow - was lax. Some seventy years after the school was set up, a new type of training was initiated for the apprentices; it was first of all complementary to the existing modes of procedure. Unlike those modes of procedure, it was based on the careful serial arrangement of time. The children attended the school for two hours a day. Classes were divided according to ability and previous experience. Allotted tasks were carried out in a regular fashion, appraised by the teacher and the most able rewarded. Progression between classes was governed by the results of tests administered to all pupils. Day-to-day behaviour was recorded in a book kept by teachers and their assistants; it was periodically looked at by an inspector.

The Gobelins school was one instance of a general trend in eighteenth-century education, in Foucault's words an expression of a 'new technique for taking charge of the time of individual existences'. Disciplines 'which analyse space, break up and rearrange activities' have to be concentrated also in ways which make possible 'adding up and capitalizing time'.' Four methods can be used to effect this.

(1) The division of lives chronologically, such that phases of development are specifically timed. Thus the period of training can be separated out in a clear fashion from a career proper. Within the training period steps in attainment can be demarcated, and all those receiving instruction can be

made to move sequentially through all of them.

(2) The separate phases of training and the subsequent 'career' - a word which thereby attains only its modern sense -can be organized according to an overall plan. Education has to be freed from the personalized dependence entailed in the relation between master and apprentice. The educational plan has to be set out in impersonal terms, wherever possible dismembered into their most elementary operations, which are then readily learned by anyone undergoing instruction.

(3) Each of the temporal segments has to be concluded with an examination, which not only guarantees that every individual will undergo the same process of instruction but also differentiates each in terms of his or her relative capabilities. The various examinations involved in the pursuit of a career are graded so that they each have to be successfully undertaken before the novitiate can move on to another.

Different forms or levels of training can be designated for the achievement of ranked offices. At the conclusion of each series some individuals can be hired off and allocated to a particular grade, while others continue to higher grades. Every individual is involved in a temporal series by means of which his or her office or rank is defined.

The 'seriation' of successive activities makes possible a whole investment of duration by power: the possibility of a detailed control and a regular intervention (of differentiation, correction, punishment, elimination) in each moment of time; the possibility of characterizing, and therefore of using individuals according to the level in the series that they are moving through; the possibility of accumulating time and activity, of rediscovering them, totalized and usable in a final result, which is the ultimate capacity of an individual. Temporal dispersal is brought together to produce a profit, thus mastering a duration that would otherwise elude one's

grasp. Power is articulated directly on to time; it assures its control and guarantees its use.7

Thus disciplinary methods reflect a specific understanding of

time, one which is an equal-interval scale. In the seriation of time, Foucault proposes, there is a procedure corresponding to the mapping of partitioned space on to bodily activities: this is

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'exercise'. Exercise is the imposition of regular and graduated physical training of the body, with an end state of fitness in view - 'fitness' referring to the preparedness of the body but also to a generalized capacity to carry out designated tasks. The idea and practice of exercise had religious origins but became a secular theme of most of the disciplinary organizations. Exercise demands regular participation over time and works on specific parts of the body. It expresses in a direct fashion the significance of control of the body, in relation to other bodies, which is essential to discipline as a whole. The body is treated as a moving part in a larger composite. Discipline, in sum, demonstrates the following main characteristics. It is 'cellular' (in terms of spatial distribution); it is 'organic' (coding activities according to programmed procedures); it is 'genetic' (in respect of serial phases); and it is 'combinatory' (uniting human activities as the paths of a social machine). Foucault quotes Guibert:

The state that I depict will have a single, reliable, easily controlled administration. It will resemble those large machines, which by quite uncomplicated means produce great effects; the strength of this state will spring from its own strength, its prosperity from its own prosperity. It will disprove that vulgar prejudice by which we are made to imagine that empires are subjected to an imperious law of decline and ruin.

There is an obvious similarity between Foucault's discussion of disciplinary power and Max Weber's analysis of modern bureaucracy. To be sure, the focus of their respective writings is different. Weber concentrates upon the 'heartland' of bureaucracy - the state and its administrative offices. In Foucault's work, on the other hand, the mechanisms of the state are rarely analysed directly; the state is examined 'symptomatically', via seemingly more marginal forms of organization, hospitals, asylums and prisons. However, in each author there is a stress upon the emergence of novel types of administrative power, generated by the concentrated organization of human activities through their precise specification and co-ordination. At first sight the theme of the transformation of time and space seems lacking in Weber's writings, and it is worth indicating how Weber's ideas can be shown to incorporate such a theme. Admittedly, it is latent rather than manifest. Consider first Weber's treatment of the nature of

modern capitalist enterprise. What differentiates 'rational capitalism' from preceding forms? Above all, it is its stable, regular character. Pre-existing types of capitalistic enterprise take place in sporadic, stuttering fashion across time and space. Rational capitalism involves the forging of regularized market relationships across space, something that can only become well-developed with the formation of a bureaucratic state, which guarantees not only property rights but also other essential institutions, most notably a regularized form of paper money exchange.

But control of time is equally necessary. The rational capitalist enterprise is one that is able to operate in a stable, orderly fashion. Weber's emphasis upon the significance of double-entry book-keeping for the development of modern capitalism is readily understandable in these terms. Double-entry book-keeping makes possible continuous capital accounting over long periods of time. Capital accounting is the valuation and verification of profitmaking opportunities. This means making a valuation of total assets at the beginning of a transaction or venture and comparing it with assets at a later date. Profitability depends, among other factors, upon being able to predict future events and subject them to calculation. Double-entry book-keeping is a kind of timemachine, because it both expresses and allows the quantification of units by reference to which the performance of an enterprise can be judged in 'ordered time'.'

Control of time is characteristic of bureaucracy in general, not just of capital enterprises. Double-entry book-keeping is a device which 'stacks' past events as well as anticipating future ones. Bureaucratic rules are also a way of doing this. Modern bureaucracies, Weber asserts, could not exist without the collation of documents which are both records of the past and prescriptions for the future - the 'files'. The files are not only documents of bureaucratic procedure; they exemplify that procedure and make possible the continuous and regular operation upon which bureaucratic discipline depends. Files are usually organized within definite offices and are part of what gives each office in a bureaucracy its distinctiveness. An 'office' is a physical setting as

well as a level in an administrative hierarchy. Although Weber barely touches upon the point, the physical distribution of offices in bureaucracies is a distinctive feature of such organizations. The physical separation of offices insulates each from the other

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and gives a measure of autonomy to those within them, and also serves as a powerful marker of hierarchy.

Weber also stresses the importance of the separation of the office from the domicile of the worker.1° One of the main characteristics of bureaucracy is that the vocational life of the official is segregated from home and family life. Impersonal formulae of bureaucratic discipline can be much more effectively applied when corporate monies and equipment can be kept separate from the private possessions of officials, when personal or kin ties are not the basis upon which decisions are concluded or appointments made and when matters concerning the household are distinguished from business affairs. The thoroughgoing separation of the home from the workplace, Weber makes clear, is found only in the modern West. But we might also note the importance of differentiation of locales in distinguishing between the spheres of operation of varying types of bureaucratic organization. Anyone who doubts the influence of the differentiation of space and setting in shaping and reflecting social patterns should ponder the position of the 'City' in Britain. Its spatial districtiveness from centres of 'industry', and its sheer concentration in one area, express major institutional characteristics of the society of which it is a part (see pp. **319-26).**

Here we might return to Foucault. In this brief excursus I am not interested in assessing the historical rights and wrongs of his exposition, or in probing the theoretical shortcomings which might be discerned in the general views upon which it draws. I want only to add a point or two to his interpretation of the relation of disciplinary power to modalities of time and space. Let me begin with the discussion given in reference to Weber in the preceding paragraph. Foucault treats disciplinary organizations as epitomized by the prison and the asylum - 'total institutions' in Goffman's

phrase, 'complete and austere institutions' in the characterization Foucault adopts from Baltard. 'The prison', as Foucault remarks, 'has neither exterior nor gap; it cannot be interrupted, except when the task is totally completed; its action on the individual must be uninterrupted: an increasing discipline

it gives almost total power over the prisoners; it has its internal mechanisms of repression and punishment: a despotic discipline." Factories, offices, schools, barracks and other contexts where surveillance and disciplinary power are brought

into play are mostly not like this, as Foucault admits, without developing the point. It is an observation of some significance, however, because 'complete and austere institutions' are the exception rather than the rule within the main institutional sectors of modern societies. It does not follow that because prisons and asylums maximize disciplinary power, they express its nature more clearly than the other, less all-embracing organizations.

The journey to work (or school) probably indicates as much about the institutional character of modern societies as do carceral organizations. The time-space separation of different sectors of social life may indeed be the condition of the largescale operation of disciplinary power. Most children attend schools only for part of the day and at certain periods of the year. Moreover, within the school day discipline is often observed in its stricter forms only within the definite timed periods that count as 'lessons'. There is no doubt that disciplinary power can be systematically generated only by the 'packing' of human beings into specific physically demarcated settings. But Weber is surely right to say that administrative discipline is most effective precisely when other aspects of individuals' lives are separated out from it. For it involves the regularized application of criteria of conduct that do not accord with the enactment of activities in other spheres of life. This is not solely because of the factors that Weber mentions but also because of the 'machine-like' nature of discipline. Foucault is led into difficulties in this regard. The point is not just that human beings resist being treated as automata, something which Foucault accepts; the prison is a site of struggle and resistance. Rather, it is that Foucault's 'bodies' are not agents. Even the most rigorous forms of discipline presume that those subject to them are 'capable' human agents, which is why they have to be 'educated', whereas machines are merely designed. But, unless subjected to the most extreme deprivation of resources, capable agents are likely to submit to discipline only for parts of the day - usually as a trade-off for rewards that derive from being freed from such discipline at other times.

In this respect reading Goffman on 'total institutions' can be more instructive than reading Foucault. For Goffman stresses that entry to prisons or asylums is demonstratively different from moving between other settings in which individuals may spend part of their day. 'Total institutions', by virtue of their all

embracing character, impose a totalizing discipline upon those who are placed within them. 'Adjustment' to these circumstances implies, and usually directly leads to, a process of degradation of self, by which the inmate is stripped of tokens of self-identity at the same time as the ordinary components of autonomy of action are heavily constricted. 'Total institutions', it may be said, both express aspects of surveillance and discipline found in other contexts in modern societies and yet also stand out in relief against those other contexts. 'Total institutions' ordinarily involve what Goffman calls 'civil death' - the loss of the right to vote and to engage in other forms of political participation, of the right to will money, write cheques, contest divorce or adopt children. But in addition inmates simply do not have separate spheres of activity where rewards denied in one sector can be pursued in another. Goffman's comment on such matters is very relevant:

> There is an incompatibility, then, between total institutions and the basic work-payment structure of our society. Total institutions are also incompatible with another crucial element of our society, the family. Family life is sometimes contrasted with solitary living, but in fact the more pertinent contrast is with batch living, for those who eat or sleep at work, with a group of fellow workers, can hardly sustain a meaningful domestic existence."

Foucault treats the investigative procedures of criminal law, psychiatry and medicine as illustrating the nature of disciplinary power in general, especially as these are applied within carceral organizations. But again 'total institutions' stand out in this respect as different from the daily life paths of those outside. What Goffman calls the 'territories of the self' are violated there in ways

which do not apply to those not within their walls. Four distinctive features of 'total institutions' can be mentioned in this

respect.

(1) Interrogative procedures frequently transgress what for most of the population are regarded as legitimate 'information preserves' about the self and about the body. In other words, data about inmates' characteristics and past conduct -which would often be regarded as discreditable by them and by others and protected by suppression or tact - are collected in dossiers available to staff.

(2) There is a dissolution of the boundaries between enclosure and disclosure that ordinarily serve to protect a sense of ontological security. Thus it may be the case that excretion, the maintenance of hygiene and appearance not only have to be carried out publicly but are subjected to regimentation by others.

(3) There are often forced and continual relations with others. Hence just as there are no back regions for toilet activities, there are no back regions in which sectors of social life can be kept free from the disciplinary demands made elsewhere. Like Betteiheim, Goffman notes that in 'total institutions' human beings are reduced to states of childlike dependence. 13

(4) The temporal seriation of activities, in the short and long term, is specified and controlled. Inmates do not have 'free time' or 'their own time', as workers do. Moreover, those who undertake serial examinations or pass through serial stages of a career in the outside world are normally also able to counterpose these to other temporal units which have a different pattern. The temporal distribution of marriage and raising children, for example, is initiated separately from those pertaining in other spheres of life.

In carceral organizations the significance of the dialectic of control is still considerable. There are contexts in which that autonomy specifically characteristic of the human agent - the capability to 'have acted otherwise' - is severely reduced. The forms of control which inmates seek to exert over their day-today lives tend to be concentrated above all upon protection against degradation of the self. Resistance is certainly one of these and no doubt is an important consideration that in some degree imposes itself, whatever policies the administrative staff might follow in the implementation of disciplinary procedures. But various other forms of reaction can be readily identified. These include what Goffman calls 'colonization', the construction of a tolerable world within the interstices of managed time and space, and 'situational withdrawal', refusing, as it were, any longer to behave as a capable agent is expected to do. But probably the most common among prisoners, as among the 'mentally

ill', is simply 'playing it cool'. This Goffman aptly describes as 'a somewhat opportunistic combination of secondary adjustments,

conversion, colonization, and loyalty to the inmate group..

There is no doubt, as many sociological studies have demonstrated, that such inmate groups can exert considerable control over day-to-day activities even in the most stringently disciplined carceral organizations. But the modes of control exerted by subordinates in other contexts, such as that of work, is likely to be greater because of a further way in which these contexts contrast with carceral ones. This is that superordinates have an interest in harnessing the activities of those subject to their authority to the enactment of designated tasks. In prisons or asylums the 'disciplining of bodies' comes close to describing what goes on; the administrative staff are not concerned with producing a collaborative endeavour at productive activity. In workplaces and schools, on the other hand, they are. Managers have to coax a certain level of performance from workers. They are concerned not only with the time-space differentiation and positioning of bodies but also with the co-ordination of the conduct of agents, whose behaviour has to be channelled in definite ways to produce collaborative outcomes. Foucault's bodies do not have faces. In circumstances of surveillance in the workplace - where surveillance means direct supervision, at any rate - discipline involves a great deal of 'face work' and the exercise of strategies of control that have in some part to be elaborated by agents on the spot. The time-space 'packing' of groupings of individuals in confined locales, where continuous supervision in circumstances of co-presence can be carried on, is obviously highly important to the generation of disciplinary power. But the demand that agents work together to effect some sort of productive outcome gives those agents a basis of control over the day-to-day operation of the workplace which can blunt supervisory efficacy. Supervisors and managers are as aware of this as anyone, and often build that awareness into the type of disciplinary policies they follow." Some of the forms of control open to workers in a tightly integrated disciplinary space (e.g., the possibility of

disrupting or bringing to a halt an entire production process) do not exist where a workforce is disaggregated in time and space.

Let me offer one final comment on Foucault and Goffman. Both writers have as one of the leading themes in their work the positioning and disciplining of the body. Like Foucault, Goffman

has also pursued at some length questions of the nature of 'madness'. Their common concern with carceral organizations might lead one to overlook the differences in their respective views of madness. Goffman's perspective actually places that of Foucault radically in question in respect of the relations between 'insanity' and 'reason'. Foucault argues that what we call 'madness' - or, following the triumph of the medical metaphor, 'mental illness' - has been created in relatively recent times. Madness is the suppressed, sequestered, dark side of human awareness and passion, which Enlightenment and modern thought is unable to conceive of in any other way save as 'unreason'. In traditional cultures, or at least in medieval Europe, folly/folie encapsulated its own reason, permitting something of a direct access to God. But by the middle of the seventeenth century and thereafter, 'Madness has ceased to be, at the margins of the world, of man or death, an eschatological figure; the darkness on which the eyes of madness were trained, out of which the forms of the impossible were born, has evaporated. But perhaps this view invests madness with a grandeur which it does not have and has never had? In seeing madness as the other face of reason it may express just those Enlightenment claims it affects to disparage. It may very well be that the clues to the character of madness or, in its modern guise, 'mental illness' are to be found not in the extravagance of delusions, visions of other worlds, but in much more mundane features of bodily and gestural impropriety. Social disability, not a mysterious access to a lost continent of unreason, may express its real nature.

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4 T. Hagerstrand, *Innovation as a Spatial Process* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1967), p. 332. Cf. also Amos H. Hawley, *Human Ecology* (New York: Ronald Press, 1950), chapters 13-15; E. Gordon Ericksen, *The Territorial Experience* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980).

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T. Carlstein, 'Innovation, time-allocation and time-space packing', ibid., p. 159; Carlstein, *Time Resources, Society and Ecology.*

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4. Structure, System, Social Reproduction

Let me at this point try to ensure that the main threads of the discussion do not become too disaggregated in the reader's mind by summarizing the overall thrust of the preceding sections of the book. In structuration theory a range of dualisms or oppositions fundamental to other schools of social thought are reconceptualized as dualities. In particular, the dualism of the 'individual' and 'society' is reconceptualized as the duality of agency and structure. Thus far I have concentrated mainly upon developing a series of concepts which serve to elucidate what the 'individual' is as a reflexive agent, connecting reflexivity with positioning and co-presence. The discussion of regionalization, however, begins to point the way towards showing how these concerns intersect with the study of social systems stretched across large spans of time-space. The next step, therefore, is to look in more detail at the concept of society, taken by many to be the main unit of analysis in the social sciences. The term needs to be examined carefully, and I shall propose that some usages are best avoided altogether.

In certain traditions of social theory the concept of society is characteristically linked in a direct way with that of constraint. The advocates of structural sociology have, in fact, tended to regard constraint as in some way the defining characteristic of social phenomena. In rejecting such a view, I shall try to clarify the contention that the structural properties of social systems are both enabling and constraining, and shall specify how 'structural constraint' should be understood. This in turn involves indicating how a number of concepts associated with that of 'structure' might best be formulated. Such a formulation cannot be

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developed wholly on a conceptual level, however. Just as I gave some substance to the discussion of agency and self in the shape of an account of motivation, so I shall introduce a classification and interpretation of societal types to give flesh to the analysis of structural properties. This will in turn lead back again to questions of 'history', which will prepare the way for a consideration of problems of analysing social change in the following chapter.

A book has a sequential form, which can be overcome to some degree by 'circulating in and out' of a range of connected issues but which inevitably has its own presentational spacing. In the light of my discussion in chapter 11 take it that, while the sections on the agent and upon co-presence precede in the text those on larger social systems, it will not be presumed that I am conceptually 'starting with the individual', or that I hold that individuals are real in some way in which societies are not. I do not accept any such views, as the Critical Notes appended to this chapter should make clear.

Societies, Social Systems

It is easy to see that in ordinary usage the term 'society' has two main senses (among others, such as 'society' in the sense of 'high society'). One is the generalized connotation of 'social association' or interaction; the other is the sense in which 'a society' is a unity, having boundaries which mark it off from other, surrounding societies. The ambiguity of the term in respect of these two senses is less unfortunate than it looks. For societal totalities by no means always have clearly demarcated boundaries, although they are typically associated with definite forms of locale. The tendency to suppose that societies, as social wholes, are easily definable units of study has been influenced by several noxious presumptions in the social sciences. One is the tendency to understand 'social systems' in close conceptual relation to biological systems, the bodies of biological organisms. There are few today who, as Durkheim, Spencer and many others in nineteenth-century social thought were prone to do, use direct organic analogies in describing social systems. But implicit parallels remain very common, even among those, for instance, who talk of societies as 'open systems'. A second factor is the prevalence of what I call 'endogenous' or 'unfolding models' in

the social sciences.'* Such models presume that the main structural features of a society, governing both stability and change, are internal to that society. It is fairly evident why this is frequently connected to the first type of view: societies are imagined to have properties analogous to those which control the form and development of an organism. Finally one should mention the widespread proclivity to generalize to all forms of societal totality features that are in fact specific to modern societies as nation-states. Nation-states have clearly and precisely delimited territorial boundaries, but other types of society, by far the more numerous in history, do not.'

Resisting these presumptions can be facilitated if we recognize that societal totalities are found only within the context of *intersocietal systems* distributed along *time-space edges* (see pp. 244-6). All societies both are social systems and at the same time are constituted by the intersection of multiple social systems. Such multiple systems may be wholly 'internal' to societies, or they may cross-cut the 'inside' and the 'outside', forming a diversity of possible modes of connection between societal totalities and intersocietal systems. Intersocietal systems are not cut of whole cloth and characteristically involve forms of relation between societies of differing types. All these can be studied as systems of domination in terms of relations of autonomy and dependence which pertain between them. 'Time-space edges' refer to inter-connections, and differentials of power, found between different societal types comprising intersocietal systems.

'Societies' then, in sum, are social systems which 'stand out' in bas-relief from a background of a range of other systemic relationships in which they are embedded. They stand out because definite structural principles serve to produce a specifiable overall 'clustering of institutions' across time and space. Such a clustering is the first and most basic identifying feature of a society, but others also have to be noted.' These include:

(1) An association between the social system and a specific locale or territory. The locales occupied by societies are not

necessarily fixed areas. Nomadic societies roam across time-space paths of varying types.

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*References may be found on pp. 221-4.

(2) The existence of normative elements that involve laying claim to the legitimate occupation of the locale. The modes and styles of such claims to legitimacy, of course, may be of many kinds and may be contested to greater or lesser degree.

(3) The prevalence, among the members of the society, of feelings that they have some sort of common identity, however that might be expressed or revealed. Such feelings may be manifest in both practical and discursive consciousness and do not presume a 'value consensus'. Individuals may be aware of belonging to a definite collectivity without agreeing that this is necessarily right and proper.

It is important here to re-emphasize that the term 'social system' should not be understood to designate only clusters of social relations whose boundaries are clearly set off from others. The degree of 'systemness' is very variable. 'Social system' has tended to he a favoured term of functionalists, who have rarely abandoned organic analogies altogether, and of 'system theorists', who have had in mind either physical systems or, once more, some kinds of biological formation. I take it to be one of the main features of structuration theory that the extension and 'closure' of societies across space and time is regarded as problematic.

The tendency to take nation-states as 'typical' forms of society, by reference to which others can be assessed, is so strong in the literature of social theory that it is worth developing the point. The three criteria mentioned above apply differentially in varying societal contexts. Consider, for instance, traditional China at a relatively late date, about AD 1700. It is common amongst Sinologists to speak of 'Chinese society' at this period. Under this label

scholars discuss such phenomena as state institutions, the gentry, economic units, family patterns and so on, regarding these as convergent with a specifiable overall social system, 'China'. But 'China' as designated in this way refers to only a small segment of the territory that a government official would have regarded as the land of the Chinese. According to his perspective, only one society existed on earth, centred upon 'China' as the capital of cultural and political life but stretching away to include a diversity of barbarians on the outer edges. Although the latter acted as though they were social groupings distinct from the Chinese, they were regarded in the official view

as belonging to China. The Chinese of 1700 included Tibet, Burma and Korea within their concept of 'China', as these were in certain ways connected with the centre. There is some basis for the more restricted notion of 'China' espoused by Western historians and social scientists. But even acceptance that there was a distinct 'Chinese society' in 1700, separate from Tibet, etc., usually means including under that designation several million ethnically distinct groups in South China. These tribes regarded themselves as independent and as having their own organs of government. They were, however, continuously molested by representatives of Chinese officialdom, who treated them as belonging to the central state.

Modern Western nation-states are highly internally co-ordinated administrative unities compared with larger-scale agrarian societies. Let us shift the example somewhat further back, to fifth-century China, and ask what social ties might exist between a Chinese peasant farmer in Ho-nan province and the T'o-pa ruling class. From the point of view of the members of the dominant class, the farmer was at the lowest level of the hierarchical order. But the social relations of the farmer were quite discrete from the social world of the Yo-pa. Most of the farmer's contacts would be with others in the nuclear and extended family: many villages were composed only of lineage members. The fields were usually so arranged that members of lineage groups rarely met anyone other than kin in the course of the working day. The farmer would have visited neighbouring villages only on two or three occasions in the year, and perhaps a local town as infrequently. In the marketplace of a nearby village or town he would have encountered other classes or ranks of people - craftsmen, artisans, traders, and a low-ranking official of the state administration, to whom he would pay taxes. Over his lifetime he would in all probability never see a T'o-pa. Local officials who visited the village would have to be given deliveries of grain or cloth. But the villager would probably avoid any other contacts with higher officialdom if they were ever imminent. For they could potentially mean brushes with the courts, imprisonment or enforced military service.

The borders recognized by the T'o-pa administration would not have coincided with the span of activities of the farmer if he were in certain areas in Ho-nan. Throughout the T'o-pa period many farmers had sustained contacts with members of their clan

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groups living on the other side of the border, in the southern states. A farmer who did not have such contacts would none the less have treated someone from beyond the border as a member of his own people rather than as a foreigner from another state. Suppose, however, he encountered someone from Kan-su province, in the north-west of the T'o-pa state. Such a person would have been treated as a complete stranger, even if that individual were working alongside him in the fields. The stranger would have spoken a different language (probably a Mongolian or Tibetan dialect), dressed differently and practised different customs. Neither the farmer nor the visitor may have been aware that they were both 'citizens' of the T'o-pa empire.

The Buddhist priests of the time were a different matter again. But with the exception of a small minority who were directly appointed by T'o-pa gentry to serve in their official temples, they also had little contact with the dominant class. Their locale, in which their lives were concentrated, was the monastery, but they had networks of social relationships which ranged from Central Asia to the south of China and Korea. The monasteries contained people of quite different ethnic and linguistic origin, brought together by their common religious pursuits. Their scholarship distinguished them from other social groupings. They travelled across state frontiers without restriction, regardless of those to whom they were nominally 'subject'. They were not, however, regarded as 'outside' Chinese society, as was the Arab community in Canton of the T'ang period. The state administration treated that community in some ways as belonging within its jurisdiction, requiring taxes from them and setting up special offices to deal with them. But it was also recognized that they belonged to a separate social order and therefore were not on a par with others within the realm of the state. One final example:

In the nineteenth century we find in Yun-nan province a political rule of a bureaucracy which was controlled by Peking and represented the 'Chinese' government; there were villages and cities in the plains, inhabited by other Chinese who interacted with the government representatives and to some degree identified with that government. But on the slopes of the mountains there were other groups, in theory also subjects of China, yet living their own life, as far as they were allowed, and having their own values and institutions, even their own economic system. Interaction with the

valley-living Chinese was minimal and restricted to the sale of firewood and buying of salt or textiles. Finally, there was often a third group on the top of the mountains, again with its own institutions, language, values, religion. We can, if we like, bypass such conditions by calling these people 'minorities'. Yet the earlier the periods we study, the more such apparent minorities were truly self-contained societies, linked sometimes loosely by economic ties, and by occasional interaction; the relationship of such a society to the ruling power was typically that of subject to conqueror at the end of a war, with contacts held to a minimum from both sides.'

In thinking of units larger than imperial states, we have to avoid the tumble into ethnocentrism which it is so easy to make. We are prone today to speak readily of 'Europe' as a distinct sociopolitical entity, for example, but this is often a result of reading history backwards. As many historians interested in perspectives wider than those concentrated within nations or even 'continents' have pointed out, if the complex of societies stretching across Afro-Eurasia were to be divided into two, a cleavage between Europe as one portion (the 'West') and the rest as the 'East' would not make much sense. The Mediterranean Basin, for instance, was an historical unity both before the Roman Empire and for hundreds of years subsequently. India marked a greater cultural disjunction, travelling eastwards, than did the various Mid-Eastern lands with those bordering in 'Europe'; and there was yet greater discontinuity with China. As one historian has laconically expressed it, 'The Himalayas were more effective even than the Hindu-Kush.'5 The differences between major 'culture areas' were often not much less marked than those between the units we would ordinarily recognize as 'societies'. Regionalization of wide scope should not be treated as composed simply of aggregate relations between 'societies'. Such a view has some validity when applied to the modern world of internally centralized nation-states but not when speaking of previous eras. Thus, for some purposes, the whole Afro-Eurasian zone can be treated as a unity. 'Civilization', from 6000 BC onwards, did not develop just as the creation of divergent centres; it was in some

ways a continuous expansion 'outwards' of the Afro-Eurasian zone as a whole.'

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Structure and Constraint: Durkheim and Others

Most forms of structural sociology, from Durkheim onwards, have been inspired by the idea that structural properties of society form constraining influences over action. In contrast to this view, structuration theory is based on the proposition that structure is always both enabling and constraining, in virtue of the inherent relation between structure and agency (and agency and power). All well and good, a critic may say - and some indeed have said 7 - but does not this conception in fact sacrifice anything akin to structural 'constraint' in Durkheim's sense? Does not speaking of structure as both constraining and enabling pay only lip service to the former? For in structuration theory 'structure' is defined as rules and resources. It is perhaps easy to see how structure in this sense is implicated in the generation of action but not so apparent where constraint enters in. For there seems to be no way in which the 'externality' of social phenomena to individual activity is sustained. Such a notion must be defended, it might be suggested, whatever the flaws in the writings of those mainly responsible for advocating it. Thus Carlstein remarks:

> a major drawback in Giddens's paradigm is that the *enabling* aspects of structure are not sufficiently balanced by *constraining* ones. There are too few principles of limitation, and by this I do not simply mean the moral-legal-normative social constraints emphasized by Durkheim and Parsons, i.e. structures of legitimation. I am referring to *basic constraints of mediation and resource limitation* rooted in certain biotic-cum-physical realities of existence. Surely, structure must also imply limits to variation and to contingency in social systems (socio-environmental systems). Of course there is room for variation and human creativity. History has proven over and over again how the application of ideas and inventions in all

realms of practice alters the received structure. But the latter is heavily biased towards the past, and imposes hard screening on things that are produced and reproduced .... I shall argue here, however, that the theory of structuration in no way minimizes the significance of the constraining aspects of structure. But 'constraint' as discussed in structural sociology tends to have several senses (Durkheim's terminology, for what it

is worth, actually oscillated between the terms *'contrainte'* and *'coercition');* and 'constraint' cannot be taken as a uniquely defining quality of 'structure'.

In structuration theory structure has always to be conceived of as a property of social systems, 'carried' in reproduced practices embedded in time and space. Social systems are organized hierarchically and laterally within societal totalities, the institutions of which form 'articulated ensembles'. If this point is ignored, the notion of 'structure' in the theory of structuration appears more idiosyncratic than it really is. One of the circumstances which Durkheim usually associates with constraint (also hinted at in the quotation from Carlstein) depends upon the observation that the *ion gue durée* of institutions both pre-exists and outlasts the lives of individuals born into a particular society. This is not only wholly compatible with structuration theory but is also inherent in its very formulation - although the 'socialization' of the individual into society should be understood as involving mutual time process, connecting the 'life-cycles' of both infant and parental figures. In his earlier writings Durkheim heavily emphasized the constraining elements of socialization, but later he in fact came to see more and more clearly that socialization fuses constraint and enablement. This is easily demonstrated in the instance of learning a first language. No one 'chooses' his or her native language, although learning to speak it involves definite elements of compliance. Since any language constrains thought (and action) in the sense that it presumes a range of framed, rule-governed properties, the process of language learning sets certain limits to cognition and activity. But by the very same token the learning of a language greatly expands the cognitive and practical capacities of the individual.

A second context in which Durkheim tends to speak of constraint also offers no logical difficulties for structuration theory. However, we have to be careful to avoid some of the dilemmas to which Durkheim's own analyses at this point give rise. Societal totalities, Durkheim points out, not only pre-exist and post-date the lives of the individuals who reproduce them in their activities; they also stretch across space and time away from any particular agent

considered singly. In this sense the structural properties of social systems are certainly exterior to the activities of 'the individual'. In structuration theory the essentials of this

point can be put as follows. Human societies, or social systems, would plainly not exist without human agency. But it is not the case that actors create social systems: they reproduce or transform them, remaking what is already made in the continuity of praxis.9 The span of time-space distanciation is relevant here. In general (although certainly not universally) it is true that the greater the time-space distanciation of social systems - the more their institutions bite into time and space - the more resistant they are to manipulation or change by any individual agent. This meaning of constraint is also coupled to enablement. Time-space distanciation closes off some possibilities of human experience at the same time as it opens up others.

Durkheim's own formulation of this issue, however, is wanting, because it is couched in the terminology of what has come to be called by many writers 'emergent properties'. Thus Durkheim remarks:

The hardness of bronze lies neither in the copper, nor in the tin, nor in the lead which have been used to form it, which are all soft and malleable bodies. The hardness arises from the mixing of them. The liquidity of water, its sustaining and other properties, are not in the two gases of which it is composed, but in the complex substance which they form by coming together. Let us apply this principle to sociology. If, as is granted to us, this synthesis *sui generic,* which constitutes every society, gives rise to new phenomena, different from those which occur in consciousnesses in isolation, one is forced to admit that these specific facts reside in the society itself that produces them and not in its parts -namely its members. In this sense therefore they lie outside the consciousness of individuals as such, in the same way as the distinctive features

of life lie outside the chemical substances that make up a living organism."

I have quoted this passage at some length just because it is so well-known and has been referred to so often as a particularly persuasive formulation. Social systems do have structural properties that cannot be described in terms of concepts referring to the consciousness of agents. But human actors, as recognizable 'competent agents', do not exist in separation from one another as copper, tin and lead do. They do not come together *ex nihilo to form a new entity by their fusion or association. Durkheim*

here confuses a hypothetical conception of individuals in a state of nature (untainted by association with others) and real processes of social reproduction.

A third circumstance in which 'constraint' appears in Durkheim's writings is in juxtaposition to the scope of action of the agent. Durkheim gives the following among other examples:

When I perform my duties as brother, husband, or citizen, and

carry out the commitments I have entered into, I fulfil obligations which are defined in law and custom which are external to myself and my actions. Even if they conform to my own sentiments and I feel their reality within me, that reality does not cease to be

objective, for it is not I who have prescribed those duties .... The point here is that 'social facts' have properties that confront each single individual as 'objective' features which limit that individual's scope of action. They are not just external but also externally defined, incorporated in what others do or in what they consider right and proper to do.

There is surely something correct about this claim, but Durkheim was prevented from spelling it out satisfactorily because of ambiguities about the notion of externality. In linking externality and constraint, especially in his earlier writings, he wanted to reinforce a naturalistic conception of social science. In other words, he wanted to find support for the idea that there are discernible aspects of social life governed by forces akin to those operative in the material world. Of course, 'society' is manifestly not external to individual actors in exactly the same sense as the surrounding environment is external to them. The parallel thus turns out to be at best a loose one, and a concern with it rests uneasily in Durkheim's later work alongside a recognition that the 'facticity' of the social world is in certain basic respects a very different phenomenon from the 'giveness' of nature.

Durkheim concentrated mostly upon social constraints in his various discussions of the nature of sociology. However, as Caristein quite rightly points out and as I have accentuated earlier, drawing upon the time-geography of which he himself is an expositor - fundamental constraints upon action are associated with the causal influences of the body and the material world. I have already indicated that these are regarded as of essential importance in structuration theory. Capability and

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coupling constraints, within definite material settings, do indeed 'screen' (as he puts it) the possible forms of activity in which human beings engage. But these phenomena are also at the same time enabling features of action. Moreover, as I have pointed out, there are major shortcomings in the usual formulations of timegeography.

The above aspects of constraint/enablement are not the same as, and are not to be reduced to, the operations of power in social life. Durkheim's sociology, in fact, may be seen as irremediably flawed in respect of the absence of a conception of power distinguished from the generalized constraining properties of 'social facts'. Consider one final celebrated passage from Durkheim. Constraint, he says, is

> intrinsically a characteristic of [social] facts .... the proof of this is that it asserts itself as soon as I try to resist. If l attempt to violate the rules of law, they react against me so as to forestall my action, if there is still time. Alternatively, they annul it or make my action conform to the norm if it is already accomplished but capable of being reversed; or they cause me to pay the penalty for it if it is irreparable . . . . In other cases the constraint is less violent; nevertheless, it does not cease to exist. If I do not conform to ordinary conventions, if in my mode of dress I pay no heed to what is customary in my country and in my social class, the laughter I provoke, the social distance at which I am kept, produce, although in a more mitigated form, the same results as any real penalty."

Constraint here refers to the structuration of social systems as forms of asymmetrical power, in conjunction with which a range of normative sanctions may be deployed against those whose conduct is condemned, or disapproved of, by others. As Durkheim's statement indicates, the constraints generated by different types of resource may range from naked physical coercion to much more subtle ways of producing compliance. But it does no good at all to collapse this meaning of constraint into the others. Moreover, as I have strongly underlined, power is never merely a constraint but is at the very origin of the capabilities of agents to bring about intended outcomes of action. Each of the various forms of constraint are thus also, in varying ways, forms of enablement. They serve to open up certain possibilities of action at the same time as they restrict or deny

others. It is important to emphasize this point because it shows that those, (including Durkheim and many others) who have hoped to find a distinctive identity for 'sociology' in the identification of structural constraint are embarked on a vain enterprise. Explicitly or otherwise, such authors have tended to see in structural constraint a source of causation more or less equivalent to the operation of impersonal causal forces in nature. The range of 'free action' which agents have is restricted, as it were, by external forces that set strict limits to what they can achieve. The more that structural constraint is associated with a natural science model, paradoxically, the freer the agent appears - within whatever scope for individual action is left by the operation of constraint. The structural properties of social systems, in other words, are like the walls of a room from which an individual cannot escape but inside which he or she is able to move around at whim. Structuration theory replaces this view with one which holds that structure is implicated in that very 'freedom of action' which is treated as a residual and unexplicated category in the various forms of 'structural sociology'.

Three Senses of 'Constraint'

Let me first of all consider the meaning of constraint in respect of material constraint and constraint associated with sanctions, then move to structural constraint. What is constraint when we speak of the constraining aspects of the body and its location in contexts of the material world? It evidently refers here to limits which the physical capacities of the human body, plus relevant features of the physical environment, place upon the feasible options open to agents. The indivisibility of the body, finitude of the life span and 'packing' difficulties in time-space emphasized by Hagerstrand are all examples of such limits. The sensory and communicative capabilities of the human body are others. We are so used to treating these as enabling qualities that it is necessary to make something of a conceptual switch to stress that they are constraining also. Of course, these constraints are not wholly 'given', once and for all; the invention of electronic communication, for example, has altered the pre-existing relation between presence and the sensory media of the

body. Alone among the categories mentioned above, constraint in this sense does not

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derive from the impact which the activities or social ties of actors have upon those of other actors. Physical capability and coupling constraints are limits to the feasible social lives that people can lead.

The time-geographic approach of beginning social analysis from identifying physical constraints is surely useful if certain qualifications are borne in mind. One, as I have said, is that the physical properties of the body and its material milieux of action are enabling as well as constraining, and these two aspects have to be studied together. Another is that the identification of physical constraints provides no particular fuel to defend a materialist interpretation of social life. All human beings have to cope with the constraints of the body, its media of mobility and communication. But it does not follow that the modes of coping with such constraints have somehow a more fundamental influence over social activity than do other types of constraint.

Turning to power as a source of constraint, again it needs to be stressed that power is the means of getting things done, very definitely enablement as well as constraint. The constraining aspects of power are experienced as *sanctions* of various kinds, ranging from the direct application of force or violence, or the threat of such application, to the mild expression of disapproval. Sanctions only very rarely take the shape of compulsion which those who experience them are wholly incapable of resisting, and even this can happen only for a brief moment, as when one person is physically rendered helpless by another or others. All other sanctions, no matter how oppressive and comprehensive they may be, demand some kind of acquiescence from those subject to them - which is the reason for the more or less universal purview of the dialectic of control. This is familiar enough ground. Even the threat of death carries no weight unless it is the case that the individual so threatened in some way values life. To say that an individual 'had no choice but to act in such and such a way', in a situation of this

sort evidently means 'Given his/her desire not to die, the only alternative open was to act in the way he or she did.' Of course, where the threat offered by a sanction is not as lethal, compliance may depend more on mechanisms of conscience than on fear of any sanction -something, in fact, upon which Durkheim laid considerable emphasis in talking of 'moral sanctions'. In the case of sanctions

there are obviously major asymmetries in the constraint/enablement relation. One person's constraint is another's enabling. However, as critiques of zero-sum theories of power have shown, such asymmetries by no means exhaust the scope of the concept of power.

We should bear in mind both the rather vague sense which terms like 'acquiescence' or 'compliance' tend to have, and the fact that by no means all 'acquiescence' in a given set of power relations is directly motivated. To acquiesce in a particular course of action might be thought to suggest conscious acceptance of that course of action and even 'voluntary' acceptance of the broader power relations in which it is enmeshed. Understood in such a fashion, acquiescence would cover only a small and relatively marginal proportion of instances in which the conduct of one actor or aggregate of actors conforms to what others want, or what is in their interests. Sanctions are usually very 'visible' only where some sort of designated transgression actually occurs or is perceived as likely to occur. Power relations are often most profoundly embedded in modes of conduct which are taken for granted by those who follow them, most especially in routinized behaviour, which is only diffusely motivated.

Material constraint

Constraint deriving from the character of the material world and from the physical qualities of the body

(Negative) sanction

Constraint deriving from punitive responses on the part of some agents towards others

Structural constraint

Constraint deriving from the contextuality of action, i.e., from the 'given' character of structural properties vis-,i-vis situated actors

What, then, of structural constraint? Once constraint deriving from sanctions is separated off, Durkheim's other points collapse into one if scrutinized at all closely. To say that society pre-exists the lives of each of its individual members at any given moment is only to identify a source of constraint in so far as its pre-existence in some way limits possibilities open to them. To emphasize that individuals are contextually situated within social relations of greater or lesser span is similarly only to identify a source of constraint if it is shown how this limits their capabilities. In each case constraint stems from the 'objective' existence of structural properties that the individual agent is unable to change. As with the constraining qualities of sanctions, it is best described as

placing limits upon the range of options open to an actor, or plurality of actors, in a given circumstance or type of circumstance.

Take the example given by Durkheim, that of the enactment of contractual obligations, or one particular type of contract, the labour contract. Contract, of course, involves strongly defined legal sanctions, but let us conceptually filter them out. The contractual relations of modern industry face the individual with a set of circumstances which limit available options of action. Marx says that workers 'must sell themselves' - or, more accurately, their labour power - to employers. The 'must' in the phrase expresses a constraint which derives from the institutional order of modern capitalist enterprise that the worker faces. There is only one course of action open to the worker who has been rendered propertyless - to sell his or her labour power to the capitalist. That is to say, there is only one feasible option, given that the worker has the motivation to wish to survive. The 'option' in question could be treated as a single one or as a multiple set of possibilities. That is to say, a worker may have a choice of more than one job opening in the labour market. Marx's point, however, is that these options effectively are of a single type. In respect of the rewards they offer to the worker, and of other features of the worker-employer relationship, all wage labour is effectively the same - and supposedly becomes even more so with the further development of capitalism.

All structural properties of social systems have a similar 'objectivity' vis-cl-vis the individual agent. How far these are constraining qualities varies according to the context and nature of any given sequence of action or strip of interaction. In other words, the feasible options open to agents may be greater than in the case of the labour contract example. Let me reaffirm once more the theorem that all structural properties of social systems are enabling as well as constraining. The conditions of the capitalist labour contract may heavily favour employers as compared with workers. But once they have become propertyless, workers are dependent upon the resources that employers provide. Both sides derive their livelihood from the capital/wagelabour relation, heavily asymmetrical though it may be.

This analysis does not invalidate the sorts of claim that social scientists or historians make when they talk of 'social forces' without reference to agents' reasons or intentions. In institutional

analysis it is permissible to establish regularized connections which are set out in an 'impersonal' manner. Suppose, by way of illustration, we isolate a relation between technological change and patterns of managerial organization in business firms. The expanding use of microchip technology, let us say, might be shown to be associated with a partial dissolution of more rigid forms of hierarchical authority. The 'social force' involved here is not like a force of nature. Causal generalizations in the social sciences always presume a typical 'mix' of intended and unintended consequence of action, on the basis of the rationalization of conduct, whether 'carried' on the level of discursive or of practical consciousness. Technological change is not something that occurs independently of the uses to which agents put technology, the characteristic modes of innovation, etc. It is odd that many structural sociologists who are perfectly able to accept this - that technology does not change in and of itself (how could it?) - do not seem to see that exactly the same applies to the social forces linking technological change with such a phenomenon as managerial hierarchies. Somehow, whether mainly as a result of conscious planning or in a fashion more or less completely unintended by any of those involved, actors modify their conduct and that of others in such a way as to reshape modes of authority relations - presuming that the connection is indeed a genuinely causal one.

Why is it that some social forces have an apparently 'inevitable' look to them? It is because in such instances there are few options open to the actors in question, given that they behave rationally - 'rationally' in this case meaning effectively aligning motives with the end-result of whatever conduct is involved. That is to say, the actors have 'good reasons' for what they do, reasons which the structural sociologist is likely to assume implicitly rather than explicitly attributing to those actors. Since such good reasons involve a choice from very limited feasible alternatives, their conduct may appear to be driven by some implacable force similar to a physical force. There are many social forces that actors, in a meaningful sense of that phrase, are 'unable to resist'. That is to say, they cannot do anything about them. But 'cannot' here means that they are unable to do anything other than conform to whatever the

trends in question are, given the motives or goals which underlie their action.

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I take it as one of the main implications of the foregoing points that there is no such entity as a distinctive type of 'structural explanation' in the social sciences; all explanations will involve at least implicit reference both to the purposive, reasoning behaviour of agents and to its intersection with constraining and enabling features of the social and material contexts of that behaviour. Two qualifications require to be added to this observation, one to do with the historically shifting character of constraint, the other associated with the phenomenon of reification.

Constraint and Reification

The nature of constraint is historically variable, as are the enabling qualities generated by the contextualities of human action. It is variable in relation to the material and institutional circumstances of activity, but also in relation to the forms of knowledgeability that agents possess about those circumstances. To have understood this is one of the main achievements of Marxist thought where it has not relapsed into objectivism. When it has done so, it has become methodologically just another version of a structural sociology, insensitive to the multiple meanings which constraint must be recognized as having in social analysis. Why should such insensitivity exist'? The answer, I think, is fairly clear. It is usually associated with those types of social thought which suppose that the aim of the social sciences is to uncover laws of social activity which have a status similar to that of natural scientific laws. To look for sources of 'structural constraint' is presumed to be more or less the same as looking for the law-governed conditions that put limits on the bounds of free action. This, for many writers, is exactly where 'sociology' finds its role as a distinctive endeavour among the other social sciences. But according to the view suggested here, it

produces a form of reified discourse not true to the real characteristics of human agents.

'Reification' has been understood in a variety of different ways in literature of social theory. Among those divergent uses three characteristic senses can be most commonly discerned. One is an animistic sense, where social relations become attributed with personified characteristics. A version of this is to be found in Marx's celebrated discussion of the 'fetishism of commodities', in

which he compares commodity relations to the 'mist-enveloped regions of the religious world'. Just as in religion 'the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the human race', so it is in the 'world of commodities' with the 'products of men's hands'." Another sense in which the term reification is often employed is to refer to circumstances in which social phenomena become endowed with thing-like properties which they do not in fact have. Again there is a reputable ancestry for this coinage in Marx: 'In exchange value, the social connection between persons is transformed into a relation between things .... ' Finally, 'reification' is sometimes used to designate characteristics of social theories which treat concepts as though they were the objects to which they referred, as attributing properties to those concepts.

The second of these senses is the one I shall adopt, but it is not acceptable as it stands because it implies that the quality of being 'thing-like' does not need further explication and because it does not make it clear that reification is a discursive notion. The concept should not be understood simply to refer to properties of social systems which are 'objectively given' so far as specific, situated actors are concerned. Rather, it should be seen as referring to forms of discourse which treat such properties as 'objectively given' in the same way as are natural phenomena. That is to say, reified discourse refers to the 'facticity' with which social phenomena confront individual actors in such a way as to ignore how they are produced and reproduced through human agency." Reification thus should not be interpreted to mean 'thing-like' in such a connotation; it concerns, rather, the consequences of thinking in this kind of fashion, whether such thinking is done by those who would call themselves social scientists or by lay members of society. The 'reified mode' should be considered a form or style of discourse, in which the properties of social systems are regarded as having the same fixity as that presumed in laws of nature.

The Concept of Structural Principles

The implications of the foregoing sections of this chapter can be described as follows. Structural constraint is not expressed in

terms of the implacable causal forms which structural sociologists have in mind when they emphasize so strongly the association of 'structure' with 'constraint'. Structural constraints do not operate independently of the motives and reasons that agents have for what they do. They cannot be compared with the effect of, say, an earthquake which destroys a town and its inhabitants without their in any way being able to do anything about it. The only moving objects in human social relations are individual agents, who employ resources to make things happen, intentionally or otherwise. The structural properties of social systems do not act, or 'act on', anyone like forces of nature to 'compel' him or her to behave in any particular way. (For further discussion in relation to problems of empirical research, see pp. 304-10.)

However, there is a range of further notions relevant to speaking of 'structure' in social analysis, and these require special consideration. I shall discuss them in the following order. First, how should the concept of 'structural principle' be developed? Second, what levels of abstraction can be distinguished in studying the structural properties of social systems? Third, how are diverse social systems articulated within societal totalities?

In identifying structural principles the discussion has to move back from the formal to the rather more substantive. Let me recall, to begin with, a main strand of structuration theory, introduced in the first chapter. The 'problem of order' in the theory of structuration is the problem of how it comes about that social systems 'bind' time and space, incorporating and integrating presence and absence. This in turn is closely bound up with the problematic of time-space distanciation: the 'stretching' of social

systems across time-space. Structural principles can thus be understood as the principles of organization which allow recognizably consistent forms of time-space distanciation on the basis of definite mechanisms of societal integration. Drawing upon a range of comparative and historical studies '16 I propose a threefold classification of types of society as below:

TRIBAL SOCIETY
(Oral cultures)

*Dominant l*ocale organization

Tradition'
(communal practices)
Kinship Group sanctions

Band groups or villages

(Fusion of social and system integration)